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Europe in 1914 was an armed camp held together by a complicated 
system of alli.ances. The assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir 
to the throne of Austria-Hungary, and his wife in Sarajevo on June 28, 
191L~ by a Bosnian terrorist provided the spark which ignited the flames 
of World War I a month later. For almost three years of this brutal 
European conflict the United States stood aside as a neutral. During 
that period and until the end of the war, her representatives in Europe 
were most interested and often concerned spectators to the tragic drama 
unfolding before them. 
The time span convered by this thesis extends from July 1914 to 
December of that year. During these early months of the conflict U.S. 
di.plomats, military and naval attache~ and special observers accredited 
to the belligerents armies sent numerous reports to Washington on the 
course of the war in Europe. These reports are valuable historical 
documents especially when examined in the context of the time and against 
the background of other events of the day. Not only do they provide 
interesting vignettes of the world's greatest conflict to that date, they 
also offer illuminating insights into the war as well. And they cover a 
.ride variety of subjects: diplomacy, politics, personalities, places , 
strategy , tactics, battles, weapons, naval affairs, controversies, trends, 
and estimates of current situations. 
These reports, too , varied from country to country and from 
person to person. Those from France, Germany and England, for example, 
g enerally surpassed those from Austria-Hungary and Russia. Some of 
these documents were long and rambling, others were short , concise , and 
lacked solid facts. Some were dull and common place, while others were 
alive and full of human interest . A few were inaccurate and some from 
Germany and England prejudiced. In the early period of the European 
diplomatic crisis of 1 91!~, the reports lacked critical analysis and 
suggested at times an ignorance of European affairs. 
These shortcomings stemmed from several sources. First, the 
embassies were undermanned and had difficulty giving assistance to 
numberous Americans trapped in Eur ope by the war. The workload multi-
plied when the United States undertook the responsibility of assisting 
citizens of the belligerent nations in like circumstances. Then , too, 
some representatives placed too much reliance on information supplied 
by their host nation and a few lent their ears too readily to rumor. 
But the reports improved toward the end of the year as various embassy 
staffs expanded and their personnel developed a more professional touch. 
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Almost fifty-eight years ago on 28 June, 1914, a Bosnian youth, 
a s sass inated the Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife, Sophie, 
in Sarajevo. His crime proved to be the spark that ignited the flames of 
World War I exactly one month later. When this tragic period of inter-
national anarchy ended on 11 November, 1918, ten million soldiers had 
d i ed , four empires had been destroyed and the European way of life had 
changed. 
For two years and ten months of this savage conflict the United 
States stood aside as a neutral. Her representatives and citizens abroad 
were interested and anxious spectators to the cruel drama unfolding before 
them. Some of them, such as Ambassadors Thomas Nelson Page in Rome and 
James Gerard in Berlin, later wrote books about their experiences during 
and after the war. While these books are interesting and valuable, the 
truth remains that the authors wrote them after the fact and after serious 
thought and editing. What the author is primarily concerned with in this 
study are questions of the following nature: What was the attitude of 
American representatives in Europe toward the diplomatic crisis of 1914? 
What kind of reports did they send home from day to day as the conflict 
raged irresistnbly onward, as events piled high upon events? How did they 
assess the scene of Europe in the grip of her awesome tragedy? What did 
they think about the combatants, the battles they fought, the causes of the 
conflict or its probable outcome? Did United States representatives in 
Europe provide corrrtbrt and assistance to civilians squeezed in the vise of 
1 
2 
unforseen circumstances? Were their reports accurate, revealing, pre-
judiced or objective? Did they in any way influence United States policy? 
The purpose of this thesis is to find answers to some of these questions. 
Originally the author of this study planned to cover the entire 
period of the war - 1914-1918. But this proved to be impossible because 
the amount of material available in the National Archives is so vast that 
he decided to limit his thesis to the time span from June 1914 to the end 
of that year. Then, too, the abundance of documentation on hand also 
forced him to be selective, and to concentrate his attention on the 
European phase of the problem, to the exclusion of the Middle East, Africa 
and the Far East. Within Europe itself events concerning Austria-Hungary 
and Turkey have not been covered in detail. They have been mentioned 
only briefly in order to provide connective tissue and continuity to the 
story. Thus the author has narrowed the approach of his study even within 
Europe, because he agrees with the Entente Powers that Germany was the 
muscle, heart, soul and brains of the Central Powers. 
-
CHAPrER II 
WAR EXPI.ODES OVER EUROPE 
Sunday, 28 June, 1914, was a beautiful summer day in Sarajevo, 
the capital of Austrian Bosnia. It was Vidov-Dan, the anniversary of 
the Battle of Kossovo in 1389, when the Turks defeated the Serbs and 
absorbed them into their empire. Thereafter, Vidov-Dan was a Serbian 
national holid~y. The streets of Sarajevo, however, were not decorated 
in honor of Vidov-Dan on that fateful Sunday morning. Serbian national 
holidays were not officially celebrated in the lands where the Hapsburgs 
held sway. Sarajevo showed its colors in honor of the visit of the 
heir to the throne of the Dual Monarchy, the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, 
and his consort, the Duchess Sophie of Hohenberg. 
The Archduke in his capacity as Inspector General of the Austro-
Hungarian Army had come to Bosnia to observe Army manuevers and incidentally 
show himself as heir apparent to the subjects of that restless province. 
The Duchess Sophie had journeyed to Bosnia to join her husband in a rare 
official appearance in which they could both take part. Other travelers 
also came to Sarajevo for their own purposes, directly related to the 
Visit of the Archduke. 
After a short inspection of military barracks in this Moslem-like 
city, the Archduke, his wife and their party, in six automobiles, started 
for the town hall "for a municipal welcome ". 1 The time was about 10 A.M. 
½he best account of the crimes committed at Sarajevo and their 
background has been written by Vladimir Dedijer in his book, The Road to 
~a.i evo. See also Joachim Remak, Sarajevo , and Hertha Pauli , The _  Secret 
.9.!_§_araj evo . 
3 
4 
On the way a Bosnian terrorist, "in a long black coat and a black hat ·1 
' 
t h rew a grenade at the automobile in which the Archduke, Duchess Sophie 
and General Oskar Potiorek, the Military Governor of Bosnia, were riding. 
The grenade missed and fell into the street behind the vehicle where it 
exploded . No one in the Archduke ' s automobile was injured but an aide, 
Lieutenant Colonel Erich Von Merizzi , riding in the automobile behind 
was wounded along with several bystanders. After seeing that the injured 
were taken to a hospital the procession proceeded to the town hall to 
continue the ceremonies. The mayor of Sarajevo presented a speech of 
welcome and loyalty which, needless to say, Franz Ferdinand did not accept 
with absolute sincerity. 
After the ceremonies the Archduke wanted to check on the victims 
of the grenade at the hospital. This necessitated a change in the original 
route of return. As the cavalcade went back down the Appel Quay from 
which it had come, the automobile in the lead turned off to follow the 
original plan. The Archduke's automobile started to follow but General 
Potiorek pointed out that they were going the wrong way. As the driver 
stopped the car and prepared to back up, a young Bosnian fanatic, Gavrilo 
Princip, stepped forward and fired two pistol shots. One shot pierced 
the Archduke's neck and the other struck Duchess Sophie in the abdomen. 
They both died within minutes. 
That same day the American Ambassador to Austria-Hungary , Frederic 
C. Penfield, sent the following matter-of-fact report from Vienna to the 
State Department in Washington: 
I regret to report assassination today at Sarajevo , Bosnia 
of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir apparent thrones Austria -
Hungary and his wife Duchess Hohenberg by pistol shots fired 
by a student. Archduke and wife were attending an official 
function. Austrian Emperor returns to Vienna Monday from 
Ischl. 1 
5 
The two decades preceeding the assassination at Sarajevo had seen 
Europe turn into an armed camp held together by a complicated system of 
alliances. The two principal alliance systems were the Triple Alliance 
consisting of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy, and the Triple Entente 
of France, Russia and Great Britain. 2 The two systems were fairly well 
balanced and nobody wanted a general war. During Bj_sm,~.rck 's tenure as 
Chancellor of Germany he tried to restrain Austria-Hungary from pursuing 
policies which would use the Triple Alliance for aggressive purposes. 
But without Bism~r ck 9 s deft hand at the helm of German foreign policy the 
ship of state eventually found itself on the rocks of a war not of its 
own choosing. 
Though serious problems divided the Great Powers of Europe such 
as the Anglo-German naval rivalry, French resentment over Alsace-Lorraine, 
nationalism, militarism, and economic rivalry, the fatal explosion came 
in the powderkeg of Europe, the Balkans. And it came between the two 
least restrained members of the alliance systems, Russia and Austria-
Hungary. After being frustrated in her push to the East in the Russo-
Japanese War, Russia turned once again to Europe and the Balkans. There 
she would support rising Slav nationalism as its natural protector. This 
1Penfield to State De artment 28 June 114. State Department File 
Number 8 3,0011 9. National Archives . 
2Among the best known works on the origins of World War I are, 
Sidney B. Fay, The Origins of the War 1914, Bernadotte Schmitt, The Comi_gg_ 
of the War, 1914, and Luigi Albertini's , The Origins of the War of 1914. 
A more recent contribution comes from the pen of the German historian, 
Fritz Fischer, [ermany·s _Aims in the First World war. 
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interest clashed directly with the policy of Austria-Hungary, which 
sought to hold Slav nationalism in check in order to preserve the integ-
rit y o f the Dual Empire . 
Serbia was determined to be the focus of Slav nationalism and 
build a greater Serbian state, at the expense of Turkey and Austria-
Hungary. Serbian outrage knew no limits when the Austro-Hungarian Empire 
in 1908 formally annexed the two nominally Turkish provinces of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, which it had occupied and administered since the Congress 
of Berlin in 1878. 1 Serbia had marked these two areas, especially Bosnia, 
for her own as a part of a greater Serbia. The iron was driven deeper 
into Serbia when af'ter the successful conclusion of the Second Balkan 
War in 1913 the London Conference of the Great Powers informed the Serbs 
that they must evacuate Albanian territory. They hesitated in their com-
pliance but were forced out when Austria sent them an ultimatum on October 
18, 1913. 
In both instances Russia wished to back Serbia but could not 
e ffectively come to her aid because in 1908 Russia had not sufficiently 
recovered from the Russo -Japanese War and in 1913 the other Great Powers 
agreed with Austria-Hungary. Two significant aspects of these clashes 
between Serbia and the Austro-Hungarian Empire stand out . One was that 
Germany stood firmly behind her ally both times. Another was that in 
the Albanian Crisis of 1913 an: ultimatum and the threat of armed force 
had caused the Serbians to act in accordance with Austria-Hungary ' s 
wishes after Serbia had ignored the dictates of the London Conference. 
~he best book on this subject is Bernadotte Schmitt ' s, The 
Annexation of Bosnia. 
7 
This experience no doubt influenced in part Austro-Hungarian action in 
the crisis of 1914. 1 
It was not immediately evident what was going to be the result 
of the incident at Sarajevo. The Austro-Hungarian Government began an 
investigation of the assassination to determine who was responsible. 
Actually, there was little doubt in the minds of the Foreign Minister, 
Count Leopold Von Berchtold, and the Austro-Hungarian Chief of Staff, 
General Conrad Von Hoetzendorf. They were convinced Serbia was responsi-
b l e and were determined that the opportunity to settle accounts once and 
for all should not be missed. First the support of the Germans had to 
be secured and the reluctance to use force expressed by the Emperor Franz 
J oseph and the Hungarian Prime Minister, Count Stephen Tisza had to be 
overcome . All of this took time. While Europe waited the press of 
Serbia and Austria-Hungary inflamed public opinion in their respective 
countries : By 23 July the conditions for action had been met and Austria-
Hungary presented a strong ultimatum to Serbia with a forty-eight hour 
time limit to run out at 6 P.M. on the evening of the 25th. 
Austrian l eaders deliberately framed the ultimatum to secure 
Serbia's rejection of the document and to provide the necessary excuse 
for war. 2 As expected the Serbian reply presented to Austria-Hungary 
was considered unsatisfactory and diplomatic relations between the two 
countries were severed on the 25th.3 The Serbs knew what was coming 
from the tone of the ultimatum and ordered full mobilization three hours 
1pay, The Origi.~of World War I, Vol. 1, p. 475, 
2
~., Vol. II, p. 273. 
3
~., p. 349. 
~ 
I 
before they presented their answer to the Austro-Hungarian Government. 
Thus Serbia was the first country to order full mobilization in 1914. 
8 
The Austro-Hungarians ordered partial mobilization against Serbia 
on the evening of the 25th. They hoped that by not mobilizing against 
Rus sia on their common frontier in Galicia, Russia in turn would not move. 
I n this hope Austria-Hungary was to be sadly disappointed . So Germany's 
ally to the south became the first major power to order partial mobiliza-
t j_on in Europe's mad rush toward armed conflict . 
United States diplomatJ.c representatives in the European capitals 
watched the war clouds gather and reported the changing situation to 
Washington. Ambassador James w. Gerard in Berlin was a 47 year-old former 
jurist on the New York State Supreme Court. President Woodrow Wilson had 
appointed him Ambassador to Germany in 1913 and he would hold that post 
until Germany and the United States broke relations in 1917, Upon his 
return to the United States, Gerard wrote two books based on his wartime 
experiences in Germany, My Four Years in Germany and Face to Face with 
Kaiserism. 
He generally viewed events through eyes and a mind not favorably 
inclined toward Germany. As early as 20 July he sent a message to 
Wa shington stating that the efforts of Kaiser Wilhelm II ' s Reich to main-
tain the peace were fruitless and that a general European war was certain. 1 
Gerard did not elaborate on the sources of his information or on the 
r easoning behind his statement . The political skies over Berlin seemed 
1G~rard to State Department, 20 J uly 1914. State Department File 
Number 763,72119/3. National Archives . 
9 
to brighten briefly during the week and he reversed his initial gloomy 
pronouncement . He told Washington on the 27th that a general war did 
not look inevitable after all. 1 It would appear that he knew l:i.ttle about 
event s then taking place in Vienna. 
The United Stat es Ambass ador in the Aust rian capital was a fifty-
nine..y-ear --0ld man with an aristocratic name - Frederic Courtland Penfield. 
He was an experienced diplomat, having served in London and Cairo. Wealthy 
by marriage, Penfield was a Catholic , a good Democrat , a serious student 
of literature and world affairs and an author. 2 These attributes made 
h im a natural for the Vienna post and President Wilson had duly appointed 
him on 28 July 1913. 3 Exactly one year later he found himself at the very 
center o f t he develop ing European crisis. 
On the same day that Gerard was t elling Washington that a war did 
not l ook inevitable, Penfield, who had his eyes and ears closer to the 
scene of a ction than his colleague in Berlin, notified the State Department 
of the very oppos i t e: 
War certain and probably localized Balkans. Germany 
morally supports Austria but Italy neutral; Montenegro and 
Roumania will aid Servia; France not participate but Russian 
att i tude unknown. Vienna anxious and hoping for short con-
flict. Bourse temporaril y closed; monarchy under martial 
law. Austrian troops for days have bein moving southward. 
War loan three million crowns planned. 
1Gerard to State Department, 27 July 1914. State Department File 
Number 763.72/5. National Archives. 
2 
Present Day Egypt and East of Suez. 
3n· t · · h: 1.c 1.onar;y: of American Biograp_Y!. . Vol. VII, pp . 425 -426. 
4 - 4 Penfield t o State Department, 27 July 191 • State Department File 
Number 763,72/12. National Archives. 
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Penfield was completely correct about war being certain, Italian 
neutrality and Germany ' s support of Austria. But he was wrong on Rournania 
and his assessment of France did not conform to the facts. He also guessed 
wrong about the war being localized in the Balkans. This was certainly 
what Austria-Hungary and her German ally desired. For Germany at the 
time was urging Austria-Hungary to act quickly and present the rest of 
Europe with a~ accompli. 1 Then, too, both Germany and Austria-Hungary 
believed that Russia was not sufficiently prepared for a war and could be 
bluffed into remaining quiet by the threat of German intervention on the 
side of the Dual Monarchy, 
The Austro-Hungarian declaration of war against Serbia came on 
28 July. That same day, Penfield cabled a bare outline of developments 
to Washington: 
To end subversive intrigues issuing from Belgrade directed 
against the territorial integrity Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, 
Imperial and Royal Government July twenty-third sent to 
Royal Servian Government note in which were formulated series 
of demands, for the acception of which delay of forty eight 
hours was granted Royal Government. Servian Government not 
having replied to note in a satisfactory manner, Imperial and 
Royal Government is under necessity in protecting its rights 
and interests, of having recourse to the force of arms. 2 
The news reported by Americans from the other side of the Danube 
was sketchy. Charles J. Vopicka, United States Minister to Serbia and 
Roumania was located in Bucharest when the crisis began. He was in touch 
with the United States Consulate in Belgrade for a brief period and 
learned that there was great excitement in the Serbian capital. Later 
Vopicka lost contact with the Consulate and it was reported to him, (he 
1 
Schmitt, The Coming of the War, 1214, Vol. I, pp. 357-360. 
2
Penfield to State Department, 28 July 1914. State Department File 
Number 7b3,72;14:. National Archives. 
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does not specify the source), that the Serbian Government had retreated 
from Belgrade to the interior of the country, fearing the approach of 
Austr1· an troops. 1 Le · r.r H k 11 th U s C 1 wis w. as e , e . , onsu stationed in Belgrade, 
was in London on leave when the crisis broke and he was not able to get 
back to his consular district until the latter part of September,2 There-
fore, when war exploded over Europe in July 1914 , the United States did 
not have an official representative in Belgrade to report on the develop-
ing situation. 
As is well known the course of the crisis depended on the attitude 
of Russia. Twice before, as previously mentioned, Russia had been unable 
to come to the aid of Serbia and had to back down in the face of Austro- · 
German power. This time the Russians decided that they could not back 
down and retain any influence in the Balkans. Therefore, the belief of 
Germany and Austria-Hungary that Russia would remain inactive while Serbia 
was conquered lacked substance, 
Russia ordered partial mobilization directed against Austria-
Hungary on 29 July, thus becoming the second major power af'ter Austria-
Hungary to take such a step. In doing so, Russia nourished false hopes 
and dangerous illusions. One of these was that if Russia made no hostile 
move against Germany's frontiers then the Kaiser's armies would not be 
mobilized, What is more Russian generals opposed partial mobilization 
for technical reasons and soon set to work to persuade the Czar to order 
State De artment O Jul 114. State Department File 
National Archives. 
12 
general mobilization. In this task the Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei 
Sazonov, assisted them. The Czar finally gave in and ordered general 
1 
mobilization on 31 July. General Sergei Dobrorolski, Chief of the 
Mobilization Section of the General Staff, took the order to the Central 
Telegranh Office. His excellent description of the scene follows: 
Every operator was sitting by his instrument waiting for 
the copy of the telegram, in order to send to all the ends 
of the Russian Empire the momentous news of the calling up 
of the Russian people. A few minutes af'ter six, while ab-
solute stillness reigned in the room, all the instruments 
began at once to click. That was the beginning of the great 
epoch. 2 
Thus Russia was the first Great Power to order general mobilization 
and general mobilization meant war as every General Staff clearly under-
stood throughout Europe.3 Russia in her turn was gambling on bluffing 
Austria and hoped that Germany would not take offense. She would be 
bitterly disappointed. 
The senior United States representative in Russia at this time was 
Charles s. Wilson, the Secretary of the Embassy. He was in charge because 
the former Ambassador, Curtis Guild had come to the United States in April 
of 1913 because of illness. His health did not improve so he resigned in 
June. Henry M. Pindell was anpointed to fill the post in St. Petersburg 
on 27 January 1914, but officially declined the ambassadorship the next 
day. Accordingly President Wilson appointed George T. Marye on 9 July, 
but he did not arrive in country until 24 October 1914. 4 
lFay, The Origins of the World War, Vol. II, p. 472. Details of the 
interplay between the Czar, the Foreign Office, and the Russian General 
Staff can be found on pp. 450-473 of this study. 
2~ . , p. 473. 
3~., p. 479. 
4r.ist of U.S. Diplomatic Officers by Country 1789-1932, Vol. III. 
Nationall\rchives. 
Wilson had been in Russia since 1912 and had a good grasp of 
Russian affairs. He cabled Washington on 31 July: 
Situation steadily becoming more hopeless. Complete mobili-
zation now in progress. Whole country, all classes unanimous 
for war. Last week's serious political strikes ended. Owing 
to mobilization railways disorganized and in case of war pass -
enger service will probably be entirely suspended •.. l 
Wilson correctly assessed the situation. His comment concerning the 
curtailment of railway passenger service is significant. Of the many 
difficulties Russia would soon experience in her conduct of the war, 
insufficient transportation would be one of the most damaging. 
13 
Back in Vienna the crisis developed unfavorably as Austria-Hungary 
answered Russia's general mobilization with the same measure, On 31 
July Ambassador Penfield told the State Department: 
Emperor this afternoon orders general mobilization all 
armed forces Austria-Hungary including landstrum. (sic) 
This is extremest military muster of realm. Situation 
growing in seriousness. 2 
So Austria-Hungary was the second Great Power to order general mobiliza-
tion. 
The focus of action now shifted to Berlin. The German Government 
began to have second thoughts on whether the impending conflict could 
1nd
eed be localized between Serbia and Austria-Hungary in view of Russia's 
attitude and military preparations. Another problem bothering the Germans 
Was the British attitude. Through diplomatic channels the British made 
it clear that they were holding Germany responsible for Austria-Hungary 's 
1
Wilson to State Department , 31 July 1914. State Department File 
Number 7b3,72/44. National Archives. 
2
Penfield to State Department, 31 July 1914. State Department 




Things s eemed so bad to Ambassador Gerard on 31 July, that he 
told Washington it looked like there would be a general war after all . 2 
As events moved inexorably toward a showdown, the German Government pre-
sented Russia with an ultimatum late in the evening of the 31st demanding 
that Russia suspend her mobilization within twelve hours or face the 
same action by Germany. This of course meant war. Earlier that same 
evening another ultimatum had gone to Russia's ally, France. This 
ultimatum informed the French of the state of affairs between Russia and 
Germany and demanded to know within eighteen hours if France would remain 
neutral in the event of a Russo-German conflict,3 
The ball was now in the French court. Myron T. Herrick was the 
United States Ambassador in Paris at this time. The sixty-year old 
Herrick had been governor of Ohio from 1903 to 1905. President William 
Howard Taft had appointed him Ambassador to France in 1912 and he held 
that post until December of 1914. 4 Herrick had been preparing to turn 
over his post to a new ambassador but the State Department instructed 
him to remain in charge for the duration of the crisis, On 31 July he 
informed the State Department of the German ultimatum to France and its 
provisions. The German Ambassador, Baron Wilhelm Von Schoen, correctly 
anticipated a negative reply from the French and told Herrick that he 
understood that the German Ambassador to Washington had requested that 
1Fay, The Origins of the world War, Vol. II, P· 410. 
2 Gerard to State Department, 31 July 1914. State Department File 
Number 763 ,72/48. National Archives. 
3Fay, The Origins of the World War, Vol. II, pp. 528-529, 
4
The New Funk and Wagnalls Encyclopedia, Vol. 18 , p. 6532. 
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the United States assume responsibility for German Government property 
and interests in France. 1 Accordingly, Herrick requested instructions 
from the State Department. 
On 1 August, France gave Germany her answer: She would 11act in 
accordance with her interests''. :Anticipating that the Germans might get 
the jump on her, France ordered general mobilization about 3:45 P.M. 2 
France thus became the third Great Power to take this decisive step.3 
In the meantime the Russians refused to demobilize as Germany had 
demanded so Germany in turn ordered general mobilization a quarter of an 
hour after the French. Technically speaking Germany was the last Great 
Power in Europe to mobilize. She also made one further move by declaring 
war on Russia the evening of 1 August 1914. 4 
On 2 August then the pace of events quickened, Ambassador Herrick 
reported that hostili ties had already started on the German border but 
that neither France nor Germany apparently wanted to be the first to de -
clare war. The German Ambassador was still present in Paris and the 
French had not given him his passport, nor had he asked for it. Herrick 
provided funds to the German Ambassador to allow him to make provision 
for many of his countrymen trapped by the press of events in France.5 
1 
Herrick to State De artment, 1914. State Department File ;;.,:;;;;;......;..._;;,.,..;._~....;.;._..;.;.;.....;.....;;....;.. _______________ _ 
Number 7 3.72/40. National Archives. 
2Fay, The Origins of the World War, Vol. II, pp. 532-533. 
4Ibid., p. 533. 
5Herrick to State Department, 2 August 1914. State Department 





In Belgium public feeling was marked by uncertainty and apprehen-
sion. The situation in this little country was reported to Washington by 
Ambassador Brand Whitlock. The forty-five-year-old Whitlock was a lawyer 
by profession, an author, a former newspaper correspondent and four-time 
mayor of Toledo, Ohio. He was to be a tower of strength during the 
terrible days that were coming. 1 Whitlock reported on 2 ,August that . 
it was difficult to secure information on which to base an accurate 
estimate of the situation. The money market was seriously affected and 
there existed, he wrote; "Great financial timidity among all classes 
Which caused runs on all the banks. "2 
The United States representative to the Italian Government in 
Rome was sixty-one-year-old Thomas Nelson Page, distinguished author and 
a member of the American Academy of Arts and Letters. 3 President Wilson 
appointed him to the post at Rome in 1913 which he held until 1919. He 
wrote a book based on his experiences in Italy entitled, Italy and the 
b'._orld War, which was published in 1920. 4 
Page was absent in London when the European crisis developed so 
the early reports from Rome were dispatched by the Secretary of the 
½he New Funk and Wagnalls Encyclopedia, Vol. 36, p. 13, 154. 
2whi tlock to State Department, 2 August 1914. State Department 
File Number 763.72/55, National Archives. 
3page's works include In Ole Virginia, Two Little Confederates, 
~ Old South and Robert E. Lee, Man and Soldier. 
4irhe New Funk and Wagnalls Encyclopedia, Vol. 25, p. 9271, 
I 
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Embassy, Mr. Peter Augustus Jay. The universal impression, he told 
Washington, was that Italy would remain neutral in the upcoming conflict. 
De spite t he fact that she was a member of the Triple Alliance, memories 
of old grievances and the clash of new rivalries with Austria-Hungary 
would Prevent Italy from going to her assistance. In contrast to the 
financial situation described by Whitlock in Brussels, Jay reported that 
the Italian financial structure appeared better and stronger than that 
of any of the other European nations. 1 As he had already informed 
Washington, the Italian Government officially told Mr. Jay on 3 August 
that Italy would remain neutral. The Italian position was that her mem-
bership in the Triple Alliance was for defensive purposes only and that 
she would not support Austrian aggression in the Balkans. Then, too, 
Italy was miffed that Austria-Hungary had failed to consult with her 
before taking action in the Serbian matter. 
on 
Germany finally declared war on Fran~e/3 August. Like all of the 
Great Powers, Germany had a master strategi~ plan for a European war. 2 
This plan had been evolved by General Count Alfred Von Schlieffen who 
had been the Chief of the German General Staff from 1891 to 1906. Briefly 
the plan called for a holding action agains: the Russians in East Prussia 
while crushing France in the west. The blov against France was to be 
delivered by a huge right arm sweep across northwestern Europe, through 
the Netherlands and Belgium, passing to the west of Paris with the objective 
o f enveloping and crushing the entire French Army within a period of 
lJay to __ State Department , 2 August 1914. State Department File 
Number 763. 72111/1. National Archives. 
~he best and most recent study of German strategy toward France 
is Gerhard Ritter's volume, The Schlieffen Plan. 
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abou t two months. The sweep would pivot on the Thionville-Metz area 
While the French were fighting German forces who would be conducting a 
p lanned and deliberate withdrawal in Alsace and Lorraine. Af'ter the 
Germans def eated France t hey would turn on the Russians and defeat them. 
Schlieffen's successor, General Helmuth Von Moltke, the younger , 
made serious modifications in the plan. In the first place he eliminated 
t he invasion of t he Netherlands. He also limited the withdrawal of the 
German armies in Alsace and Lorraine more than Schlieffen had planned . 
In t he East the frontiers were to be defended instead of trading space 
for time as Schlieffen desired. 
Thus German offensive operations began in the West first and 
Belg i um would be the first country to feel the bite of the Teutonic sword, 
Bel gian neutrality was guaranteed by treaty and Belgium was determined 
to maintain it against all possible violations. As the crisis became 
wors e the Belgian Government took all military precautions short of 
mobilization. 1 
Ambassador Whitlock reported from Brussels on 3 August that German 
representatives had presented an ultimatum to the Belgian Government 
demanding passage for their troops acros s Belgium. He also noted that 
he had reliable reports that the Germans had already invaded Belgian 
t erritory and that a clash had taken place at Vise, a town north of Liege 
th lt . . 2 near e Dutch frontier , resulting in considerable casua ~es • . Later 
t hat day Whitlock sent another message to Washington which he requested 
b e held in strictest confidence. Germany, he related, was seeking to 
1s chmitt, The Coming of the War , 1914. p. 386 . 
2 
Whitlock to State Department, 3 August 191~. State Department 
File Number 763.72/77. National Archives. 
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justify her demands on Belgium by asserting that the French intended to 
violate Belgian neutrality and that military necessity dictated that 
Germany anticipate French action. Whitlock also learned that the official 
Belgian reply to Germany would be a categorical refusal of all demands. 
However, negotiations between the Belgians and the Germans continued 
largely because the Belgian Government was waiting to see what the 
attitude of the British would be to the violation of Belgian neutrality. 1 
The popular feeling among the Belgian populace was unmistakable : strongly 
anti -German. 
In the meantime Ambassador Gerard reported from Berlin that all 
foreigners, including Americans , were forbidden to leave the country 
until mobilization had been completed.
2 
In this dire state of affairs, the position of Great Britain was of 
utmost concern to Berlin, Paris and Brussels. Would the British come in 
on the side of France and Russia or would they stand aloof? The man who 
kept Washington informed on such matters during these critical days was 
Ambassador Walter Hines Page. 
Page was fifty -nine years old in 1914 and had been the United States 
Ambassador to Great Britain since 1913, He had been a partner in the 
publishing firm of Doubleday and Page , and also the founder and editor of 
a monthly magazine of general commentary . 3 Page had been a firm supporter 
of Woodrow Wilson 1s candidacy for President and his appointment followed 
\1hitlock to State De artment Au State Department 
File Number 763 . 72 99. National Archives . 
File 
3The world's work. -
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the elect1·on. In th th t Amb d e mon s o come assa or Page would also prove to 
be a firm friend of his British hosts. 1 
Page had already offered the good offices of the United States for 
mediation on 29 July to Sir Edward Grey, British Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs. He reported to Washington on the 31st that Grey had 
expressed his gratitude for the American offer and asked if a similar 
offer had been made in Vienna, St. Petersburg or Berlin. Sir Edward 
Was in a gloomy mood after the failure of his proposal for an ambassa-
dorial conference to prevent Austria-Hungary from going to war with 
Serbia. Said he to Page: "It looks as if Europe were in the clutch of 
blind forces. 112 
The situation did not improve as July faded into August. Page 
reported that comrmmication with Germany was difficult and the telephone 
to Paris was out. Many American travelers were caught by the turn of 
international events and needed assistance. More ominously, the Ambassador 
told Washington that the British Admiralty expected a general war and 
that British troops were being concentrated on the northern seacoast.3 
By 3 August the '~lind forces" that Sir Edward Grey spoke of had 
almost completed their work. The British Foreign Office informed Page 
that the Czar had given his personal assurance to the Kaiser that Russian 
½'he New Funk and Wagnalls Encyclopedia, Vol. 25, p. 9271. 
2 4 Pae to State De artment 1 Jul 1 1. 
Number 76~3~.7~1~1~9~4~.~N~a~t~i~o~n~a~l~Ar~c~h~i~v=e~s~.="'--,i;~ ..... 
State Department File 
3page to state Department, 1 August 1914. State Department File 
Number 763.72/52. National Archives. 
..._ 
21 
troops would not cross the frontier unless Russia was attacked. 
Actually 
th
ings were not that simple. As previously mentioned, the rulers and 
military staffs of Europe for years past recognized that mobilization 
meant war. When Russia failed to halt her mobilization upon Gennany's 
demand, the Germans knowing that mobilization itself was tantamount to 
an act of war responded accordingly, Page also related that the British 
Foreign Office believed that the Germans and Austro-Hungarians had de-
cided on war some time previously. The opinion in official circles in 
Great Britain was that Germany was the determined aggressor. 1 
Meanwhile the Ambassador had immediate problems of his own. The 
Embassy was overrun with crowds of Americans wanting cash for letters 
of credit and most anxious to get home. The Americans were further 
Pinched by the ordinary British bank holiday being extended three days. 
Page anticipated that the crowds and their troubles would increase as 
the crisis developed. 2 
Late on 3 August, "an army source" informed the American Ambassador 
that the British land forces were mobilizing to the last man, including 
the territorials, and that an expeditionary force would be sent to the 
Continent . Page told of "immense crowds II marching the streets near the 
'Ivar Office and the Parliament buildings, The prevailing attitude was 
that Great Britain would be at war very soon. 3 
1Pa e to state De artment Au st 1914. State Department File 
Number 7 3,72/95. National Archives. 
2Ib.d . 2 _2:_• • P• • 
3Page to State ~~artment, 3 August 1914. State Department File 





Grey informed Ambassador Page on the 4th that his Government had 
that afternoon sent an ultimatum to the German Government demanding that 
the treaty insuring the integrity of Belgium be respected and that Germany 
withdraw her demands on Belgium. The ultimatum was to expire at midnight. 
The Germans had made overtures to Great Britain to secure her neutrality, but 
the British rejected them. Grey told Page: 
All governments must rest on mutual agreements and the 
sacredness of treaties, (it) is all that separates us 
from unorganized society. England's position becomes impos-
sible if we acceed to the violation of the treaty insuring 
Belgium's neutrality. 1 
The British Ambassador in Berlin, Sir Edward Goschen, took the 
ultimatum to the German Foreign Office around seven on the evening of 
the 4th. The German Foreign Minister, Gottlieb Von Jagow, explained to 
Goschen that strategic necessity dictated the move through Belgium as 
the quickest and easiest way to get at France. Goschen then asked to 
see the Chancellor, Theobald Von Bethmann-Hollweg. The Ambassador's 
interview with the Chancellor was no more satisfactory than the previous 
interview with the Foreign Minister. Bethmann-Hollweg repeated the 
reasons given to the British previously for the violation of Belgian 
neutrality and delivered himself of the following statement: 
He said that the step taken by His Majesty ' s Government 
was terrible to a degree, just for a word 'neutrality' a 
word which in war time had so often been disregarded - just 
for a scrap of paper, Great Britain was going to make war 
on a kindred nation who desired nothing better than to be 
friends with her . 2 
1Pa e to State De artment, 4 Au State Department File 
Number 7 3. 72/130. National Archives. 
2Fay, The Origins of the World War, Vol. II, p. 545. 
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Neither Great Britain nor Germany backed down. The interview in 
the Ch ancellor's office ended and Goschen departed . The ultimatum expired 
at mi dnight of the 4th without a satisfactory German reply. So Great 
Britain and the German Empire were at war. In the early hours of 5 August 
a representative from the British Foreign Office officially notified 
Ambassador Page of this final turn of events.1 
The s cene now shifts back to the Continent where the modified 
Schlie ffen Plan was uncoiling through Belgium toward the French border. 
On the 5th Ambassador Whitlock reported to Washington that the first big 
engagement of the war had taken place at the fortress city of Liege. The 
Germans had been repulsed and Belgian morale ran high. He added that 
further engagements were expected. 2 However . high Belgian morale, some 
p eople in the Bel g ian Government had an excellent appreciation of the 
situation as it began to unfold. In a message later in the day Whitlock 
related that plans were afoot to move the seat of government from Brussels 
to Antwerp. 3 
Liege, a manufacturing city situated on both banks of the Meuse 
Riv er, lies some fifty miles to the east and slightly south of Brussels. 
It had been of strategic importance since the Medieval period. The age 
of the railroad enhanced its importance since it lay on the trunk line 
between Berlin and Paris. 4 Liege also guarded the corridor between the 
¼age to State Department, 5 August 1914. State Department File 
Number 7b3,72/114. National Archives. 
2whitlock to State De artment, State Department 
File Number 7 3. 72/173 . National Archives. 
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s and the Dutch frontier. In the first days of August, the German 
o1.·rst Army o f General Alexander Von Kluck and h r t e German Second Army of 
a l Karl Von Buelow poured down this corri·dor. cener A specially trained 
cerrnan t ask force attempted to break through the outer ring of forts on 
tbe 5th but met with unexpected resistance. It was th· is engagement t hat 
AJJlbassador Whi tlock reported to Washington. But Major General Erich 
Ludendorff soon rallied the attackers and succeeded in penetrating the 
defenses on t he night of August 5th - 6th. The Germans then brought up 
their b i g surprise, huge 42 cm. howitzers that reduced the ring of forts 
to rubble. Liege surrendered on the 16th and the Germans,safely over 
their fir st major hurdle ,now swept west and south. 
Some five thousand Germans were caught in Belgium by the sudden 
outbreak of the war. Full of fear and in many instances short of funds 
theY came to Brussels and were housed in convents and whatever other 
shelter was avai lable. Through the initiative and organization of the 
United Stat es Embassy and the good offices of the Belgian Government 
these people were fed and taken care of until transportation was arranged 
for t hem to Holland. From there they were provided transportation to 
Germany through the efforts of the United States Embassy at the Hague.
1 
such feelings of compassion and sympathy for unfortunate humanit y soon 
ranked among the early casualties ; of the war now being unleashed in its 
full fury. 
The gentleman responsible for the successful completion of the 
operation des cribed above was United States Ambassador Henry Van Dyke . 
1Whitlock to State Department, 7 August 1914. State Department File 
Number 763 . 72 / 230. National Archives. 
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A poet , a Presbyterian minister, a former professor of theology at 
Princeton University, and a widely published author Van Dyke was sixty-
two at the ti.me. He claimed among his numerous friends Mark Twain, James 
Hhi tcomb Ri ley, former President Grover Cleveland and, of course, Presi-
dent Woodrow Wilson. Van Dyke resigned his post in 1916 because he could 
not reconcile his strong feelings in favor of the Allied cause with 
being a minister to a neutral country and took a commission as a Lieuten-
ant Corn.rnander in the (:hapl.:dn Corps of the U.S. Navy .
1 
Despite the strength and speed of the German juggernaut crashing 
through Belgium, few Frenchmen seemed aware of the ordeal that awaited 
t hem. Ambassador Herrick reported from Paris on 8 August that the French 
were confident. Mobilization had come off without a hitch and they 
considered German offensive operations thus far unsuccessful. Frenchmen 
everywhere , regardless of party or place in society, were united in the 
defense of their country. 2 
In Berlin Ambassador Gerard thought that German forces might also 
invade the Netherlands. 3 van Dyke at the Hague saw a garbled version of 
Gerard's message and sent one of his own to the State Department express -
ing his disagreement. 4 Actually if Count Von Schlieffen had still been Chief 
of the German General Staff , Gerard most probably would have been right. 
1Dictionary of American Biogra.phy9 VoL Y..> PP • 186-188 . 
2
Herrick to State 8 Au State Department 
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File Number 7 3.72/255. National Archives. 
4van D ke to State De artment 10 Au ;ust 1 c14. State Department 
File Number 7 3.72/308. National Archives. 
As already mentioned, the original plan had called for the mighty right 
a rm sweep of the German armies in the West to pass through the Nether-
l ands a s well as Belgium. Moltke's elimination of the Netherlands inva-
sion was the first of several modifications he made to the grandiose plan 
o f his prede cessor. In the meantime, however, Dutch Queen Wilhelmina 
d eclared martial law in her provinces bordering on Belgium; Limburg, 
North Brabant and Zeeland . 
As the struggle continued in its early stages, the Germans still 
h ad hopes that the Belgians could be pursuaded to cease their resistance 
and allow the passage of German troops across Belgium. On 9 August 
Ambassador Whitlock notified the State Department that he had received 
a mes sage from Ambassador Van Dyke at the Hague repeating the German 
proposals made in the original ultimatum to Belgium. The only difference 
wa s that the Germans took pains to praise the Belgians for their martial 
spirit. Germany still ins isted that Belgium allow passage of her troops, 
permit her to use Liege as a base of operations, and detach herself from 
France. Whitlock asked for instructions from the State Department as to 
t he propriety of passing this proposal on to the Belgian Government. He 
pointed out that the Belgians had already flatly rejected a similar pro-
posal. Whitlock on his own initiative allowed the Belgian Foreign Minister 
a nd his advisers to take a look at Van Dyke's message. Their remarks 
concerning the proposal strongly indicated that if the United States, in 
its neutral role, presented such a document to the Belgian Government, 
the Belgians would be deeply resentful . Ambassador Gerard in Berlin 
apparently thought that it would be a good idea for Whitlock to present 
t he proposal but the weight of opinion was against him. As Ambassador 
Whitlock said , "It is not a proposal for peace but of new alliances for war. 111 
1Whitlock to st~.Q..~_p_artment, 9 August 1314. State Department 
File Number 763.727252. National Archives. 
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At the other end of the European continent German diplomacy was 
to be infinitely more successful than it had been in the West . The 
Ger mans , in the years before the outbreak of war, had developed consider-
erable influence in Turkey. When the war broke out the pro-German 
faction in the Turkish Government was not quite strong enough to bring 
Turkey in on the side of the Germans . But with time they would. 
Now it so happened that one Admiral Wilhelm Von Souchon commanded 
a German squadron operating in the Mediterranean in 1914. The squadron 
consisted of the battle cruiser Goeben and the light cruiser Bres1au. 
Souchon' s mission was to show the flag in peacetime and be prepared to 
interfere with French troop movements in case of war . He was having the 
boilers of Goeben repaired at Pola, the Austrian naval base on the 
nor·theastern coast of the Adriatic, when the news of war came. Souchon 
took his battle cruiser quickly out of Pola and through the Adriatic to 
keep the Allies from bottling him up . The Italians refused him coal at 
Brindisi and with Goeben still only partially repaired the chances of 
reaching the Atlantic were slim. The German Admiralty ordered merchant 
s hips to meet the squadron at Messina. Breslau fell in with Goeben at 
Taranto and the two ships took on coal and acquired a German merchant 
ship as a tender. 
The squadron left Messina at 1 A.M. on 3 August and steamed west 
for the French embarkation ports of Bone and Philippeville on the Algerian 
coast. The squadron bombarded these ports and then made for Messina 
again to take on more coal. The Allies planned to intercept Souchon on 
his way into the Atlantic , but Berlin gave him another mission, En route 
to carry out his bombardment orders the German AdmiraJ.ty directed Souchon 
to take his squadron to Constantinople! The Germans passed a British 
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squadron on the way back to Messina but since Germany and Great Britain 
were not as yet at war preventive action did not ensue. London ordered 
the British ships to shadow the Germans until Grey ' s ultimatum expired at 
midnight. 
As time passed, the Germans outdistanced the pursuing British 
ships and finally lost them in the darkness and fog. After coaling 
frantically at Messina from German merchant ships, Souchon set off on 
his fateful voyage. A British cruiser located him at the eastern end 
of the Straits of Messina and dogged his wake. Admiral Souchon planned 
to meet a German collier off Cape Malea in Greece. So the Germans tried 
to shake off their shadow and at one point Breslau dropped back and traded 
shots with the Britisher with no damage to ei.ther side . Finally the 
British Admiral Commanding in the Mediterranean, Sir A. Berkely Milne , 
called off the chase and Souchon was able to meet his collier in private. 
After coaling, the German squadron made for Constantinople and the Turks 
allowed them to enter the Dardanelles. 1 
The United States ambassador at Constantinople was fifty-eight-
year-old Henry Morgenthau, a lawyer by profession, whom President Wilson 
appointed in 1913,
2 
He reported the arrival of Goeben and Breslau to 
Washington on 11 August, added that ships, officers, and crew would be 
transferred to the Turkish Navy and correctly surmised that Turkey would 
soon come in on the German side . 3 Heretofore, MorGenthau had reported 
1Tuchman , The Guns of August, PP· 161-187. 
2The New F'unk and Wagnalls Encyclopedia, p. 8632. 
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on the behind-the-scenes struggle in the Turkish Government between the 
pro -Germans and those officials who wanted to wait a bit to see how the 
fight would go before committj_ng themselves . 1 
The arrival of Goeben and Breslau tipped the scales in favor 
of the pro -Germans . Thus Germany had acquired another weak ally , one 
that had recently lost two wars , but one that would be of enormous 
strategical importance to the Central Powers because of her crucial 
geographic position at the crossroads of Europe and Asia Minor . The 
belli gerent s thus far in 1914 were for the Central Powers Germany and 
Austri a -Hungary with Turkey to come in on their side in early November. 
For the Allies: France, Russia, Great Britain, Belgium , Serbia, Monte-
negro and Japan. The latter declared war on Germany on 23 August for 
the purpose of picking up German holdings in China and Germany's Pacific 
islands. 
We come now to a curious but highly interesting report on the 
events l eading t o the war in Europe. It came from Major George T. 
Langhorne, Military Attache" in the Berlin Embassy, who sent it to the 
2 War College Divisfon of the U.S. Army General Staff. Since his appoint-
ment to this post, Langhorne got along very well with his German hosts 
no doubt too well. In addition to being pro-German Langhorne tended 
to stray from military affairs into politics, diplomacy and policy-making. 
While these tendencies ultimately led to Langhorne's relief early in 1 915 , 
h is reports are valuable for the purposes of this study since they present 
the view from Berlin as seen through the eyes of an American representative, 
¾1orgenthau to State Department, 7 August 1914. State Department 
File Number 763 .72/439. National Archives. 
2Report from Langhorne dated 1 2 August 1914, subject: Notes, Army 
War Col.lege File Number 8690-15. National Archives . 
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Langhorne ' s position on the origins of the war runs as follows: 
The plot which the Serbians formulated and executed against the Archduke 
Fr a nz Ferdinand had the approval and assistance of members of the Serbian 
Government and Army. The Crown Prince of Serbia was closely conne cted 
with the plot, therefore, the Austro -Hungarian Government issued an 
u l t imatum to Serbia that was completely justified. Among the Austro-
Hungarian demands were the following: Serbia should punish the con-
s p i rators; suppress the secret societies responsible for pan-Serbian 
agitation; publish in an official paper the true story of the assassina-
t ion, and dismiss and punish the army officers implicated in the plot. 
'When Serbia refused these just demands war followed. 
Major Langhorne went on to relate that an American, not further 
identified, traveling from England through Germany told him that Russia 
was going to mobilize and this would bring about the great war that 
people had been reading about for ''forty years'! . It was impossible to 
believe that the Great Powers of Europe should go to war because of the 
actions of some assassins and hard to believe that the Allies would take 
Serbia's part in the dispute. The unnamed American said his information 
came from an unnamed Englishman, who traveled extensively in the Balkans. 
It was all a plot against Germany and Russia was behind it . 
According to Langhorne, Germany made every effort to keep the 
dispute localized between Austria-Hungary and Serbia. Russia asked 
Germany to mediate but then began to mobilize. The Kaiser requested 
the Czar to cease mobilization since this would prejudice diplomatic 
efforts. The Czar assured the Kaiser that it was only a partial mobiliza-
t ion, a precautionary measure. The Kaiser was also in touch with King 
V 
George,6f England through his brother Prince Henry of Prussia, who was 
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at that time in London. Wilhelm II earnestly tried to head off a clash 
between Russia and Austria-Hungary when the Russians announced general 
mobilization. Germany sent an ultimatum to Russia with a twelve_hour 
time limit demanding that she cease mobilizat ion, since this was a 
hostile act directed toward Germany . When it was discovered that the 
message was unclear or garbled Germany gave Russia an additional six 
hour s in which to answer, 
Langhorne ' s report continues in this vein: On 31 July Germany 
declared martial law when "everything in Germany automatically passed 
into the hands of the Army!'~l on 1 August Germany ordered general 
mobilization which began the next day. France mobilized after having 
given an unsatisfactory answer to Germany concerning the question of her 
ult imate intentions in case of a Russo-German war. England said that if 
Germany invaded Belgium she would take extreme measures. Langhorne 
added that England could have avoided the war between France and Germany. 
He did not think that France wanted to fight Germany and he was sure 
that Germany did not wish to fight France. 
Ma,jor Langhorne repeated some of these same points as he described 
the earliest days of the war as seen from the German viewpoint. Russia 
mobilized against Austria-Hungary, he reported, but he added that this 
action also threatened Germany. The latter, which had not shown the 
slightest desire to fight or to be aggressive, had to mobilize in self 
de f e nse and support Austria-Hungary. France mobilized to fulfill her 
treaty ob.ligations and offered to keep her troops six miles in back of 
1~.) p. 3. 
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the frontier but violated this proposal even before the Germans had an 
opportunity to accept it. Russian troops had already crossed the border 
in several places so Germany was attacked by two countries. 
Langhorne attended the Reichstag on the afternoon of 4 August and 
saw the unanimous vote for war credits. He noted that the peace-loving 
Social Democrats supported the Government and joined the rest of the 
house in cheering the Kaiser. Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg in a speech 
a nnounced that the French were massing troops southwest of Belgium and 
that French officers had already passed through Belgium thereby violating 
Be lgian neutrality. It was necessary for the German Army, therefore, to 
pass through the southern part of Belgium to meet the French. 1 
In Langhorne's view Germany and Austria -Hungary were fighting to 
punish assassins and suppress anarchists whereas Russia was fighting to 
protect fellow Slavs. The British thus found themselves in the position 
of aiding the cause of assassins and anarchists and fighting as an ally 
o f their true enemy, the Russians. Actually, it was all the result of 
an international plot laid by the other European powers who were envious 
of Germany and her wonderful achievements in arts, science, and industry. 
Carried away by his enthusiasm for his host country, Langhorne wrote: 
I wish that the Americans at home could see the situation 
as one sees it here in Germany. In a matter of fact as if 
going to church, the Germans have started in this war which 
is a fight for their existence as a nation and I think 
that every American if he knew the true story, would sympa-
thize with Germany.2 
On the first day of mobilization Major Langhorne went to the 
German War Office and asked if it would be possible to see the Prussian 
l~ •• p. 5. 
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war Minister, Ericlhl.Von Falkenhayn. The War Office was quiet and seemed 
to be running normally. When admitted to the presence of th· h is andsome 
General, Langhorne apologized for bothering him at such a time. But 
Von Falkenhayn replied that it was quite all r :i.[f),t since he really did 
not have much to do. The German organization was so thorough and the 
plans so complete that all that was needed was the order to go ahead 
and carry out the operation. Falkenhayn told Langhorne that Germany 
did not want to f i ght but that since France's neutrality could not be 
guaranteed and since mobilization was an act of war the German plans 
would have to be executed. 
Langhorne rapsodized further about German mobilization and des-
c ribed how the people were working together, how everything was going 
like clockwork with much enthusiasm but with little excitement. Not 
all of the men were called to the colors because the government exempted 
many to handle vital services and carry on business. Men past military 
age filled in for those who were called up. Older men, women, boys and 
gir ls rallied together to get in the harvest which was bountiful. The 
army had over a million volunteers which it could not use immediately. 
Troops left for the front in an orderly manner. 
On 9 August, Major Langhorne, by permission of General Falkenhayn, 
visited some of the railroad stations in Berlin to see the troops off. 
He described the orderly and well-planned loading of supplies, equipment 
and horses so that upon arrival at the appointed destination everything 
would be immediately ready for action. The Germans loaded officers and 
men as carefully as they did equipment and horses so that complete unit 
integrity would be maintained. 
Columns of troops in their new field grey uniforms passed through 
the streets, a battalion of infantry here a battery of artillery there. 
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Ever ywher e peopl e cheered the troops. As t hey marched along, large 
crowds f ollowed them to the station and press ed gif~s of coffee, cake, 
lemonade , sandwiches and cigars onto their heroes. The soldiers sang 
lustily a s they marched, ''Es braust ein Ruf wie Donnerhall" and "Deutsch-
land Ueber Alles 1!..; Langhorne was part i cularly impressed by the appearance 
of the German cavalry but dubious of the milit ary value of the lances 
they carried and crit ical of their carbines. He terminated his report 
by rel a ting t hat all of t he Kai ser ' s sons had gone to war. The Crown 
Prince commanded a corps, 1 Prince Eitel Friedrich commanded the Fi rst 
Regiment of the Guards, and another son went into the Navy. 
Ambas sador Gerard also had some comments regarding the German 
scene dur i ng the f irst days of the war. In a long telegram to the State 
Department dated 18 August he, like Langhorne, described the cheering 
crowds and public enthusiasm for the war. But he told too of demonstra -
tions agains t the Rus s ians and French including a mob that threatened 
the Rus s i an Ambassador and his staff with sticks on the occasion of their 
d epart ure . A mob also broke all the windows in the British Embassy 
after Britain declared war against Germany. The authorities arrested 
many Americans as Englishmen and there were complaints of mistreatment 
a t the hands of excited crowds. 2 The press did not help the situation 
b y urgi ng the public to be on the lookout for spies thus increasing the 
d anger to all fore i gners from excited Germans. 
Excitement and ugly incidents were not confined to Berlin. Gerard 
r elates in his report that the Russians sacked the German Embassy in 
1 . 
Langhorne is in error here. 
the Fi f th Army. 
Actually the Crown Prince commanded 
2Gerard to State Department, ·18 August 1914. State Depart ment 
File Number 763.72/830. National Archives . 
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St . Peter sburg and that a mob beat an employee to death. Charles Wilson 
in St . Petersburg confirmed this story. 1 
Americans were very popular with both the German Government and 
the public . Gerard says that the offi cials at t he Foreign Office were 
u .l't-r- f r iendly and the press urged the German public to show every kind-
ness t o Americans. This attitude, however, would change drastically 
before the year was out. 
Ambassador Gerard concluded his report by saying that the German 
p r ess contained stories of French forces crossing the frontier and 
occupying the towns of Gattethal, Metseral and Markirch . The press also 
carried s t ories of French of ficers found in Germany dressed in Prussian 
u nif orms and of French aviators who had violated the neutrality of the 
Net herlands and Belgium. According to the newspapers a French airship 
wa s r eport ed to have dropped bombs on Nuremberg . In Gerard's opinion 
the German public was enthusiastic over the fall of Liege and the press 
r eported that i t had been taken with lit t J.e German los s. At the end of 
h i s report the Ambas sador stated that the press was also full of stories 
o f Belg ian cruelties to German 2 noncombatants. 
The r eports from Unit ed States representatives in Europe as the 
cr i sis of 1 914 developed and exploded into war are on the whole rather 
fragmentary. The exception to this general statement are those filed 
by Major Langhorne. The quality of the reports seem to vary according to 
h ow well the various American representatives got along with their hosts, 
Langhorne, who found the Germans to hi s liking, submitted informative and 
1Wilson to s tate De artment. st State Department 
File Number 701. 6261 6. National Archives , 
2 
Gerard to State Department, 18 August 1914. State Department 






















detailed reports. Brand Whitlock in Belgium apparently got along well 
With Belgian officials and his reports show it. Walter Hines Page in 
Lona.on was on a par with Whitlock in quality and ahead in volume. 
There are several reasons why the reporting during the period 
discussed in this chapter was not as extensive as it might have been. 
One was the suddenness with which the storm exploded over Europe. Some 
American officials were simply caught off base. Another restrictive 
factor was the large volume of business that U.S. Embassies and Consu-
lates were expected to conduct with a small staff on a day- to-day basis. 
When war broke out, stranded Americans descended by the thousands on 
U.s. Consulates and Embassies all over Europe seeking help and advice. 
Then when the various nations discontinued diplomatic relations and 
Went to war an additional burden fell on United States representatives 
abroad. For they now had to aid thousands of citizens and subjects of 
the belligerent countries in addition to assisting their own people. 
Under such circumstances the job of keeping Washington adequately informed 
Was accomplished as well as could be expected. 
CHAPI'ER III 
ARMIES ON THE MARCH IN THE WEST 
The German armies in the West launched their operations immediately 
U:pon th 
e declaration of war with France based on the modified Schlieffen 
Plan. 
The assault on the Belgian fortress city of Liege has been sug-
gested b 
riefly in Chapter II of this study. Major Langhorne in a report 
dated 29 September 1914 described the action at Li'ege. 1 He noted at the 
outset th 
at there seemed to be an impression in the United States that 
Liege, 
and later the fortresses of Namur and Maubeuge, were able to hold 
Up the G 
erman advance for some time. This idea, he contended, was com-
:Pletely false. Such fortifications needed a covering mobile field force 
to k 
eep the enemy from setting up his siege artillery as the Germans did. 
The Belgians constructed these forts between 1888 and 1891. Massive 
concret . . 
e structures which mounted five to six cupola turrets, they looked 
like hu . 
ge Indian burial mounds from a distance. An iron watershed kept 
v1ater f 
rom running down between the cupola and the barbette. The guns 
in th 
e forts consisted of 21 cm mortars with a range of eight thousand 
Yards 1 ' 5 cm rifles with a range of ten thousand yards, and 12 cm rifles 
v{j_th a range of two d thousand yar s. The muzzles of the guns did not 
:Proj 
ect beyond the turrets. A steel observation tower, provided with a 
spotlight, stood on the highest point of the fortification. This tower 
li':t-o 
1
Report, dated 29 September 1914, subject: European War Lessons 
~he Belgian Forts About Liege and Namur and the French Forts About 
~ , Army War College File Number 8690-58, National Archives. 
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FIGURE 4 
DIAGRAM OF THE BEWIAN FORI'S 
.. . 
. ~ . 
Langhorne Euro ean war Lessons from the Bel ian Forts About Lie e 
ana. ' --._;.:, Namur and the French Fortp About Maubeuge. 
. ~ ·. , 
' 
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could be lowered into the casement when necessary. Ventilating shafts 
t hrough the concrete brought fresh air to the officers and soldiers below. 
Under the turrets a gallery led to the fire control room and the magazines. 
A dry moat thirty feet deep and covered by small rapid -firing guns in 
turrets surrounded the forts. 'These forts can therefore be likened to 
a stationary battleship~·.1 wrote Langhorne. Liege and Namur were ringed 
by these forts some eight to twelve kilometers from the center of the 
city. About four hundred men, half artillery and half infantrymen, con-
stituted the garrison of each fort. 
The German plan of attack was to reduce two of the forts with 
Siege artillery, capture the battered positions with infantry, move into 
the city , and from there reduce the other forts. The Germans employed 
monster 42 cm howitzers to subdue the forts at Liege. 2 This merciles s 
pounding shattered the watersheds and the fragments fell between the 
turrets and the barbettes jamming the turning mechanism. Shells pene-
trated the concrete under the barbettes and upon exploding killed the 
crews in the turrets and made the galleries untenable. At Fort Lonci n 
one of the heavy shells crashed down the magazine ventilator shaft, blew 
Up the magazine leaving a crater fifty feet deep, and completely wrecked 
the fort. Almost the entire garrison was killed. 3 
Captain A.H. Sunderland, U.S. Army, who was in Belgium during the 
latter part of 1914 in connection with Belgian relief work, visited many 
Namur 
l 
~-' p. 2. 
2rbid., Langhorne erroneously calls the 42 cm howitzers 49 cm. 




FORT IDNCIN PIT LIEGE 
Shartle, Report of Captain Samuel G, Shartle, C.A.C . Military 





42 cm HOWITZER EMPLACEMENT AT LIEGE 
Shartle Re ort of Ca tain Samuel G. Shartle c Ac M"l·t 
' • · • 1 1 ar Observer with the German Army December 20, 1914-April 6, 1912 , p. 4 
of the battle scenes. His impression of the destruction at Fort Loncin 
follows: 
Each of these (cupolas) i s within about 75 feet of the 
center of the pit formed by the explosion of the main 
magazine. It appeared to me that this explosion probably 
caused the ammunition in secondary magazines or handling 
rooms near this and another cupola to explode blowing out 
the supports and allowing them to fall into their present 
positions, as both cupolas are damaged in a very similar 
manner. I do not believe that each of these was damaged 
by a separate shell as my guides (German officers) tried 
to make me believe. 1 
Captain Sunderland added that the Germans advertised their siege 
guns prominently. It appeared, he thought, that they used the bombard-
ment of Fort Loncin as a "demonstration" for the purpose of intimidating 
Personnel of other fortresses they might besiege in the future. 2 Sunder-
land also mentioned in passing that only three or four localities in 
Liege suffered damage from the attack. In each case this was some house 
Which had been burned by the Germans because civilians fired on German 
troops in the streets af'ter Belgian troops had left. 3 
As the German armies poured across Belgium toward the French border 
several instances of destruction in retaliation for alleged civilian 
sabotage or sniping took place. In most instances the destruction was 
accompanied by German execution of hostages. On 23 August, the little 
town of Vise , scene of the first clash in the West, was destroyed. On 
his visit to Belgium in November of 1914, Sunderland reported that Vise 
Was entirely in ruins. He did not see a house that was not destroyed. 
lReport, dated 19 December 1914, sub,ject: Notes on Belgium, Army 
~ar College File Number 8984-1, p . 5 , National Archives. 
2Ibid. , p. 8. 
J~., P• 9, 
~ 





According to the Germans, this destruction was in retaliation for the 
firi ng of civilians on German detachments after the main body of troops 
had passed through. Sunderland related that the American Consul in Li~ge, 
a Mr, Heingartuzr, told him that the measure was taken only after three 
1 
such shooting incidents had taken place. Further on in his report he 
added: '~he once picturesque little city of Dinant is practically wiped 
out." Dinant is a small city located astride the Meuse River approximately 
fifteen miles due south of Namur. Sunderland said that the buildings on 
the west side of the river were destroyed by artillery fire while those 
on the east side were burned. 2 
The incident which raised the greatest furor was the burning of 
1,ouvain. This ancient university city, famous for its library, is located 
fifteen miles to the west of Brussels on the Dyle River. Sunderland 
agreed that of all the Belgian cities Louvain showed the greatest amount 
of destruction. Based on his knowledge from former visits he estimated 
that one third of the city had been burned over. This included many of 
its better parts. He was told that Louvain had been untouched by war 
when the Germans first entered. When the main body of troops had passed 
on, guards remained at the railroad station. On a signal civilians rushed 
the station which was subjected to heavy firing from nearby houses and 
streets. This attack on the rail station coincided with a sortie on the 
Germans by the Belgian field army based on Antwerp. The Germans held 
1~., p. 2. 
2 
Ibid., p. 10. -
the station and were relieved by troops returning from the main column.l 
The destruction began on 25 August. 
In February of 1915, Captain Samuel G. Shartle, U. S. Anny, a 
member of a team of U.S. military observers, also visited Louvain. It 
was his opinion that the earlier report s of the destruction in the city 
were exaggerations. The team drove through most of the city and visited 
the destroyed section which, according to Shartle, was mainly the street 
leading from the rail station to the town hall. At least eighty percent 
of the city, he thought, was undamaged. Shartle noted that the true 
story of what happened at Louvain would have to wait for the historian 
because neither Germans nor Belgians could give an unprejudiced account.2 
On 1 September, Ambassador Gerard transmitted a message composed 
by Major Langhorne which related the same story concerning Belgian civilians 
firing on German soldiers that Sunderland reported. Langhorne added, 
however, that the activities of the Belgian civilians must have been 
organized by the Belgian Government and that any other stories of the 
Louvain incident were "absolutely untrue". 3 On the 15th and 17th of 
September, American newspapermen accompanying the German Army got out a 
dispatch which affirmed that they had witnessed neither wanton brutality, 
1ill.3_., p. 11. 
2 
Report, dated 18 June 1915, sub,ject: Report of' Captain Samuel G. 
Shartle C.A.C. Militar Observer with the German Ar , December 20 l 14 
to April , 1915, p. 2 , Army War College File Number 713-22. National 
Archives. 
3Gerard for Langhorne, 1 September 1914. State Department File 



















THE sTREEI' BEI'WEEN THE TOWN HALL A.ND THE RAILROAD STATION IN LOlNAIN 
,~hart le, Report of Captain Samuel G. Shartle, C. A. C. Military 
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GERMAN SOIDIERS ON THE MARCH IN BEIGIUM 
Shartle, Report of Captain Samuel G. Shartle, C.A.C. Military 
2:Pserver with the German Army December 20, 1914-April 6 , 1915, p. 35. 
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destruction nor drunkeness on the part of German soldiers. According 
to these observers, German discipline was excellent. Incidentally, one 
of the cities mentioned in this dispatch was Louvain . 1 
Hugh S. Gibson, the Secretary of the U.S. Embassy in Belgium, was 
in Louvain on the afternoon of 28 August with other members of the 
diplomatic corps. He observed the activity there that day and was asked 
later by both the Germans and the Belgians to make an official statement 
of what he saw that afternoon. Gibson was reluctant to give testimony 
since he was present only on the last day of what was a three-day operation. 
Ambassador Whitlock was of the opinion that any official testimony given 
by Gibson would violate America's neutrality. 2 His private feelings in 
the matter are best expressed in a telegram to the State Department. 
The time has not come and the occasion will not permit 
me to report on the excesses of German soldiers in Belgium. 
While there may have been exaggerations in the published 
stories they are in spirit true a~d at a later d~te I
3
shall 
make a comprehensive report on this dreadful subJect. 
Both sides were anxious to tell their story to the world and in 
particular to the United States. In Rome the German and Belgian repre-
sentatives gave their versions of the Louvain incident to the United States 
Ambassador and requested that their statements be published in the American 
press. Ambassador Page declined to fulfill their request but instead 
1 
. Gerard t~_State Department, 16 September 19~~. State Department 
File Number 763.72116/41, 17 September 1914, State Department File 
Number 763.72/1039. National Archives. 
2~ibson to State Department, 29 September 1914. State Department 





forwarded the documents to the State Department for such action as the 
Secretary saw fit. The stories, of course, had already been carried in 
1 the European press. 
In the meantime, the German Army continued its march through 
Belgium. On 18 August, Ambassador Whitlock reported that the Belgian 
Government and the royal family, minus the King who had remained with 
had 2 
his army in the field,/ moved from Brussels to Antwerp. The reason the 
Government withdrew from the capital, as Whitlock reported the next day, 
was because German cavalry was advancing on the city in considerable 
numbers. The Military Governor, with what Whitlock described as a 
totally insufficient force, was going to try to defend the city and the 
Burgomaster offered the Americans refuge in the fortified area. Ambassador 
Whitlock, however, politely declined. 3 
The German rv Army Corps, General Sixtus Von Armin commanding, 
occupied Brussels on the afternoon of the 20th. The evening before the 
U.S. and Spanish Ambassadors had persuaded the Belgian Military Governor 
not to offer a futile resistance on humanitarian grounds. He complied 
and as a result the occupation was orderly and quiet prevailed in the 
Belgian capita1. 4 
File 




3Whitloclt to State Department , 19 August 1914. State Department 
File Number 763.72/517. National Archives. 
4whitlock to State Department, 25 August 1914. State Department 
File Number 763.72/599. National Archives. 
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Von Armin wasted no time in taking advantage of his situation. 
On the same day the German ' s occupied Brussels he levied a forced loan 
mipion 
of fifty million francs on the city and one for four hundred fif'ty~n 
the Province of Brabant. The city "loan " was promptly naid but the 
provincial "loan" was too s teep and Mr. Gibson reported that it would 
probably have to be reduced. In addition to money the Germans also went 
after food supplies. Gibson accurately predicted that the food requisi-
tions coupled with the isolation of Brussels by war would soon produce a 
serious situation for the population. 1 
During the last days of August the German right wing armies had 
reached France and had begun to achieve the same reputation in that 
country that they had gained in Belgium. Ambassador Herrick notified 
Washington on the 21st that the French Government charged the Germans 
with violating the Hague conventions. They asserted that the enemy 
bombarded the unfortified village of Pontamousson without warning and 
that they also bombarded a hospital. Then, too, the French claimed to 
have found a German bandolier with ,,:d umdum bullets in it. 2 Herrick was 
back on the wire on the 24th, the 26th and the 29th with more tales of 
alleged German outrages , Specifically, the French charged the Germans 
with the wanton burning of villages, shooting ,:non combatant inhabitants 
of the villages, attacks on French Red Cross personnel by wounded Germans, 
and using 'dumdum bullets. Mr. Herrick did not make any judgments or 
1Gibson to State Department, 25 August 1914. State Department 
File Number 763.72/615. National Archives. 
File 
De artment, 21 Au st 1 14. State Department 
National Archives. 
comments on t he French charges but simply passed them on to the State 
Department as they had been given to him. 1 
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The 30th of August proved a busy day for Mr. Herrick. To begin 
~ith a reliable source told him that the French Government was moving 
the · 2 mint from Paris to Bordeaux. Here was a sure indication of official 
French assessment of the military situation then unfolding. Next the 
Brit· ish Ambassador told Herrick that seventy thousand British troops had 
successfully held two hundred thousand Germans but had finally been forced 
to retire when the French failed to reinforce them. He went on to say 
that F rench reinforcements had finally arrived and the situation looked 
more "hopeful". 3 This was the garbled version of the Battle of Mons, 
fought on 23 August, which reached Paris. Unfortunately for the British 
Ambassador, even as he talked to Herrick, both British and French forces 
~ere in full retreat before General Von Kluck's oncoming legions. 
The situation was far from "hopeful" for the Allies. Some feeling 
Of i tnpending calamity had penetrated the French capital because in the 
same message containing the British Ambassador's story, Herrick noted 
that even if the government and the rest of the diplomatic corps left 
Paris for Bordeaux or elsewhere he proposed to remain. He remarked that 
F· lHerrick to State De artment, 24 Au State Department 
7~le Number 763.7211 / ; 26 August 191, State Department File Number N ~-72116/11; 29 August 1914, State Department File Number 763.72116/13. 
a ional Archives. 
F 2Herrick to State Department, 30 August 1914. State Department 
'ile Number 763.72/677. National Archives. 
F 3iferrick to State Department, 30 August 1914. State Department 












the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ren~ Viviani, received this 
suggestion most cordially. To round off this busy day an aerial messenger 
from across the Rhine visited Paris and deposited several bombs on the 
city. The only reported casualty was one woman killed.
1 
The German 
airplane returned the next day and dropped more bombs as well as some 
proclamations wrapped in a German flag. Herrick and his "committee" 
held that these actions violated the Hague Conventions and the rules of 
civilized warfare. 2 
As the German armies began to close in on Paris Mr. Herrick remained 
at his post reporting the latest news to Washington and preparing for the 
worst. A dispatch, dated 2 September, noted that Lord Kitchener, the 
British Secretary of State for War, had been in Paris the day before. 
Kitchener was in France to buck up Sir John French, the Commanding General 
of the British Expeditionary Force. Sir John was reluctant to coouerate 
with the French after the Battle of Mons but Kitchener brought him back 
into line.3 British troops blew up a bridge over the Oise at Compiegne 
behind them as they continued their retreat. The French Government was 
to depart Paris for Bordeaux that night accompanied by the diplomatic 
community minus Mr. Herrick, who reported the Germans advancing from the 
~ast as well as the north. It looked bad for Paris, but Paris would be 
4 
defended. 
1Herrick to state 1 Se tember 1 14. State Department 
National Archives. 
2Herrick to State De artment 1 Se tembe:r_l914. State Department 
File Number 7 3.72116/15. National Archives. 
3-oupuy, The Encyclopedia of Military Historl , p. 937. 
4Herrick to State Department, 2 September 1914. State Department 
File Number 763.72/749. National Archives. 
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A German bomber f'lew back agai·n on th f't 
ea ernoon of' the 3rd. 
c related that f'u ·1 d t d th a si a e gree e e German but he went away un-
hal"lned. 
On 5 September, Mr. Herrick, anticipating the arrival of' the 
Gel"tnans 
in Paris, requested Washington to ask the German Government to 
:respect A . 
merican property in the city. He had even gone so f'ar as to 
dl"aft 
a Poster which would be placed on American property identifying it 
as 
such to the German occupation forces. 1 The streets and boulevards 
1'lei-e 
empty. T +> 
ra~fic was gone. The tourists were gone. 
siior one August in its history Paris was French -- and 
p .ent. The sun shone, fountains sparkled in the Rond 
1°1nt, trees were green, the quiet Seine flowed by unchang-::.g, brilliant clusters of Allied flags enhanced the pale 
ey beauty of the worlds most beautiful city. 2 
rhough he 
COuld not know it at the time, Herrick would not see the Germans 
through the Arc de Triomphe. On the same day he sent out his 
the Battle of the Marne began which ended then and thereafter 
the G 
ei-mau threat to Paris. 
As the battle raged to the east of Paris, Herrick and his staff 
Obs 
el""ed the 
city preparing for a final fight. The French strengthened 
OJ.a, 
fort1r· h 1 lcations, they dug rifle pits by the Porte Maillot, w i ea 
S,t©lif 
icant Portion of the population followed the Government south. 
Gel"nian . 
airplanes no longer roared over the city because French planes 
no1o1 
Patrolled Paris skj:es. The Ambassador and his staff were fully occupied 
wtth th
eir Plans for protecting American property. Thezy-: were also troubled 
by l" 
equests for protection f'rom people whose own diplomatic representatives 
we:t-e i 
n Bordeaux. Herrick noted that the situation raised embarrassing 
l<'tJ.e ~ick to state Department, 5 September 1914. State Department 
Numbei- 763.72/792. National Archives. 
Sru.chman, The Guns of Aug,ust, p. 416. 
questions.1 
By ll September the immediate results of the Marne had become 
obvious. In a message that day Mr. Herrick reported: 
The advance of the Allied forces has been considerable 
today bringing them nearer the point where it would seem 
that a decisive battle is to be fought within the next day 
or so. The more conservative opinion fears that the re-
treat may be a ruse and that a determined effort will be 
made to cut through the French line aided by the Crown 
Prince ' s Army which is said to be marching to the south.2 
The situation had become clearer ·a day later as the Germans continued 
their retreat. Inhabitants of the little villages around Paris began 
to return to their homes confident that the 'Hun" had been turned back 
this time.3 
57 
The German retreat began to come to a halt in the middle of Septem-
ber when they dug in north of Soissons to resist the Allied pressure on 
them. The fighting continued on into the end of September with the French 
reporting some progress on their "left " but with no decisive action. It 
was the beginning of the so-called "race to the sea" as each of the bellig-
erents tried to find the others flank and failed. A major cause of this 
failure was that neither side had an o~erwhelming advantage in transport 
and manuever which would allow them to execute such an operation success-
fully. As September came to a close Herrick reported: "Little change in 
military situation in past few days. Tone of Allies sanguine." 4 
l 
Herrick to State Department State Department 
File Number 7 3 .72 7g-r. National Archives. 
2 
Herrick to State Department, 11 September 1914. State Department 
File Number 763.72/847. National Archives. 
3Herrick to State Department, 12 September 1914. State Department 
File Number 763.72/850. National Archives. 
4 . 
Herrick to State Department, 29 September 1914. State Department 
File Number 763.72/1000. National Archives. 
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Down in sunny Italy Ambassador Thomas N Page descri·b d th • e e political 
situation in that country as "unsteady". The Italian Government was firmly 
maintaining its neutrality while quietly making military preparations 
such a s calling up reserves to the tune of two hundred forty thousand men 
to augment the regular army of two hundred thousand. The Government was 
also beginning to stockpile supplies. Public opinion in Italy at this 
time was pro-French. Page remarked briefly that the most dangerous 
situation lay in the Balkans. Roumania was quiet but might not remain 
that way while Turkey was showing great unrest and had failed to disarm 
Goeben and Breslau. The Ambassador also cited the danger of a general 
rising of all Islam. 1 
German confidence in the initial phase of the war was graphically 
expressed by Hans Von Flotow, the German Ambassador to Rome, in a con-
versation with Thomas N. Page near the end of August. He said that 
President Wilson's offer of mediation was a bit premature although later 
everyone would be grateful for such an offer. 2 Flotow stated that German 
victories had substantially decided the war and that while Germany would 
not claim any territory in France she would probably demand some colonial 
compensation.3 
On 8 September, Ambassador Page dispatched a letter to the Secretary 
of State in which he analyzed the situation in Italy. The Italian 
~age to State Department, 22 Au@st 1914. State Department File 
Number 763.72111/345. National Archives. 
2August 4, 1914. ''Good offices of President Wilson in the interest 
of European peace." The message was transmitted through the State , Depart-
ment to the U.S. Ambassadors in the principal belligerent nations. All of 
them politely declined the offer, 
3pa e to State De artment 2 st 1914. State Department File 
Number 7 3.72111/355. National Archives. 
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Government was giving assurances that it intended to maintain its 
neutrality and the business community was hardily seconding this posture, 
h e reported. But beneath the official stance there was, 
..• an undercurrent of expect ancy that in the future and, 
perh~ps, before long there may be a change and that the 
I t alian peopl e, e specially those in the North, may force 
the hand of the Government and de clare in favor of the 
Allies. However this may be, Italy has undoubtedly made 
preparations , a nd coul d place in the field immediately a 
good army.l · 
He was correct concerning the undercurrent of pro-Allied sentiment among 
the Italian people. The irredentist movement for the redemption of the 
2 
Trentino and Trieste was strong, particularly in northern Italy. Then, 
too, evil memori e s remained of Austrian rule in Italy.3 A newer source 
of friction was Italian fear of Austro-Hungarian designs on the Balkans 
and around the Adriatic Sea. 4 
Yet when Page wrote about Italy, s . · "good preparations" and her 
ability to "place in the field immediately a good army", he was clearly 
short of the mark. Italy indeed was frantically trying to stockpile 
f ood and the necessary materials of war but these preparations were by 
no means near completion when Page sent his message. The Italians had 
not recovered from their war with Turkey in 1911 to 1912 and the Italian 
Army was short on equipment and training. 5 
1page to State Department , 8 Sept ember. 1914. State Department 
File Number 763 . 72/903. National Archives. 
2 Page, Italy and the World War, p. 110. 
3~., p. 112. 
4 ~., pp. 219-220. 
5~., pp. 150, 161, 171. 
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The concluding portion of the letter to the Secretary of State 
deals 
With Italian public sentiment regarding Germany. Page said that 
feeli 
ng Was as much · t G ·t 
agains ennany as i was against Austria-Hungary 
because of the 
reported atrocities in Belgium. The German Embassy had 
t:r,1ec1 
to reverse this attitude with an extensive press campaign but 
apparently to little avail. By the end of September Page notified 
ivash· 
lngton that Italy could not remain neutral much longer. 1 
The months of August and September looked very rosy from Berlin, 
Judging b ,r 
J the reports sent home from American civil and military ob-
annou 
Ambassador Gerard reported great public enthusiasm over an 
ncement that a French Anny corps at Belfort had been defeated. Two 
days later on 2 dl l · d t l August the German press prou y proc aime a grea 
V-.:Lct 2 
ory- Won at Muelhausen. The German Government released an official 
st
atement on bl 
19 August which denied that Gennan ports were under ockade 
and 3 
specifically denied that the German Navy had mined the North Sea . 
The Germans were particularly sensitive about the mine question. 
'.t'he All 
ies charged the Germans with laying mines in the ouen sea contrRry 
to th 
e Provisions of the Hague Conventions . Both Brand Whitlock in 
13
e1gium and 11 t · t 
Wash.in 
Walter H. Page in Great Britain reported the a ega ion o 
gton. In their dispatches both Ambassadors seemed to give some 
We· 





~ard to State Department , 18_August 1914. State Department 
Number 763.72/830. National Archives. 
~ile 
3
~ to State Department, 19 A~gust 1914. State Department 
Number 763.72/723. National Archives. 
~U 4I>a e to State De artment 11 Au ust l 14. State Department File 
be ~ber 763.72 339; !:l!!!,tlock to State Department, 13 Augu?t 1914. State 
Pal:'tment File Number 763.72/372. National Archives. 
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By 21 August, t he German Government was announcing that their 
a rmies were victorious from Metz to V'osgesen and that many prisoners 
and guns had been t aken. 1 This announcement referred to the Battle of 
Lorraine. Crown Pr ince&upprecht of Bavaria and General Josias Von 
Heeringen , commanding r espectively the German Sixth and Seventh Armies , 
conducted t he planned withdrawa l d i ctated by the Schlieffen Plan. Then 
they t urned on the French and threw them back on Nancy. 
On 22 August, Gerard told Washington that t he Germans were not 
accepting neut ral mili tary observers in the battle areas but that in 
response to War Department requests he would broach the matter again. 2 
A few days later he reported that a French force of eight army corps had 
attacked Saarbruecken but had been defeated and thrown back with a loss 
of over ten thousand prisoners and fif'ty guns . The Germany Army, he 
added , was complet ely equi pped down to the smallest detail , and performed 
as if it were on manuevers. Aircraft were active on both sides.3 On t he 
evening of t he s ame day Ambas sador Van Dyke in Holland i nformed Washington 
that a German Zeppelin had bombed Antwerp, Although it dropped only seven 
bombs and the total damage was rather negligible Europeans considered the 
a ction outrageous. Of course, the Continent was not quite ready for this 
new kind of warfare. Concluded Van Dyke, "No notice of this bombardment 
was given in advance. ,.4 
1Gerard to State Department , 21 August 1914. State Department 
File Number 763, 72/ 568. National Archives . 
2Gerard to State Department, 22 August 1914. State Department 
File Number 763 ,72118/5 . National Archives. 
3Gerard to State Department, 25 August 1914. St at e Depart ment 
File Number 763,72/ 612 . National Archives . 
4van.J2:Yke to State Department 1 26 August 1914. State Department 
File Number 763 .72/628. National Archives. 
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The German attack in the West was proceeding successfully in all 
of the army areas by the end of August. But by this time Moltke had 
allowed another modification of the Schlieffen Plan. According to the 
or· · 
lginal blue prints the German left wing was to fight a withdrawing 
act· 
lon into Germany when the French launched their attack in Lorraine. 
The str,a ;t ,egy behind this withdrawal was to suck the French strength into 
th
e Reich so that Joffre could not use all his forces to parry the power-
ful thrust of the German right wing as it crashed across northern France. 
In the meantime, the German center would hold as a pivot while Kluck's 
and Buelow's forces smashed the French ever southward. But Von Moltke 
saw the chance for victory on the left wing as well and permitted his 
armies in that area to attack. These strong German thrusts soon brought 
th
e French, who had been attacking Ya ''outrance" ' in Lorraine, to their 
senses in time to enable Joffre to withdraw his troops before they had 
been too badly mauled and in time to assist those forces which would soon 
be r· 1 lghting on the Marne. 
It was during this period, too, that Von Moltke detached two corps 
from the all-important right wing and sent them East to help repel the 
Russian menance in East Prussia. The only thing Von Moltke accomplished 
by this maneuver was to weaken the decisive punch against France. The 
troops he dispatched arrived after the Battle of Tannenberg had eliminated 
the t') J:\U.Ssian threat. 
Major Langhorne , submitted a report to the War Department in early 
October in which he arranged a table of events covering this period that 
b lAmong other works on this famous battle see the recent studies 
~y Georges Blond, The Marne and Robert B. Aspre~ The First Battle of the 
~ . 
FIGURE 11 
GERMAN MACHINE GUN GOING INTO ACTION ON THE WESTERN FRONT 
Shartle, R~port of Captain Samuel G. Shartle, C. A.C. Military 
Observer with the German Army December 20, 1914-April 6, 1915, p. 40, 
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leaves the reader with the impression that the Germans, with a few minor 
losses, were sweeping everything in front of them. 1 The German Crown 
Prince won a great victory at Longwy. Namur had fallen by 25 August and 
an English cavalry brigade had been defeated. The British and eight 
French brigades were forced back by the Germans near Maubeuge. By the 
28th the German Government was reporting that three French divisions and 
the British Army had been completely defeated near Maµbeuge with much 
material taken and that the town of Manonviller had fallen . French forces 
evacuated the city of Lille and, as already noted, German airplanes flew 
over Paris. The first trophies of war appeared in Berlin in the form of 
Russian battle flags and Russian , French and Belgian guns. Montm~dy fell, 
Givet gave up the ghost and the Germans defeated ten French corps near 
Reims. The Germans were pushing on San Quentin when the French Government 
removed itself f'rom Paris to Bordeaux. September 4th and 5th were par -
ticularly big days as German cavalry moved near Paris and occupied Reims, 
while Rouen and Boulogne were reported evacuated by the French and two 
of Maubeuge's ring forts fell . September 7th saw the storming of Nancy 
in the presence of the Kaiser. But Nancy did not fall. Maubeuge did 
cave in on the 7th with the recorded booty of four generals, forty thousand 
troops, four hundred guns and much other assorted war material. 
Yet dispatches from the American diplomats confirmed Major Lang-
horne's report of the unfolding drama as seen from Berlin. The Secretary 
of the Embassy, Joseph c. Grew, then thirty-four, sent a letter to the 
Secretary of State in which he emphasized, "the Germans are walking 
1
Report from _Langhorne , dated 2 October 1914, subject: Table of 
Events, Chronological};l Arran~ed, European War 1914. Army War College 





Burtt, Report of Observations with the German Arm¥ , p. 45. 
thro h 
ug the French, British and Belgian armies " He also t· d 
• men 1one that he had b 
een giving some thought to possible German demands after the 
successful conclusion of the war. 1 
Ambassador Gerard was on the wire to Washington on 4 September, 
to i 
nfo:rm the State Department that the German General Staff had released 
a rep t 
or claiming some ninety thousand prisoners taken in battle in East 
Pt-ussia 2 h·1 
• w 1 e in France the towns of Hirson, Les Aywelles, Conde, La Fere, 
a
nd 
La.on had fallen to the German armies. German cavalry too had almost 
reached Paris. In the West the German cirmies had crossed the Aisne River 
and w 
ere advancing to the Marne. The French Army near Verdun had been 
f'o;r, 
Ced south by the German Crown Prince commanding the German Fif'ttf Army. 
Fight. 
ing was in progress in upper Alsace and the armies under the Bavarian 
Crown p 
rince and General Von Heeringen were being opposed by strong 
.F':r-en h 
c forces. An attack was at that time in progress toward Reims.3 
During the hectic days of early September Gerard relayed a message 
top 
resident Wilson from Kaiser Wilhelm. The Kaiser had complained of 
atrocit· 
ies committed on wounded German soldiers by Belgian civilians, 
the A 
mbassador reported, and the Belgian Government was urging the civil 
l 
.F'ile Q.rew tokcretary of State, 2 September 1914. State Department 
and d~um?er 7b3.72/888. National Archives. Joseph C. Grew had a long 
ae 1stinguished diplomatic career abroad and in the State Department. 
Unt;fs appointed Ambassador to Japan in 1932 and remained at that post 
the outbreak of war in 1941. 
2The Battle of Tannenberg, August 26-31. 
3 
.F'ile ~ Gerard to State De artment 4 Se tember 1914. State Department 





population to conduct illegal warfare against German occup t· t 
a ion roops. 
Wilhelm, too, was particularly upset by the idea that Alli· ed 
troops were 
using dumdum bullets in violation of the Hague Conventions, l As pre-
viously noted from Ambassador Herrick ' s reports from Paris the French 
charged the Germans with the same violation, Both sides produced evidence , 
or a,t least some bullets, in an attempt to prove their case to the rest 
of the world, particularly to the United States. Captain Shartle provided 
a clue to the truth behind these charges and countercharges in a report 
he submitted to the War Department in the spring of 1915: 
Among other exhibits were .•. original packages of 
dum-dum ammunition captured at Maubeurge (sic) and Longwy; 
•.• Doubtless the dum-dum ammunition was for use in 
colonial wars, on the same grounds as led the United 
States to adopt a • l~5 caliber pistol . 2 
Captain Shartle ' s conclusion regarding the dumdum bullets appears 
sound. The British, the French and the Germans a11 had colonies in the 
''uncivilized ., portions of the world. There was nothing in the Conventions 
against using dumdums on "savage" warriors. When the war came suddenly 
dumdum ammunition was probably issued inadvertently along with regular 
ammunition. And certainly in the stress of combat the ordinary soldier, 
even if he knew of the prohibition of the Hague Convention, was not going 
to forego the use of perfectly good ammunition just because a bullet had 
a flat nose. 
1Gerard to 
7 September 1914. 
Archives. 
State Department, Message from Kaiser to the President, 
State Department File Number 763,72116/27, National 
2 . Report of Captain Sanruel G. Shartle , C.A.C . Military Observer 
with the German Army, December 20, 1914- to April 6, 1215, Army War 
College F'ile Number 8713-22 . National Archives. 
One of the most important battles of the twentieth cent 
f ought ury was 
f . 
between t he 5th and the 10th of September 1914. 
Actually the 
batt1 " 
e consisted f t· h · o a con inuous series of actions that went into the 
l. sto:t-y b 
00ks under the collective name, ''I'he Battle of the Marne". 
General Von Kluck's First German Army had defeated the British 
E.lCPedit · 
ionary Force at the hard-fought battles of Mons on 23 'August and 
Le c at eau 
on 25 - 27 August . In Von Kluck ' s estimation those battles 
haa. 
elimina t ed the British from further consideration . 
fol'ln 
ed the 
left flank of the Allied line and Von Kluck 
had the . 
situation in control. 
The Brit i sh Army 
now thought he 
Putt 
he f ear 
Though the Germans had hurt the BEF and 
of God in General French , Von Kluck had not eliminated that ,, 
contemptible 
little army" and he was in for a nasty surprise. 
General Joseph J.C. Joffre, the French Commander in Chief, ordered 
the P:i.f'th 




to attack Von Kluck 's left flank thus easing the pressure on the 
This move r esulted in the Battle of Guise which the two forces 




and stopped Von Buelow's Second Army and forced him to call 
help, 
In the meantime General Joffre was assembling a new Sixth 
'Unde . . 
Under 
r General Michel Maunoury near Paris and a new Ninth Army 
F'rench 
General Ferdinand Foch behind the embattled Fourth and Fifth 
When Von Buelow called for help Von Kluck discarded what kmies. 
~'as 1 









Von Kluck thought that the French Fift tr Army represented 








line and win the war. He was unaware of Maunoury's Army building up in 
the Paris area. Nor did he give serious consideration to the British . 
Von Kluck's premature turn presented the flank of the German forces to 
MaurLour,y!a Sixth Army and Joffre lost no time in exploiting the opportunity. 
He issued his attack order on 4 September, directing the Sixth Army to 
move from the Paris region eastward toward Chateau-Thierry. The British 
Army and the Fifth French Army, supported by the French Nintti1, Army were 
to focus on Montmiral. Joffre also ordered the Fourth French Army to 
hold and the French Third Army to advance westward from Verdun. Thus 
the German right wing ran the risk of being caught in a double envelop-
ment. 
The French Sixth Army moved out of its assembly area and hit Von 
Kluck's open flank on 5 September. The Battle of the Ourc~as this par-
ticular action is called, lasted until 7 September and opened Von Kluck's 
eyes to his difficult situation. To save himself he pulled the bulk of 
his army back across the Marne River, counterattacked Maunoury and forced 
the French to assume a defensive posture. 
When Von Kluck shifted his front to the west to meet Maunoury, 
a gap opened between his army and Von Buelow ' s Second Army. The British, 
whom he had thought little about, and the Fifth French Army moved into 
the gap and attacked part of Von Buelow's Army on the Petit Morain. 
General Foch ' s Ninth French Army encountered the bulk of Von Buelow 's 
Army at St. Gond and was struck in the right flank by General Max Von 
Hausen's German Third Army. A savage battle ensued and ended temporarily 
in a draw. 
On 8 September Von Moltke sent one of his general staff officers, 
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situation . Hentsch arrived at Von Buelow's headquarters in time to be 
greeted with the news that the Second .Army's right flank had been turned 
by the French Fifth Army. Von Buelow wanted to retreat and Hentsch 
approved h" i s decision. The pesky British were advancing deeper into the 
gap bet ween t he two German armies and threatening Von Kluck's left flank 
and rear. c 1 d d o onel Hentsch, acting for Von Moltke, or ere Von Kluck to 
retr eat a s well. Von Moltke, realizing that the great offensive had 
failed d • or e r ed a general retirement which ended with the Germans dug 
in along t he line of the Aisne River. 1 With their failure on the Marne 
the Germans had missed a golden opportunity to knock the Allies out of 
the war that autumn. 
A vivid picture of the carnage and destruction wrought in this 
great battle was left to posterity in reports forwarded to Washington by 
Major Spencer Cosby, Military Attach/ at the United States Embassy in 
Paris. The first of these reports recounts a trip Major Cosby made to 
the scene o f a ction on 12 - 13 September at the invitation of General 
Joffre. 2 
At the beginning of the journey the French took Cosby to Joffre 's 
headquarter s at Chatillon-sur-Seine, some one hundred sixty miles south-
east of Paris. 
Ge neral Jof fre 
On the basis of first-hand observations he described 
as, 
1 Dupuy, The Encyclopedia of Military History, PP· 937-939. 
2 Report from Cosby, dated 7 September 1914, subject: Visit to 
Battlefi elds of the Marne. Army war College File Number 8690-36. National 
Archives. 
··.a man of 63, with white hair and moustache, above the 
medium height, not very soldierly either in carriage or 
dress, rarely smiling and too pale to look robust, but with 
the calm manner and steady eye of one who knows just what 
he wants and is not to be turned from his purpose. 1 
73 
After a short conversation with the French generalissimo, a staff 
officer briefed Cosby on past and current operations. At the conclusion 
of the briefing Major Cosby and his French escorts started for the Marne 
battlefields. He recorded his first view of the area in these words: 
At Mailly, 35 Km south of Chalons, we came upon the first 
signs of battle, several of the houses being damaged by shells, 
but the real battle field begun at a little village 7 Km fur-
ther on, where not more than one out of every three houses was 
left standing. Just outside it the fields on each side of the 
road were dotted with little parties of soldiers burying the 
dead , many of whom, however, could still be seen lying in all 
directions. The German dead could be made out with difficulty, 
but the red trousers of the French enabled them to be discerned 
at long distance. This was another confirmation of what the 
French have frequently told me, that the invisibility of the 
bluish grey field uniform of the Germans has given them a 
great advantage. We could hardly advance 100 yards along the 
road without passing a dead horse in the ditch, in an advanced 
stage of decomposition, and many others could be seen in the 
fields. I saw many trenches constructed by both armies on 
each side of the road. These were all in the form of hasty 
entrenchments and appeared to have been thrown up by small 
bodies of troops, as the majority were not over from 50 to 
100 feet in length, and r saw no long or continuous lines, 
yet the country was flat and afforded little shelter except 
occasional small stretches of forest. 2 
In the city of Chalons the inhabitants told Cosby stories of 
Germans looting abandoned stores and houses durillf:, their occupation. The 
Mayor acknowledged that some of the looting had been done by the "riff-
raff ., of the city who took advantage of the situation. The Germans also 
demanded 30,000,000 francs as a war indemnity from the Department of the 
l~.' p. 2. 
2 
~-, pp. 4-5. 
Marne of which Chalons is the capital. They only got 506,ooo francs 
before they began their retreat. 1 
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Major Cosby spent the night of 12 September in Chalons and departed 
the next morning for La Fere Champenoise. Here is his description of 
t he trip: 
The whole road from Chalons to this town had been one con-
tinuous battlefield; burial parties were at work everywhere 
and the f ields were dotted with the results of their labors -
fresh earthen mounds, large and small, some marked by little 
crosses made of two twigs fastened together, others by a 
stick driven in the earth with a soldier's battered cap on 
top, but most without marks of any kind. Everywhere we 
found the French hard at work repairing the railroad and 
telegraph lines, many of which were already in use. 2 
The balance of Cosby's report was filled with stories of German 
atrocities as told to him by the inhabitants of the towns he visited. 
Eric Wood, an attache/ in the Paris Embassy, visited portions of 
the battlefield between 11 and 13 September . Major Cosby submitted a 
report to Washington containing the notes Wood made during his trip. 3 
The report is not written in a formal style but in a series of word 
s ketches: 
Marne . 
Our road passed through the position held by the Germans 
during this attack. Here beside the road lay three dead 
Germans in the short grass, side by side, each in exactly 
the same position on his back. Each had the shirt torn 
from the f'ront of his chest , and the bare spot was marred 
by a clotted mass of closeJy grouped bullet marks. Their 
arms were doubled under them all in the same way - an un-
natural way. A closer inspection showed that their arms 
had been tied behind them at the elbow. We then realized 
1~. 
2 . 
~., pp. 5-6 . 
3 
Report from Cosby, dated 7 October 1914, subject: Battle of the 
Army War College File Number 8690-49. National Archives. 
that we were on the scene of a military execution . It seemed 
that these three had been among the prisoners t~en in the 
charge of the 17th (French Infantry Regiment), and that loot 
had been found on thiir persons. They had been summarily exe-
cuted by the French. 
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Further along the road Wood and his party came upon the Vitry 
position , approximately sixty miles east of Paris. He described the 
French defensive positions on a plateau of wooded, rolling hills made 
doubly strong by the broken, swampy terrain in f'ront of it. The Germans 
assaulted this position with an estimated two hundred thousand men. 
Among the German units was the Imperial Guard. Wrote Wood: 
I should say that the Imperial Guard does not exist to-day , 
judging by hearsay and by the number of their dead and wounded 
which we saw. The battlefield was approximately comprised 
Within the towns of Champaubert, Coligny, Pierre-Morains , 
Clamanges , Sommesous, Gourgaucon, Correy and Sezanne. Of the 
village of Pierre-Morains nothing remained but a few smoulder-
ing chimneys and bits of walls . At Clamanges was a French 
hospital . All the French wounded had been taken away to the 
south of France, but there were 1,300 German wounded in the 
little village. Every house was full of them. The church 
was packed - they lay in long rows . 2 
One scene that Wood described in his notes is of particular interest 
because it spotlights a weapon heretofore lightly regarded - the machine-
gun . Wood called the weapon by its old French name, "mitrailleuse": 
Just outside of Ecury , on the brow of the hill , was the 
German defensive position •• . The French infantry charged 
across an open field ... coming from some woods where they 
had been themselves intrenched . The Germans ... were not 
in real trenches. They were in the outside edge of a 
potato field, and each man had pushed up a little pile of 
earth and potatoes in front of him. When the French began 
to charge the Germans ••. fired until the French got within 
about a hundred yards , hit ting a score of me~. Then the 
Germans ran. This led the French into a ' charge home' in 
line . They had not observed , however, the little trench . . • 
1~., p. 2. 
2~., p. 3. 
skillfully hidden by fresh cut boughs and turf Wh . . • en the 
French line came opposite, a group of mitrailleuses ( h. 
) t 
. . mac ine-
guns in his trench fired, striking every man but one · th 
French battalion. Sixty dead still lay in one straight in e 
like the sweep of a mowing machine. The wounded , which:: 
perhaps to the dead, as four of five to one, had been removed 
The moment the mitrailleuses 'opened ' the German infantry · 
which had only been playing at running away, turned 'right 
about' and charged back, fell upon the one survivor and filled 
him full of bayonets. He lay fifty 1ards ahead of the 'row', in a patch of trampled potato field . 
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Near the end of his narrative, Wood made some interesting personal 
evaluations concerning weapons and European marksmanship: 
I personally consider very strongly that the bayonet, the 
sabre and the lance, all profusely used in this war, are ab-
solute anachronisms. I believe that half the losses we saw 
were perhaps due to the obsession for cutting which European 
nations all seem to possess more or less, and which crops up 
whenever they get into any sort of action. 
The shooting of the infantry was exceedingly bad. In 
one place German infantry lying down in skirmish order , 
in the edge of a potato field (apparently one company) 
had fired about ninety rounds a man at about an equal 
number of French two hundred and fifty yards away in the 
edge of a wood. The ground between was as flat and unob-
structed as a billiard table. The French had fired about 
sixty rounds a man. This makes a total of some 15 ,000 
rounds for the Germans and 10,000 for the French. All this 
shooting had resulted in the killing of three Germans and 
six French. The mortality among the trees around the 
French was, however, one hundred percent:2 
The American diplomatic and military dispatches originating in 
the European capitals provide instructive pictures and on-the-spot reflec-
tions of the war on the western front. Yet curiously enough they reveal 
little or no understanding or knowledge concerning the magnitude of the 
German setback on the Marne. This was especially true of those reports 
coming from Berlin where confidence in the future continued unabated and 
1~., pp. 4-5. 
2 Ibid., pp. 11-12 . 
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where stories of victory constituted a steady diet for the German public. 
The German mood is reflected in Gerard s dispatch 
to the State 
Department on 30 September. In fact it sounds as though Major Langhorne 
had either composed it or had supplied the information on which it was 
based . The report told of a German advance in front of Toul, a small 
city approximately twenty miles west of Nancy, and related that the 
Kaiser's troops were eager and in good condition. The heavy artillery 
pounded out its grisly score and the best of teamwork existed everywhere. 
The German people, Gerard affirmed, made a big success out of the "game". l 
However, a note lacking the usual sunshine and glory for the 
Germans came from the pen of Major Langhorne in February of 1915. The 
subject of the report was military organization and preparedness and 
Langhorne, in trying to prove a point, let the cat out of the bag. He 
re1ated that a General Staff officer from the German Third Arrrry told him 
that in the advance to the Marne and subsequent retreat to the Aisne, 
h is unit in twenty six engagements had lost between sixty and seventy 
percent of its personnel in casualties. The officer cited two regiments, 
one arti1lery, the other infantry, where one hundred percent replacement 
was necessary. Major Langhorne went on to say that the casualties had 
been terrific and that this information should be given publicity in the 
United States to make the American public realize what war really meant. 
The loss in the German officer corps was particularly serious. 2 
1Gerard to State De artment State Department 
File Number 7 3.72/1021. National Archives . 
2"Report from Langhorne, dated 8 February 1911, subject: A Study 
Interrupted by the Present war. Army War College File Number 8690-141. 
National Archives. 
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As the "race to the sea " began, th e problem of Antwerp and the 
Belgian Arm 
Y behind the area of' operations demanded quick solution by 
the German High Command. 
The city had to be taken and the threat posed 
to Germ 
an communication by the Belgian field army eliminated. 'l'he Germans 
were evict tl . 
en Ya bit sensitive to the extensive criticism their methods 
in Belgiu h 
m ad aroused throughout the rest of the world because they went 
out of' th . 
ei-r way to be as "correct ·· as possible in the case of Antwerp. 
First th 
e Germans, acting through the U.S. and Spanish Ambassadors, 
agreed to 
spare the historic monuments in Antwerp if the Belgians agreed 
not to use any of them for military purposes.l After the Germans decided 
that a bombardment of t th k d Antwerp was indeed going o be necessary ey as e 
for the good offices of' the Spanish and United States diplomatic officials 
to warn the local authorities of' the impending action in accordance with 
th
e Hague Convention. Both the Spanish and the Americans declined to act 
as requested by the Germans. However, mindful of the 1 n~ncombatants in 
the ·t · h Cl Y and after discussing the problem between themselves the Spanis 
Ambassador sent his naval attache to the city authorities to inform them 
unofficially of the impending assault.2 The bombardment began on l October 
and the city surrendered eight days later. The Belgian King and his Army 
got away down the coast and took their place in the Allied line facing 
the Germans.3 The u,s. Consul General, Mr, Henry w. Diederich, witnessed 
the assault on the famous port city and in a message to the State Department 
1Whitlock to State Department, JO October 1914. State Department 
File Number 763.72116/63. National Archives. 
2 ll o t ber 1914 State Department Whitlock to State Department, c O • 
File Number 763.72/1072. National Archives. 






Ugh Berlin reported as follows: 
Af'ter a f' · h . , Ant rig tf'ul night of bombardment I had to leave 
ar2-:::-P on account of' my family Thursday morning early 
Sat ing Ghent late at night and shall return tomorrow 
aft urday morning if' possible. The last view had of' Antwerp 
over crossing the Scheldt showed the petroleum oil tanks 
er each of' which the American flag was floating were ablaze. 1 
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The last phase of' the 'race to the sea" took place in Flanders 
du2-1ng th
e months of' October and November. The two most important actions 
•re2-e th 
e First Battle of' the Yser, lasting from 18 October to 30 November, 
and th 
e First 
Battle of' Ypres lasting from 30 October to 24 November. 
Yp2-es, no"' 
called Iper, is a small city in the southern part of' Flanders. 
The p1· .l:'st B t 
a tle of' Ypres was a particularly bloody one. In this battle 
the O • l'J.ginal 
British Expeditionary Force was practically wiped out in its 
successful 2 
effort to save the Channel ports f'rom German capture. Captain 
Allan L. B . 
riggs, the U.S. Military Attache in Vienna, passed on a report 
to f. T h • vvas J.ngton 
concerning these battles in Flanders. The report, written 
by German lvar 
correspondent Armand Feheri, gives the picture from the 
Ge.:rinan Side 3 
in the days before the trench stalemate began. 
According to Feheri the struggle for the east coast of' the English 
Cbann l 
e lvas fought in an area that could be roughtly divided into f'our 
sections: ( ) 1 the inundated district of' Nieuport; (2) the terrain south 
Of' N· 
J.euport; (3) a range of' low hills between Ypres and Armentieres; (4) 
------------
lR 
State D e ort f'rom Consul General Antwer throu Berlin Embass to 
~ epartment, · October 191 State Department File Number 7 3.72/1o66. 
ional Archives. 
2 
Dupuy, The Enc;z_~lopedia p~ Military History, p. 940. 
3 
C b Report f'rom Brigss I dated 24 November 1914, sub.ject: j/:; at!!. on the North Sea . Range Find.ing b;z_ Aeroplane. Army 




and the ar ea from Arment i eres to Lens. The inundated district made troop 
movement s impossible. The terrain to the south of the inundated area as 
far as Ypre s was cut up considerably by canal s. The most important of 
these canals was the Yser-Ypres canal because its width and the flood 
dams constituted a powerful defensive obstacle. This area was also 
broken up with many small copses of woodland, small villages, isolated 
fann houses and meadows. In fact it presented the Germans with the most 
difficult terrain problems encountered in the entire campaign on the 
western front. South of Messines there are sections suited for defense 
but none were as important as the line of the Yser-Ypres Canal. The hills 
between Ypres and Armentieres rise to the west and their dome shaped 
summits provide good defensive artillery positions. The area between 
Armentieres and Lens is flat and is divided by the I.ifs River which flows 
northwest and by the La Lawe canal which extends between Esthaires and 
Bethune in a north-south direction. 
The flood dams (dikes) in the northern part of the battlefield 
formed a natural line of defense from 10 to 20 meters high. A disadvantage 
to this position was that in case of retreat by the defending forces, the 
field of fire would not be very good. This is probably why the British 
and the French defended key points on the east bank of the canal instead 
of withdrawing behind it. The Allies defended their positions tenaciously 
but they fell to the Germans except for the city of Ypres. The Allies 
then set up their defensive line along the canal. The Germans advanced 
along the front to this line. The Allies had converted the flood dams 
into infantry trenches and provided some portions of the line with con-
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FIGURE 1~ 
THE BATTLE-GROUND OF ~~ST FLANDERS 
Af't 
er a thorough reconnaissance the Germans 1 
c everly strong 




at places deemed suitable for crossin th 
g e canal . 
br·H~· 
i~;g material and when the time came th i · 
er infantry 
canal '1,,rith lightning . like rapidity" and pushed the Allies 
f'ir"t 1 · 0 
ine of' trenches at the crossing points. The Germans 
f'ive d'ff' 




the first line of trenches on the west side of' the canal he G 
ennans d 
iscovered further Allied field fortifications. In the wet 
lheadoi-ls 
, cut u b 
,, P Y many ditches, the German advance was described as ciif 
ficu1t ·,. 
Hostile artillery, including ship guns used by the British, 
kept tbe 
th i-lhole area under "terrific '' fire. The Germans had to entrench 
ernse1» ves 
A.1.J.iect 
and Wait until their own heavy guns came up to silence the 
The many ditches and streams made discovery of the 
batteries, 
A.1.J.:tea. 
i gUns' Which were "cleverly mounted in low ground behind embankments" 
lllnossible 
f'or regular patrols. 
'.r'b· J.s being the case the spotting of the enemy batteries was done 
cornoletely from the air. As soon as a flyer located a battery he 
to h 




terrain feature that could be identified by the German battery 
illl!n rom their own positions. After taking pictures the flyer 
ea.:i.ate1 





A copy of the picture was then rushed to the appropriate 
the The Germans computed the distance to the location of 
commander. 
enellly 
©lns from their position by the following method: 
Vil'he line from the position of the German battery to the 
on:
1!1e auxilliary aim (church steeple, windmill, etc.) made 
by ide of a triangle which could be accurately measured 
ang;eans of the range finder. The second side of the tri-
au.x· e_vas f'ormed by a line drawn on the photograph from the 
111
ary aim to the position of the hostile battery; the 
length of this line was found without difficulty by multipli-
cation of the distance on the photo between the two just 
mentioned points with the scale of reduction. Two sides of 
the triangle being known the third side, that is the distance 
between the German and the hostile batteries was accurately 
ascertained,l 
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The report goes on to say that this procedure was necessary because 
the superiority of Gennan artillery was in the accurate high level fire 
of their heavy batteries. With these guns it was possible not only to 
silence the enemy positions but to destroy them completely with one shot . 
"A shell from one of these batteries ( 42 and 21 cm siege guns), a colossus 
of iron, strikes a hostile battery, in most cases nothing is left of it, 
guns as well as men. 112 As soon as the Allied batteries had been silenced 
the German heavy artillery moved up in the night to take up its new 
positions. The Allies, however , kept preparing yet other defenses to 
their rear so that the procedures described above had to be endlessly 
repeated. This is why the German advance was so slow. 
In the engagements fought between Ypres and Armentie'res the fight-
ing was of a different nature. The German lines had advanced beyond 
St· Eloi, Wyrschaete and Mes sines towards hill 156 near Mt, Kemmel which 
commands the surrounding area. The advance constituted a succession of 
assaults against fortified Allied positions on high ground . The artillery 
played an important role on this part of the front too by silencing the 
enemy guns and preparing the fortified positions for infantry assault. 
Feheri says that the broken, hilly ground gained the attacker some ad-
vantage by providing cover to moving troops and affording protection 
against hostile fire. Between A.rmentieres and Lens the country is flat 
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and the German offensive west of Lille made a powerful advance beyond 
La Basse toward Bethune. There were no serious obstacles on this section 
of the front and, even though the Allies opposed the advance from trenches 
and fortifications, German superiority in tactics, training and morale 
proved more effective than in the other sections where the Allies were 
able to establish themselves in defensive positions behind natural 
terrain features. 1 
The Allies slowed the German drive and halted it by the end of 
November. In fact they went over to the offensive along the line from 
Nieuport to Verdun . The attack started on 14 December and terminated 
Christmas Eve without breaking the German line. The French opened an 
offensive in the Champagne on 20 December. The First Battle of Champagne 
still raged as the year drew to a close but with little prospects of 
French success. Operations on the Western Front up to this time had 
cost the Allies and the Germans almost a million casualties apiece. 2 
The quality of the reports and dispat ches filed by American repre-
sentatives improved slightly as the war developed. The most interesting 
reports covered in this period came from Major Langhorne in Berlin and 
Major Cosby in Paris. For dramatic impact and acute observation Eric 
Wood provided the best. Definite tones of pro-Allied sympathies can be 
detected in the dispatches from Ambassador Whitlock in Belgium and Ambassa-
dor Herrick in France. This tendency would grow and have a decided impact 
on American thinking both public and private. 
1~., p. 3. 
2
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Falls, The Great war 1914-1918, p . 81. 
The relative absence of dispatches from Ambassador Walter Hines 
page in London does not indicate that he was not busy. Page was very 
much occupied maintaining good relations between the United States and 
Great Britain. Nor was his task always easy. Most of Page's reports 
dealt , as one might expect, with U.S. - British relations, whereas the 
focus of this chapter has been on the Continent . Page, however , did not 
labor in vain and his efforts, like those of Herrick and Whitlock, would 
eventually bear fruit to the detriment of the Central Powers. 
,,~ 
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TANNENBERG AND THE EAST 
On Germany's eastern flank the war opened with a Russian invasion 
of East Prussia, The Russian advance had been foreseen by Von Schlieffen 
and included in his plan. The Germans had a single army, the Eightp, 
unde r General Max Von Prittwitz covering the Eastern Front to delay the 
Russ ian advance until t he western Allies had been defeated. Then the 
ful l power of the German Army would be transferred over their efficient 
railroad system to crush Russia. 
Two things interfered with the operation as planned. First the 
Russ ians advanced before they completely mobilized, thus moving faster 
than the Germans had anticipated. The precipitate Russian advance was 
made in response to urgent pleas from France. The second item was psycho-
l ogical. In theory the Germans were prepared to give up a slice of East 
Prussia in their holding operation but when it actually came to surren-
dering German soil, even temporarily, they found it difficult to bite 
the bullet. 
On 17 August, General Pavel K. Rennenkampf's First Russian Army 
c lashed with the German First corps under General Hermann K. Von Francois 
at St allupoenen, a town in northern East Prussia near the Russo-German 
border. Rennenkampf had the worst of it and retreated to the frontier 
while Von Francois retired on the town of Gumbinnen. The Russians ad-
vanced again and fought the Battle of Gumbinnen on 20 August. General 
Von Francois hit the Russian right flank hard but the other German attacks 
were not as successful. In reality the battle ended in a draw. As a 
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result Von Prittwitz t elegraphed Von Moltke that he was going to withdraw 
to t he Vi stula River and asked for reinforcements to hold that line. Von 
Prittwitz was afraid of Rennenkampf 1 s superior numbers and the threat to 
his right flank presented by the Russian Second Army under General 
Alexander Samsonov. Von Moltke 1 s answer came quickly and firmly: he 
r e l i eved Von Prittwitz from command of the German Eighth Army, 
Von Moltke then called General Paul Von Hindenburg out of retire-
ment t o take over in the East. The man selected to be Chief of Staff 
for t he Eighth Army was General Erich Ludendorff, who had done so well 
at Li~ge, As Ludendorff started his journey eastward he studied all 
messages concerning the situation in East Prussia. He then telegraphed 
orders ahead for a concentration against Samsonov while leaving a holding 
forc e against Rennenkampf, Upon joining Von Hindenburg, Iudendorff re-
ported his actions and Von Hindenburg approved. When the two generals 
a rrived at Eighth Army Headquarters they discovered that Lieutenant 
Colonel Max Hof:fmann, brilliant Chief of Operations, had already prepared 
f or the same movements and troop dispositions that Ludendorff had ordered. 
This incident is an excellent example of the training that German General 
8taff officers received , When confronted with a certain situation the 
t wo officers working independently came up with the same solution. The 
s t age was now set for one of the really epic battles of history:--Tannenberg . 1 
General Samsonov's Second Russian Army advanced northwestward in 
Pola nd without reconnaissance and ran head on into the German XX Corps on 
24 August. The Russians were unable to dislodge the Germans from their 
1
For an old but interesting study of this engagement , with many 
excellent maps, see General Sir Edmund Ironside 1s book, Tannenberg. 
FIGURE 17 
GENERAL PAUL VON HINDENBURG 
Shartle, Re ort of Ca tain Samuel G, Shartle C. A. C, Militar 
Observer with the German Arm December 20 1914-A ril , 191, p. 27 , 
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positions. The XX Corps withdrew to Tannenberg and the rest of the 
Eight Army joined them on their left and right. The Germans knew the 
exact location of all the Russian Second Army units, and what their orders 
were because the Russians sent them in the clear. 1 
The real action began on 26 August, when the Germans hit Samsonov 
on the left, the right and in the center. The battle raged for three 
days and Von Francois's r Corps succeeded in turning the Russian left 
flank . On the night of the 29th Von Francois had maneuvered into the 
Russian rear and the encirclement was complete.2 General Samsonov was 
badly beaten and he committed suicide . Besides one of their leading 
generals, the Russians lost some one hundred twenty- five thousand men 
and f ive hundred guns. Whereas Al lied confidence in Russia diminished 
German morale surged so high that the failure at the Marne two weeks 
later was virtually overlooked.3 
Major Langhorne submitted a report on the Battle of Tannenberg 
which merits attention for two reasons : First, the narrative contains 
some excellent detail; Second, it presents the battle as it appeared 
from the German viewpoint. 4 The following pages are a paraphrase of 
Langhorne's Tannenberg account . 
The Russians sent strong forces out from Kowno , Olita and Grodno 
to the north. This was Rennekampf's First Russian Army. The Germans had 




Re ort from Lan borne dated 10 Februar 11 , sub"ect: The Battle 
of Tannenbera. Army war College File Number 8690-13. National Archives. 
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their First Army Corps at Gumbinnen, the XVII Army Corps south of Gumbinnen, 
and the First Reserve Corps south of the XVII. The XX Army Corps was on 
a line from Lautenburg, through Neidenburg to Willenberg. While Rennen-
kampf was Pressing the Germans in front of him the Russian Second Army 
u nder General Samsonov was moving northwest toward the Neidenburg-Willen-
berg line from Warsaw. As the Germans fell back in front of Rennenkampf, 
Generals Von Hindenburg and Ludendorff arrived to take charge . They 
planned to leave a light screen facing Rennenkampf and deal with Samsonov , 
who was approaching from the southeast in great strength. The screen 
consisted of the fortress troops from Koenigsberg , the First Cavalry 
Division, and some Landsturm and Landwehr troops . Their mission was to 
hold Rennenkampf and cover the march of the First Army Corps, the XVII Army 
Corps, and the First Reserve Corps . 
The Russian Second Army was advancing on line in the following 
order from south to north: the VI Army Corps, the XIII Army Corps, the 
XV Army Corps, the XXIII Army Corps, the I Army Corps, and detachments 
from the Guard Corps. The Russian cavalry was south of Gorzno1 in 
large numbers but achieved nothing of significance at this time or later. 
The German First Army Corps moved by rail from Insterburg through 
Koenigsberg to an area southeast of Deutsch Eylau and detrained around 
the towns of Ratowi tz, Rattlau, Hartowi tz and Tilli tzken. The German 
XVII Army Corps marched west to Friedland, reaching it on 25 August and 
then turned south through Schippenbeil. The German First Reserve Corps 
marched west to Bartenstein then south to Seeburg, reaching it also on 
the 25th. The German xx Army Corps in the south was covering a front of 
1 
Langhorne no doubt meant Grodno. 
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some thirty-five kilometers which spread it too thin to stop any strong 
at t ack launched by the Russians. Fortress troops from Thorn under General 
Muhlmann were br ought up to reinforce it . 
On 23 August, the Russians launched an attack on the German 37th 
Di v:i.sion (XX Corps) at Bigaken. This attack continued for three days 
and eventualJ.y forced the di vision into retreat .1 The Germans were 
a f'raid that the Russians would make a "strong bayonet attack" and destroy 
the whole division. But the Russians did not press their advantage 
vigorously and the 37th Division was able to withdraw successfully to a 
n ew position. In the meantime the 3rd Reserve Division had moved to 
Hohenstein and taken up its position there. The new position occupied 
by 
th
e XX Army Corps ran from Ostrowitz through Logdau, Frulen, Muhlen, 
Potzda l to Drobnitz. The position at Muhlen was particularly strong, 
During this period a Landwehr division had been brought in from Mecklen-
burg by rail and placed at Biesselden. The Russian VI P.rmy Corps moved on 
Bischofsburg and the Russian I Army Corps with elements of the Guards 
attached moved on Soldau. Allenstein was the objective of the Russian 
XIII Army Corps while the Russian xv and XXIII Army Corps were driving 
the German XX Army Corps backward. 
By the evening of 25 August the German preparations were complete. 
The thin s creen that the Germans had left behind in the north to occupy 
Rennenkampf was succeeding admirably, Actually, he did not make a threat -
e ning move during the entire Battle of Tannenberg. 2 The Germans gave 
1~., p. 3. 
2
Rennenkampf had no idea of what the Germans were doing , He was 
afraid to turn sou.th for fear that the Germans would attack his flank . 
Als o there was supposed to be a personal quarrel between Rennenkampf and 
Sams onov. See Tuchman, The Guns of August, pp . 323 -324 and p. 327, 
t heir Firs t Cavalry Di vision much credit for keeping close tabs on 
Rennenkampf while the bulk of their forces dealt with Samsonov to the 
south. 
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By t he 25th Germany's I Corps had completed its rail movement and 
had taken up a position on the right flank of the XX Army Corps. The 
troops from Thorn moved from Lautenburg to Soldau where they met the 
oncoming Russian I Army Corps, stopped it dead , and forced it back but 
d i d not destroy it . The German XVII Army Corps struck hard at the Russian 
VI Army Corps south of Bischofsberg forcing the Russians to retire. On 
the 26th the Germans started moving their right wing forward using the 
s trong point of Muhlen as a pivot. On the 27th General Muhlmann ' s troops 
moved out from Lautenberg bound for Ruttkowitz. The whole Gennan I Army 
Corps moved on Neidenburg while the 41st Di vision of the German XX Army 
Corps marched on Bansborn and Thurau . As a part of this massive operation 
t he I Reserve Corps pressed toward Passenheim-Kukukswalde while the XVII 
Army Corps advanced on Kobulten and Mensguth. The Russians had succeeded 
in occupying Allenstein because the German 3rd Reserve Division covering 
that city had not been strong enough to keep them out , Part of the I 
Res erve Corp which was not involved in the forward movement was ordered to 
Pat richen to help cover this area. 
The German I Army Corps as it moved toward Neidenburg on the 28th 
deployed as follows : The 41st Division marched east toward Bigaken; the 
37th Division moved on Hohenstein; and troops from the Graudenz fortress 
hurried onward to help the 41st Division attack Bigaken . As the enveloping 
movement developed the Germans presented the following order of battle: 
General Muhlmann ' s troops were at Soldau ; the I Army Corps was located 
between Usdau-Neidenburg and Muschaken with its cavalry at Willenberg ; 
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from south to north around the circle the XX Army Corps, the 3rd Reserve 
Division, the Mecklenburg Landwehr Division, the I Reserve Corps, and the 
XVII Army Corps. In the middle of this concentration of German strength 
lay the Russian XXIII, XV and XIII Army Corps. 
When night had fallen on the 29th the enveloping movement was 
complete and the three Russian Army Corps were surrounded in a ring of 
fire and steel. Many Russians were killed by the German artillery when 
th
ey sought cover in some woods in the middle of the circle. The Germans 
captured over ninety thousand prisoners with all of their equipment and 
two of the corps cornmanders.l General Samsonov went off into the woods 
a
nd 
committed suicide. During the fighting on the 29th the Chief of 
Staff of the German I Corps received a message that one or more Russian 
Army Corps was moving on Neidenburg from Mlawa. If t his were true then 
the I Corps would be caught between the advancing Russians and the 
Russians trapped in the circle . The Germans decided, largely on the 
poor performance of the Russians in attack , to ignore the threat from 
t he outside and continue to press the enveloping operation. The Russian 
threat never materialized, thus justifing the German decision. 2 
According to Langhorne's report, during the whole gigantic action 
which resulted in the destruction of the Russian Second Army, the German 
cavalry and aviators performed in an outstanding manner. The Russian 
cavalry, on the other hand, was mediocre. The Russians erred seriously 
when they broadened their front and sent their VI Army Corps against 
Bischofsberg and the XIII Army Corps to Allenstein. Of course, the most 
s erious blunder made by the Russian High Command was the failure of 
1
Ibid, , p. 6. 
2Ibid. -
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Rennenka f 
mp to coordinate with Samsonov . Had they done so the Russians 
could have taken a large bite out of East Prussia before the Germans could 
have gathered sufficient forces to oppose them effectively. 
As soon as Samsonov and his Army had been eliminated at Tannenberg, 
th
e Gerrnan I h I R C rps t d Army Corps, XVII Army corps and t e eserve o urne 
on the left , or southern, flank of Rennenkampf's First Army. The latter 
had managed to push his cavalry as far west as Wormditt south of Koenigs-
berg, and had briefly occupied Rastenburg and some villages north of that 
city.l 
But German pressure from the south was powerful enough to force 
Rennenk.ampf into hasty retreat over the front ier in a series of actions 
that cost him some thirty thousand prisoners plus large numbers of killed 
and wounded . Thi s phase of the campaign saw the arrival of two additional 
German corps from the west by rail, which attacked Rennenkampf in the 
front While he was being assaulted on the southern flank.2 After Rennen-
kampf had been chased back across the border the Germans paused to reor-
ganize. 
During this del ay in the campaign the Eighth Army was given to 
Ge neral Von Francois and a Ninth Army was formed under the command of 
General Von Hindenbur g . Langhorne's report states that a Russian Army 
Corps usually was made up of f orty thousand men. Three Russian Army Corps 
were destroyed at Tannenberg with the resultant loss of one hundred t wenty 
t housa nd men killed, wounded and captured . Together with the losses 
suffered by Rennenkampf this indicated that the Russians had been hit hard. 
1~.' p. 7, 
2 . 
~-, p . 8. These were the two corps dispatched from the Western 
Front by Von Moltke when it looked like the Russians were going to advance 
far into East Pruss ia. 
While the Russians were suffering a heavy defeat at the hands 
of the Germans in the north, to the south they did much better. Conrad 
Von Hoetzendorf, the bellicose Austrian Chief of Staff, launched his 
forces consisting of three armies north and east from Lemberg toward the 
Russian frontier. The Russians met the Austro-Hungarians with their 
Southwestern Army Group under General Nikolai Ivanov . The Austrians 
were successful on their northern flank and in the center. On the south-
ern flank, however, the Russians hurled the Austrians back on Lemberg 
the capital of Galicia. This action put the Austrians on the defensive 
all along the line. Soon the Russians broke through the Austro-Hungarians 
at Rawa-Ruska, about thirty miles north of Lemberg, in a crucial series 
of battles from September 3rd to the 11th. 
Hit very hard, disorganized and demoralized, the Austrians aban-
doned Lemberg and retreated one hundred miles to the line of the Carpathian 
Mountains. They left a strong garrison in the fortress of Przemysl to 
hold it until the fortunes of war changed and looked to the Germans for 
1 
help. In the meantime the Russians occupied most of Austrian Galicia . 
Another Langhorne report, dated 8 February 1915, contains detailed 
information concerning the operations conducted by the Germans and the 
Austro-Hungarians after the Tannenberg campaign.2 Once again, in the 
following pages, the war in the East is described from the German side . 
After the Russian invasion of East Prussia had been repulsed with 
heavy losses, including the destruction of one of the invading armies, 
1
Dupuy, The Encyclopedia of Military History, P• 943. 
2
Report from Langhorne , dated 8 February 1915 1 sub.ject: Events 
in the Eastern Theater of war Since the Middle of September 1914. Army 
War College File Number 8690-129. National Archives. 
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the bulk of the German forces in that theater were freed for new operations. 
The Austro-Hungarian Army was at this time in retreat over the San River, 
in western Galicia, after having been mauled by the Russians, who were 
in pursuit. The German forces, who had defeated the Russians in East 
Prussia were not ordered south to assist their allies in mounting a 
counter offensive to halt the Russian drive. The German mission was to 
s trike at the rear elements of the Russian force which was crossing the 
San in pursuit of the retreating Austrians. The latter moved what avail-
able troops they had to the north bank of the Vistula River to cooperate 
with the German forces concentrating for the counter offensive. The 
r ap id movement of the German troops from the Prussian frontier in East 
Prussia to their new positions in southern Poland was a tribute to the 
German military railroad administration. 
Six divisions of Russian cavalry had been operating on the western 
bank of the Vistula but the German intervention had forced them back with 
heavy casualities. By the end of September the immediate objective of 
the German forces to relieve pressure on the retreating Austro-Hungarians, 
who were retiring between the Carpathians and the Vistula River, had been 
achieved. Strong Russian elements had broken off their pursuit of the 
Austro-Hungarians and were moving in a northerly direction east of the 
Vist ula along a line running from l.uhlin to Kazimierz. 
As October began the Russians crossed the Vistula between Sando~ierz 
and Josefow intending to engage the center of the advancing German-Austrian 
fo rces. Other Russian troops were to advance over the river at Ivangorod 
and f l ank the German left wing. But the Russian plan came to naught when 
t he Germans launched a surprise attack with superior nuinbev.s. On 1+ October, 
t h e advance guard of the Russian forces was thrown back across the Vistula 
lOO 
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of Opatow. Further down the river the Russians made attempts to 
c ross at several places but were repulsed with heavy losses. While these 
at · 
c 1..ons were taking place the Austro -Hungarians had succeeded in checking 
a
nd 
then forcing i nto ret reat the Russian Army which had entered Galicia. 
They were pushed back over the San River and the fortress of Przemysl, 
which had been threatened by the Russians, was relieved. Then the German-
Austrian formations, which had succeeded in holding the Russians to the 
l ine of' the Vistula, ran into trouble. 
The Germans received information that the Russians were building 
up heavy troop concentrations in Warsaw and had established strong bridge 
heads between Lowicz-Skierniewice and Grojec and the Pilica River. All 
of this gave strong indications that the Russians were preparing an offen-
s ive against the German left wing from the direction of Warsaw. These 
suspicions were confirmed by certain papers found on the body of a Russian 
o:fficer.
1 
The actual Russian plan was for five army corps to hit the 
Germans on the Vistula above and below Ivangorod. The major portion of 
the Russian formations, ten army corps with reserves, was to break the 
German left on a line from Warsaw to Georgiewsk, a town 25 miles northwest 
o:f Warsaw. The only way to stop the Russian offensive was to anticipate 
them by opening a German drive on Warsaw. If the Russians could be held 
at the Vistula then the Austro-Hungarians from the San would have sufficient 
time to swing north and hit the Russian left flank. 
The German Command left a light screen to hold the river line at 
the anticipated points of crossing, and launched their main force in the 
1
Ibid., p. 2. 
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direction of W 
arsaw. The Germans had beaten the Russians to the punch 
and qu · k 
le ly overran their weak forces in the fortified positions west of 
Warsaw. I 
n the meantime the screen of troops left at the river had 
succeeded in holcti·ng ld t t . 
the Russians but cou no preven one crossing below 
Ivangorod. 
The fighting in all areas was long and bloody and did not end 
until 
2
0 October. 1 By this time the Russians had built up a troop 
strength f 0 
four times the number of the attackers in front of Warsaw 
and su 
cceeded i·n holct1·ng the Germans. 
The American Consul in Warsaw, Mr. Hernando de Soto, thought the 
city would f 2 
all to the Germans . The British Consul agreed and lef't the 
Polish capital so Mr. de Soto assumed responsibility for British interests. 
The city officials were also certain of imminent German occupation and 
asked de Soto to take the city under the official protection of the United 
States Goverrunent. l 
Naturally this request was far beyond the atitude of 
action granted to a 
Consul, so he had to refuse. The Russian Government 
itself apparently h U . 
thought the city doomed and approached t e nited States 
i nformally, 
requesting that the Americans use their influence to save 
Warsaw from destructi·on. 3 h th b d l The German reputation, we er ase on rea ities 
or propaganda, had preceeded them from the West. The Secretary of the 
United States Eb 
m assy in St. Petersburg , Charles Wilson, told Washington: 
Reported informally to Foreign Office requests (for U.S. 
Protection) received from Warsaw, was told informally and 
Fil.e N 2wilson to State Department, 12 October 1914. State Department 





THE RUSSIAN FRONT 
Pollard, A Sh0rt Jlistor of the Great war, p. 146. 
Vtlkcnnr 
(!) 
u nofficially t hat Russian Government would be pleased if 
America could on its own a ccount intimate unofficially to 
German Governme nt that destruction of Warsaw and same 
t rea tment as Bel gian t owns would cause painful impression 
in Ameri ca . l 
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There is nothing to indicate that the United States Government 
took the a ction requested by the Russian Government. The best conjecture 
would be that t he Americans refused because of the very strict interpre-
tat ion of neutrality that the United States Government was operating 
under during t hi s period. In any event the Germans did not take the 
c i ty at this time . 
The Germans employed their air arm on the Eastern Front as well 
as i n the West. The beleaguered Mr. de 3oto in Warsaw notified Wilson 
at t he U. S . Embassy in s t. Petersburg that this final trial had been 
t h rust upon him: 
Consul Warsaw r eports German airships have dropped several 
bombs over city one exploding close to Consulate. Has 
displayed flag.2 
The German drive stalled in front of Warsaw and their Austro-
Hungarian allies di d no better to the south. Major Langhorne's report 
goes on to outline the subsequent operations on the Eastern Front. 3 
Russian resistance in Galicia described as "stubborn" in the 
report, kept the Austro-Hungarians from pushing in the Russian left 
fla nk . The situation of the Germans in Poland became precarious. Any 
chance of the Austro-Hungarians getting far enough north to cooperate 
with the ~nnans had gone glimmering. The screen left on the Vistula 
1~. 
2w·1 · 6 914 i son to State Department, l October l , 
File Number 763,72116/84. National Archives. 
State Depart ment 
3
Report from Langhorne, dated 8 February 1915, sub,iect: Events 
i n the Eastern Theater of war Since the Middle of September 1914. Army 
War College File Number 8690-129. National Archives, 
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could no longer contain the Russians and they crossed the river. 
To counter the Russian threat the Germans planned to attack an 
enemy force which had crossed the river near Warsaw by using one German 
army corps currently located above and below Ivangorod. Thus German 
troops would be replaced by Austro-Hungarian troops moving up the lef't 
bank of the Vistula. In the meantime, German troops in front of Warsaw 
would pull back. The troops moving up from the south were to take the 
pursuing Russians in the flank. The Russian attacks on the prepared 
positions into which the German troops had retired were repulsed with 
heavy losses. The German force from Ivangorod had scarcely begun its 
movement when the Russians broke the Vistula line with superior forces 
and at the same time concentrated a large formation against the German 
left flank. As a result the Germans were threatened with envelopment. 
Russian pressure thus compelled the Germans and the Austro-Hun-
garians to cease operations on the whole San-Vistula front from Warsaw 
to Przemysl and to fall back. 1 By the end of October they had retired 
to a line from Cracow through czenstochau to Sieradz. During the retreat 
the Austrian and German forces systematically and thoroughly destroyed 
all highways, railroads and telegraph facilities. The devastation slowed 
the advancing Russians down enough to allow the German and Austrian 
armies to withdraw in an orderly fashion. Some of the Russian forces 
penetrated further into Galicia while the main body followed the course 
of the Vistula in a south-southwesterly direction. Another Russian force 
and 
advanced on Thorn, a city one hundred/ ten miles northwest of Warsaw, on 
both sides of the Vistula River. 2 
1~., p. 4. 
2~ •• p. 5. 
I 
The Germans recognized that the only way to stop the Russian 
o ffensive was to attack and destroy the Russian formations. Purel y 
defensive measur es would resul t i n i nevitable defeat because of the 
overwhelmi ng superiori t y in numbers which the Russians enjoyed. The 
Au stro-German plan wa s to at tack the Russian for ces advancing along the 
Vistula east of Cra cow while holding the Russians in defensive actions 
on the wings i n East Pruss ia and Galicia . 1 It was necessary to strip 
as many troops as could be possibly spared from other parts of the front 
to build up the attacking force . s o the Austro-Gennans created strong 
formations near Cr acow and on the Upper Silesian frontier. 
The Germans concentrated a large force of their troops on the 
frontier near Thorn and placed it under the command of sixty-five- year-
old General August Von Mackensen. 2 The task of Von Mackensen was to 
defeat the Ru s s ian forces advancing on the southwestern side of the 
Vistula and then t ake t he main Russian force in the flank. The Germans 
placed a small force near Soldau, sixty miles east of Thorn, to prevent 
any Russian incur sion into East Prussia . 
By t he middle of November the Russian formations from the East 
Prussian border , down the Vistula, and into Gal icia numbered some forty-
f'i ve army corps wi th r eserve di visions in abundance. The Russians brought 
troops in f:rom Siberia and the Caucasus to contribute to the huge off ensive 
which soon began along the whole line. 
1Ibid. -
2 
Von Mackensen successfully commanded the Austro-German forces in 
Western Ga licia during 1915 and was made a field marshal. He lived t o 
the age of nine ty-six , dying in 1945 . The New Funk and Wagnalls Encyclo-
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But the German defenders beat the Russians back from So1dau after 
some stiff fighting . In a battle lasting from the 13th to the 15th of 
November the Germans defeated three Russian army crops at W1oclawec and 
at Kutno. They took twenty-eight thousand prisoners and captured many 
macr.fue ,.stJ.ns and artillery pieces . 1 A detachment from Von Mackensen 's 
army pursued the remnants of the Russian formations while his main force 
turned south as planned and defeated another Russian army corps. Von 
Mackensen's threat to their right flank forced the Russians to shift 
their Second Army around until it faced northwest instead of west. Most 
of' the Russian Fifth Army soon took up positions along the line of the 
Second Army thus opening a large gap between the Fifth Arm,y and the Russian 
Fourth Army to the south of it. 
Von Mackensen's advancing troops moved toward Lodz and took the 
road center of Zgierdz on the 17th of November. On the 18th the Germans 
forced the Russian right wing back and compressed the Russian Second and 
Fifth Armies into a restricted area around I~dz. During the next few 
days the German left wing closed in on Iodz from the east and southeast. 
Other German forces consisting mostly of cavalry closed in from the west 
and southwest. It began to look like the Germans and Austro-Hungarians 
were going to accomplish much more than their original objective of 
blunting the enemy offensive. For a brief period it seemed that destruc-
t ion of the encircled Russian armies by the still outnumbered Austro-
Hungarian and German troops was possible. The Russians, however, succeeded 
. ~eport from Langhorne, dated 8 February 1915, subject: Events 
in the Eastern Theater of war Since the Middle of September 1914. Arm,y 







in relieving thei·r d d t b h" surroun e roops y punc ing through from the south-
east. 
Some of the Russians from the East Prussian frontier along with 
a co:i:-p 
s from the Russian First Army, which was falling back north of the 
V:tstu1a 
• combined with the right wing of the Russian Fourth Army to push 
th:rough the 
covering German troops and to surround them. General Von 
110:rgen 
'advancing on Lowicz, could not assist the endangered German 
t:roops 
because he had started to run into serious resistance from hostile 
forces 
in superior numbers. 
The situation of the surrounded German troops located east of 
loa.z 
looked hopeless. They, however, did not think all was lost and 
Proceeded 
to prove it by breaking out to the west on the night of 24 
Not only did they elude the Russian trap but they also sue-
Ceea.ed . 
:i.n taking with them some twelve thousand Russian prisoners of war 
as we11 
as considerable amounts of captured equipment including artillery 
a.na. 
~~~ 1 
guns. They also brought all of their wounded out. Lang-
horne 
calls the operation a tribute to the training and resolute attitude 
Of th 
e Ge:rman 
soldiers and a fine example of capable and inspired leader-
Sh:t 
p, By 26 November these troops (XXV Reserve Corps, General Reinhard 
Von S 
cheffer-Boyade1)2 had made contact between lowicz and Lodz with 
Genera1 V 
on Mackensen 's army moving in from the north. 
The G · S ad k h erman lines by this time ran from Kazimerz to z e , sout 
Of lodz t 
' 
0 the area around Lowicz.3 Against this line the Russians 
l 
Ibid ~·, p. 6. 
2 
Dupuy, TI,1.e Encyclopedia of Military History, p. 944. 
. 3I{ 
:tn the E~t from Lantshorne, dated 8 February 1915, sub,ject: Events 
~y iv astern Theater of war Since the Middle of Se tember 1914. p. 8 , 
ar College File Number 8690-1.29. National Archives. 
llO 
launched a 
series of heavy assaults from the middle to the end of Novem-
be:r. 
Even so , ·they fa1· led to break th G 1 · e erman 1ne and in the process 
SUff 
e:red many casualities. 
So the Germans went over to the attack as December began, even 
thought 
heir troops were near exhaustion f'rom three weeks of continuous 
combat, 
The German right wing succeeded in breaking through a weak 
:Point in the R 
ussian line and surrounded the Russian position at Lodz, 
Th· 
ls turn of events forced the Russians to order the evacuation of the 
City, 
an operation they successfully completed on the night of 5 December. 
Russian attempts to reinforce their hard pressed troops in the 
no:rth f 
rom their southern armies were foiled by the Austro-German forces 
OJie:rat· 
J.ng in that area. The left wing of Von Mackensen's northern army 
sta:rt d 
e to close in on Lowicz; the Austro-Hungarian forces pushed out of 
the C 
a:rpathians and Galicia on the Russian left wing. The offensive of 
the G 
e:rrna.ns and Austro-Hungarians along the whole Eastern Front forced 
the R 
Ussians to give way, first in west Galicia and then in Poland. 1 
Th 
e original objective of the German operation had been accomplished, 
name1 
y to blunt the Russian offensive and keep them out of East Prussia 
ana. Sile . 
SJ.a, The Germans and the Austro-Hungarians took one hundred 
thi:rt 
y thousand Russian prisoners of war during this period along with 
cons 'd 1 
erable numbers of artillery pieces, machire guns and other war 
lllate:rial. 
Langhorne winds up his report by giving credit for the successful 
catnpa1 
gn to the bearing of the Austro-German soldiers and to their out-
Stana.1 
ng leaders. He said the troops maintained a strong confidence in 
lib --2:£.·, p. 9. 
lll 
th
emselves and a consciousness of the objectives to be accomplished. 
f · 
l.Ve months they fought and marched wi t hout res t in an area devastated 
au
d 
depopulated by war and at the end hampered also by adverse weather 
For 
conditions. 
Through it all t heir morale remained high and their offen-
Sive 1 Power unimpeded. 
A report that Major Langhorne submitted on the 25th of February 
1915 
contains some interesting observations and comments by the Germans 
concerning th 2 
e Russians and the battles on the Eastern Front. The 
Ge:rin 
an General Staff by this time had concluded that they had overestimated 
the R 
Ussians and had underestimated the British. The Germans when op-
Posed to the 
€;:t·eater than 
fought quite 
Russians could win against three to one odds. Anything 
that usually called for a German retirement. The Russians 
well but could not properly mount an attack. Russian 
al"tiJ.1 
ery operated very effectively and was supplied with good guns and 
Shells. 
The Russian Army was well clothed and well equipped. Some of 
the R 
Ussian leadership was good but instances such as the failure of 
Rennenk.ampr 
and Samsonov to cooperate severely crippled their operations. 
Russ· 
lan combat intelligence was poor and they were not able to maneuver 
:t-a.Pidly. 
During the Lodz campaign a Russian battalion overran a German 
battel'.'y, 
to Oth 
Wiped out the gunners in the process, and then meekly surrendered 
er nearby German troops.3 Langhorne said that during a trip he 
took alo 
ng the Eastern Front the Germans told him numerous stories about 
the Will 
ingness of the Russians to surrender. In some instances the 
1 
Ibid --.;;,;;,;:;,,•, p. 10. 
2 
~Armi~0 rt from Langhorne, dated 25 February 1215, subject: Notes on 
~- Army War College File Number 8690-149. National Archives. 








Burtt, Report of Observations with the German Army, p. 46 . 
Russian soldiers tried to surrender without weapons but the Gennans would 
not accept their surrender until they went back and got some rifles. 
The report goes on to say that the Russian trenches were well 
constructed but that they placed the officers in a separate position to 
the rear of the trenches occupied by their troops. 1 The Germans remarked 
that captured Russian troops told stories of being deserted by their 
officers. A German general told Langhorne that during one attack the 
Russian soldiers advanced without any artillery support in a bayonet 
charge. The Russian charge was allowed to approach close to the German 
line and then was decimated by artill ery, rifle and machinegun fire. The 
German general who related this story to Major Langhorne characterized 
t he Russian leadership in thi s instance as criminal. 2 
Near the end of this report Langhorne expressed his opinion of 
the performance of the German Army thus far in the war: 
Mere numbers to not count in modern war. It is difficult 
to find words to describe the performances of the German 
armies in this war. They seem to be better trained, better 
instructed, better equipped, and better led than any armies 
the world has hi therto seen. All descriptions of them, as 
far as I have seen, are filled with superlatives. 3 
Unfortunately there was no u.s. military attache in Russia until 
Lieutenant Sherman Miles, u.s. Arrny, arrived at the end of October 1 914. 
¾ajor Langhorne accepted what the Germans told him without question. 
A U. S . military observer, Captain Samuel G. Shartle, who visited this 
fro nt in March of' 1915 had a different explanation. Shartle said that 
t he trenches in the rear were for reserves. Report of Captain Samuel G. 
Shartle C.A.C., Militar Observer with the German Ar December 20, 
191 to April , 1915, Army war College File Number 713 -22, P· 29, 
National Archives. 
2lli£_. ' p. 3, 
3lli£_.' p. 4. 
The Russ i ans had rejected the United states G 
overnrnent's request that 
military observers be attached to the Russian armies in the 1 field, so 
there are not any comparative reports from the Russian side 
concerning 
operations on the Eastern Front. I.a.nghorne's reports are very good on 
detail and faithfully record events as they really took pla ce · As always , 
ever when reading MaJ·or Lan h ' t h hOW , g orne s repor s is pro-German bias must 
be taken into account. 
Captain Allan L. Briggs, the U.S. Military Attach/ in Vienna 
' 
submj_tted a report on the Austro-German retreat at the end of October 
2 
1911~. His account is generally a broad treatment of the events recounted 
in detail by Langhorne. But Briggs was not reluctant to write about ad-
verse conditions within the armies of the Dual Monarchy. 
The Austrian armies took up a position between the fortresses 
of Krakow (Cracow) and Przemsyl and in the Carpathians south-
east of the latter fortresses . Precise information as to the 
positions of the armies is not at hand. The retreat was cov-
ered by a division of the Austrian troops whi ch must have suffered 
considerably, particularly in the stand made at the Lysa Gora 
mountains as the hospitals in Vienna received hundreds of 
wounded at that time,3 
The written observations of U.S. representatives concerning the 
military events occuring on the Eastern Front in 1914 were as complete 
as those concerning the war in the west. Charles Wilson in St. Petersburg 
was handicapped by not having a military attach/ until late in the year. 
Wilson in fact did not mention the decisive Battle of Tannenberg once in 
18 Au State Department 
File Archives. 
~e:port from Briggs 
I 
dated 20 November 1914, subje~t: The German 
and Austrian Retreat of October 2%h, Army War College File Number 
8690-88 . National Archives. 
1.1.5 
anY of his dispatches. The nearest thing to a report from the 
Russian 
side of the battleline was the meager bits of news from Warsaw 
furnished 
by Consul de Soto . Captain Briggs in Vienna depended on the Austrians 
for his information, except for occasional comments like the one quoted 
above, Major Langhorne submitted the most detailed reports but they 
suffered from his lack of an analytical approach. A good portion of 
1,a.nghorne's information was obviously derived from the German General 
staff and he simply passed it on without critical comment. Major Lang-
horne did visit the battlefields under the auspices of his German hosts. 
His reports, however, do not indicate that he took proper advantage of 
the opportunity to make professional observations. Certainly La.nghorne's 
reports do not compare with those of Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Kuhn, his 
successor as attache which were objective, more precisely written and 
stuck to the business at hand. 
The military reports from the Eastern Front in 1914 were at best 
mediocre and lacked a true professional touch. The diplomatic dispatches 
were of a better quality but were too few and too brief, One receives 
the impression that some of the American observers lacked sufficient 
background to understand the historic events unfolding before them. 
Perhaps they were not as highly motivated as they might have been. 
--
CHAPI'ER V 
WAR ON THE WATERS OF THE WORLD 
Of the several factors creating antagonism between the German 
Empire and the British Empire, naval rivalry was not the least import-
ant. To be sure, commercial and colonial competition contributed to 
i ll feeling as well as the traditional British policy against any 
~~ntinental nation establishing a hegemony threatening the European 
balance of power as Germapy seemed to be doing. But the potential 
~enace of a big German Fleet was something readily understood by 
virtually every Englishman. He comprehended the threat to an island 
kingdom Which imported the very necessities of life by water and he 
payed the taxes which enabled the British Fleet to maintain a position 
of superiority. The press kept the public well informed on naval matters 
and the seed bed of anti-German feeling was prepared for some incident 
like the invasion of Belgium. 
Thus in August of 1914, the two principal naval antagonists 
among the belligerents were Germany and Great Britain. The only other 
European powers with fleets worthy of the name were France and Italy. 
The French battle fleet, by previous agreement with Great Britain, largely 
confined its activities to the Mediterranean and Italy was neutral: . The 
other warring nations who possessed warships were negligible quantities 
by comparison. The bulk of British naval striking power was concentrated 
in their Grand Fleet and by the Germans in their High Seas Fleet. Both 
countries, of course, had various squadrons and individual warships 
scattered around the globe when war crune. The British had the preponderance 
116 
of power as exemplified by t heir twenty-eight dreadnoughts and battle 
cruisers compared to Germany ' s eighteen . 1 
Lieutenant Commander w. R. Gherar d i occupied the post of U. S . 
IIaval Att h I' 4 ace at the Berlin Embassy in 191, Unlike his military 
counterpar t , Ma jor Langhor ne , Commander Gherardi managed to report the 
situation from Germany as he s aw it, and the German viewpoint on affairs, 
without loosing h i s neutr al detachment . Much of his informat ion, like 
that of other U. S . observer s ' came from official sources ' newspapers 
and personal contacts . Commander Gherardi , s reports are both interesting 
and enlightening. 
Naval activi ty on the high s ea s began with the operations of 
Admi r al Souchon a nd hi s Mediterranean s quadron as has been related els e-
where in thi s thes i s , 2 The political significance of the escape of 
Goeben a nd Br eslau to Constantinople and the subsequent activities of 
those ships outwe i gh the strictly naval importance of Souchon I s actions. 
On 4 August t he ex -Hamburg -American liner Konigin Luise, employed as a 
minelayer by the German Navy, was sunk off of the English coast by a 
British squadron, 3 so f irst blood in the naval war went to the British. 
The fi r s t f leet type action in the conflict took place on 28 
August i n the a r ea of Heligoland Bight. The Germans had been sendi ng 
strong scout ing f orces out int o the North Sea and finding no opposit ion 
had become a tri fle t oo bold . The British laid a trap for them consisting 
1 
Dupuy, 'Kg_e Encyclopedia of Military Histor.l,, pp. 933- 931~. 
2
See Chapter II, pp. 30-32 . 
3
Report f rom Gherardi , hereafter identified as "Z "1 1914-1915, 
~ub j ect : Sinki ng of German Minelayer "Konigin Luise ". Offi ce of Naval 
Intelligence Fi le Number 5278 F-6-d. National Archives . 
1.1.8 
0
.f a destroyer force as a decoy backed up by battle cruisers and sprang 
:i.t on t h e e nemy in · thick weather". The Germans took the bait and chased 
:::.he British d e stroyers into the mist, becoming somewhat separated in the 
process· Because of poor visibility the pursuing German light cruisers 
ne'rer saw the British battle cruisers until it was too late. In the 
ensuing action the Germans lost the cruisers Ariadne, Mainz, Koeln and 
the accompanying torpedo boat V-187, 1 
Koeln was engaged at five hundred meters by the battle cruisers 
and was put down in six minutes with the loss of all hands except for a 
single stoker . Among those lost on~ was Rear Admiral Maas, Second 
Admi.ral of' the Scouting Ships. 2 Mainz was badly damaged by gunfire and 
all of the officers above deck were killed or wounded. The cruiser had 
taken one torpedo hit but was still buoyant enough that her capture by 
the British seemed highly probable. To prevent such a disgrace Ober-
Leutnant Wolf Von Tirpitz, the son of Admiral Von Tirpitz, ordered the 
magazine detonated . This action succeeded in sinking the ship thus pre-
venting her capture. Young Von Tirpitz and other survivors of ~ were 
taken prisoner by the British . 3 
Some of the survivors from the torpedo boat v-187 had an exciting 
tale to tell: 
1
Re ort from "Z" dated ?l Au ust 1914, sub · ect: Loss of Cruisers 
'',~ri adn e ", ''Mainz ", "Koeln" and ''V-1 7 11 , Office of Naval Intelligence 
File Number 6b8 4 F-b-d, National Archives. 
2 
Report from "Z" dated 14 September 1914, subject: Naval Battle of 
Heligoland, August 29, 1914. Office of Naval Intelligence File Number 
6684 F-6-d. National Archives. 
3
Report f rom "Z II dated 22 October 1914, sub.j ect: Loss of the German 
Cruise r "Mainz 
1
'. Office of Naval Intelligence File Number 668h F-6-d. 
Nationa l Archives. 
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d After the cr ew of 'Vl8r ' had had to leave her , the British 
testroyer s which had been f iring at her put out their boats 
~ rescue the survivors . Ober-Leutnant Jasper and four men were 
~icked up by a boat in wh i ch were an English officer and four 
nglish men at the oars. While the rescue was going on, a 
German cruiser appeared and opened fire . The British des-
troyers then made all haste to get their boats and escape. 
When the boat with Ober-Leutnant Jasper in it came alongside 
the B · ' r itish officer a nd men got on board their destroyer and 
then ordered the Germa ns out , The Germans kept fast in the 
boat , To a repeated order, Ober -Leutnant Jasper replied that 
uud:r no circumstances would they go on boar d the destroyer . 
As it was ev i dent t hey would not move, they were fired upon 
by Engli sh officers , s everal shots from revolvers, and a 
seaman p i cked up a shell and threw it at them. To prevent 
being hoisted i n with the boat, t he Germans cut the boat 
fall.s and t he boat line, so that the boat drifted clear and, 
t~e destr oyer maki ng o f f to save herself, the boat with the 
five Germans in i t wa s p i cked up (by) the cruiser 'Stettin' . 
The British boat itself is now in Wilhelmshafen .
1 
l20 
The fi ght put up by Ariadne excited the admiration of the British, 
Aboard one o f the Brit ish cruisers (not identified) a half dozen of the 
survivors were being given "three cheers " when they saw a German cruiser 
appro ach ing. Be f ore t he third cheer could be sounded the Germans jumped 
over board and swam away. The British cruiser moved off and the swimming 
men were picked up by the German cruiser Strassburg ,
2 
The fi rst major naval engagement had ended with a clear-cut British 
victory , The Germans lost another warship, this time in the Baltic Sea 
area , as Augu st drew to a close , The cruiser Magdeburg grounded in the 
Bay of Finland near the isla nd of Odensholm in a thick fog. Efforts to 
rel ease the ship proved to no avail and when Russian naval units appeared 
on the scene a nd took Magdeburg under fire the German crew blew her up to 
~ eport from "Z" dated 22 October 1914, subject: 
Torpedo Boat ''Vl87 ". Office of Naval Intelligence File 
National Archives. 
Loss of German 
Number 6684 F-6-d. 
2 Report from "Z t' dated 24 October 1914 , subject: Notes on the Loss 
of t h e German Cruiser "Ariadne". 
6684 F-6-d. National Archives. 
Office of Naval Intelligence File Number 
Pl"event 
possible capture. H l h db e p a een summoned by radio but the fog 
Pl"evented a 
timely r escue. 1 
struck back in a very telling blow on 22 September The German Navy 
Ylhen the sub 
marine U-9 in the course of a single hour sank three British 
C!'U. 
lsers "With great loss of life. Early that morning u-9, in a calm sea 
anct cl ear "Weath er, was proceeding on a southwesterly course about twenty 
mi] .. es fr 
om Hoek Van Holland. At approximately 0600, t hr ee large British 
C!'Uisers -w ere sighted approaching in a line abreast going in the opposite 
ct· lrect1on to 
that of u-9. The U-boat immediately made a torpedo attack 
on the cent 
er cruiser Aboukir. Mortally damaged the British cruiser sank 
in a matt er of minutes. The other two cruisers made for the spot where 
A.,boukir had - · gone down. This gave Kapitan-Leutnant Otto Weddigen , U-9 's 
commandi ng officer, the opportunity for another quick attack. He made 
the most of' it and Hogue quickly joined her sister on the bottom of the 
North Sea.. Then Cressy came charging up only to be greeted by two tor-
pedoes -wh. lch capsized her . Cressy floated for a bit and then sank to join 
the other two. 2 
Commander Gherardi submitted a short report on the sinking of the 
cruisers: 
The following which is f'rom an authentic source, gives 
some idea of' th~ state of mind and nerve of the commanding 
officer of' the German submarine during the destructive 
attack on the three British cruisers: 
. 1Report from "Z" dated 29 August 19l4z. subject : 
Cruiser "Magdeburg ". Office of Naval Intelligence File 
F-6-d. National Archives, 
Loss of German 
Number 5282 
2Re ort from "Z ,, dated 27 Se tember 1914, sub ·ect: German Submarine 
U- Sinks .British Armored cruisers ''.Aboukir" "Ho e" and Cress ,, . Office 
of' N l r N b 51nc. F 6 d National Archives. ava ntelligence File um er ~ - - • 
After Lieutenant Weddigen, commanding the 'U-9• had st
ruck two of the British cruisers and emerged hi~ peri-
;c?pe a third time to get his bearings for attacking the 
hird cruiser, he saw the work of rescue going on and 
~he wreck was so dreadful that a strong revulsion of feel-
ing swept over him so that he turned away from the peri-
scope and was about to make off, leaving the third cruiser 
~ntouched. During his indecision, his Second in command 
touched him on the shoulder and said: 'Remember, Captain, 
t~at those wretches incited the Japanese against us.' And 
at was sufficient to decide Lieutenant Weddigen to 
attack the third ship. 1 
1-22 
The incredible part of the whole incident to the modern eye is 
that 
a~er A_boukir was hit, the other two cruisers set about rescue opera-
t· 
J.ons as if' 
they were dealing with some peacetime maritime disaster. And 
as the qu 
0 te above indicates even after Hogue was sunk, Cressy persisted 
in att empting to pick up the survivors from the other two cruisers in-
Stead 
0
f' taking of'f or attempting to find and sink the U-boat. The 
Bl"it· 
lsh were to learn quickly that one did not tarry long in an area 
whe:r-
ea U-boat was operating and one certainly did not stop dead in the 
wate:r-
and Present a stationary target. 
But the British could play the submarine game too. For example, 
the G 
erman cruiser Hela was returning to her base after a night patrol in 
.late 8 
eptember off' Heligoland when she was caught by the British submarine 
E .. 9 
~ aud sent to the bottom. A Hamburg '~oasting steamer'was in proximity 
and w·t 
J. nessed the action. The steamer had spotted the sub and tried to 
wa:r-n th 2 
e cruiser but was too late. 
b B 
2
Re ort from "Z" dated October 1 14 sub · ect: Sinkin 









H.M.S. CRESSY, HOOUE AND ABOUKIR 
Gherardi, Report from "Z" 27 September 1914 . 
l 
J.24. 
A word should be said at this point about Koeni gsberg and Emden. 
The former was a German light cruiser stationed off the East African 
coast when the war broke out . She was soon in action and on 6 August 
sank her opposite number, the British light cruiser Pegasus off Mombasa. 
This was her moment of glory. But she was harassed by superior British 
naval strength and f inally driven up the Rufigi River in German East 
Africa in October 1914. Koenigsberg was sealed in her refuge by the 
British who sank a ship across the river channel . There she remained 
until the British got around to destroying her in July 1915 by using 
monitors to get close enough up the shallow stream. 
In August, Admiral Count Maximilian Von Spee commander of the 
German China Squadron, detached the light cruiser Emden for independent 
operations in the Indian Ocean. Under her Captain Karl Von Muller the 
cruise was highly successful as Emden took twenty-one prizes and bombarded 
Madras on 22 September. She finally met her end under the guns of the 
Australian cruiser Sydney in the Cocos Islands on 9 November. 1 On the 
2
lst of that month Ambassador Gerard at the request of the German Govern-
ment notified Captain Von Muller, then a captive, that he was the recipient 
of the Iron Cross First and Second Class. The Iron Cross Second Class 
was conferred on all offi.cers and petty officers , and on fifty seamen to 
be selected by Captain Von Muller. 2 
On l November, the German surface fleet scored its biggest victory 
of the war. Admiral Von Spee brought his China Squadron across the Pacific 
and off Coronel, Chile, met the British squadron under the command of 
1
Dupuy, The Encyclopedia of Military History, p. 945 , 
2 
~rard to State Department , 21 November 1914. State Department 




Admiral Sir Christopher Cradock. 
Von Spee had with him t he heavy 
cruisers ~ (Fl agship) and Gneisenau, and the light cruiser Le· . 
s l.PZ1:B,, Dresden 
~ and Nuernber~ . Cradock' s squadron consisted of the h . 
ea:vy cruisers Good Ho ( 
~ Flagship) and Monmouth, the light cruiser Glasgow and a con-
V-el'ted merchant 
auxiliary cruiser Otranto, Admiral Cradock also had under 
his 
command an old battl.eship , Canopus, but he l.eft her behind because of 
hel' 
Slow speed • .l 
A letter from Count Von Spee tells the story. 
November 2, 1914. 
Yesterday was All Saints Day and a day of fortune for us. 
r Was en route with the squadron, passing southward on the 
-~oast, when I got wind that an English cruiser had entered 
he small coaling harbor of Coronel near Concepcion . As 
a ccording to the general rules of international law a ship 
~f a belligerent power entering a neutral harbor will have 
0 
leave again within 24 hours. I made up my mind to cap -
ture her . I had distributed the places in such a manner th
at 'NUERNBERG' was to go to the harbor to see if the 
Cl'Ui s er was still there, the other ships took up positions 
outside . To save coal the ships had only steam up for 14 
knots, but were otherwise clear for action. My ships were 
dis tributed about 4. 25 only 'GNEISENAU' in immediate V. . ' 
i cini t y when it was reported to me that in west south 
West two ships were sighted. I made towards them and 
0
l'dered the other cruisers to come to me, for it was clear 
to me that I had adversaries before me , namely the armored 
cruiser 'MONMOIJrH' and the small cruiser 'GLASGOW'. Shortly 
after the auxiliary cruiser 'GrRANTO ' made her appearance 
and after a little while the armored cruiser 'GOOD HOPE'. 
The enemy attempted several maneuvers by which, according 
to rn;y- opinion he would have come nearer to the coast and 
Would have gained the weather gauge, which would have been 
Very i njurious to me . I had at once given orders to 
'SCHARNHORST ' and 'GNEISENAU' to have all boilers in action 
and i n a quarter of an hour I ran with 20 knots against a 
heavy sea and with good fortune reached a position parallel 
to t he enemy. But I was so far alone and had to wait for the arrival of the other ships. The enemy was kind enough 
not t o di s turb me, the distance amounting at that period · 
about 9 miles . When my ships were about together at 6.10 , 
except the 'NUERNBERG" which was not yet in sight, I 
1nupuy, The Encyclopedia of Military History, p. 945, 
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FIGURE 25 
ADMIRAL COUNT MAXIMILIAN VON SPEE 
Gherardi, Report from 11Z11 2 November 1914. 
commenced to lessen the distance and when I was about 5 miles 
(1 sea mile= 1. 8 km.) I gave orders to open the f'ire. The 
battle had commenced and in the main I directed the line 
quietly with very little change of' the course. The sun in the 
West I was able to outmaneuver so that I was not troubled by 
sunlight. The moon in the east was not yet full, but promised 
good illumination during the night, rain bows being visible in 
different places. My ships fired rapidly and had good success 
With the large ships. 'SCHARNHORST' fired against 'GOOD HOPE' 
(Flagship Admiral Craddock), 'GNEISENAU' against 'MONMOUTH', · 
'LEIPZIG' against 'GIASGOW 1 , 'DRESDEN' against ''OTRANTO '. The 
last ship left the line after a while and escaped as I supposed. 
Fires broke out on 'GOOD HOPE' and 'MONMOUTH' and on the first 
ship a strong explosion took place which against the evening 
sky looked like brilliant fire works. I had the belief that 
the ship must now sink but it kept afloat and the fight con-
tinued. Darkness broke in, and having lessened the distance 
at first to about 4500 metres I turned so far that the dis-
tance was increased. The fire continued towards the ships 
Which could only be made out by the flames raging on them and 
when the gunners could not aim any longer I stopped the firing. 
Firing from the enemy had ceased before. I ordered the small 
cruisers to take up the pursuit, as the enemy however had 
evidently extinguished the fires there was nothing to be seen. 
The artillery fight had lasted 52 minutes. About 8 .40 minutes 
I observed at a great distance ahead, about ten sea miles, 
artillery fire. I made towards it to give assistance if 
necessary. It was the 'NUERNBERG' which could not make con-
nection in the first place and which had now met the 'MONMOUTH' 
lying heavily to starboard. The 'NUERNBERG' approached closely 
and gave her the rest with gun fire. 'MONMOUI'H' capsized and 
sank: . It is very much to be regretted that the heavy sea for-
bade any work of rescue besides the 'NUERNBERG' believed the 
'GOOD HOPE' to be in th; vicinity which was probably an error. 
It is very probable that the 'NUERNBERG' took one of the large 
cruisers to be the 'MONMOUTH' in the moonlight and the great 
distance. I do not know what became of the 'GOOD HOPE'. Lieu-
tenant G. who had time to make observations was of the opinion 
that she had listed to starboard heavily and if I recall the 
Picture I believe it to be possible. She was put out of action 
and it is very possible that she sank:. 'GIASGOW' was hardly 
to be seen, she is supposed to have received several hits, but 
made her escape. Thus ye have come out victorious on all sides, 
and I think God for it. 
Admiral Von Spee was still not sure that Good Hope had sunk in the 
darkness and indicated that he was going to look for her the next day.2 
1 
Report from "Z ", Letter from Count Von Spee dated 2 November 1 911+. 
Office of Naval Intelligence File Number 4648A F-6-d. National Archives. 
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I 
. Gcrma,n -Squadron : 
(Bl-<u: l.·.) 
(3) /1 . .!lf.8. OlcUJ(!OH'. 
(,t) H.lrf. S . Otranio. · 
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Gherardi, Report from "Z " 2 November 1914. 
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But G 
...22,d Hope...z.. like Monmouth, had gone down. Otranto and Glasgow, fol-
l.o'-'in 




British and correspondingly raised the morale of the 
s, 
'The brilliant success of our East Asiatic Squadron off the 
Chil 
ean coast has awakened a justifiable joy and satisfaction in the 
Gel'nl 
an :People. "l 
But retribution was near at hand. For the British Admiralty 
l:'eactea. 
quickly to the defeat and dispatched Vice Admiral Sir F. D. 
Stu:rd 
ee "1ith 
the battle cruisers Invincible and Inflexible to hunt for 
the G 
el'lnan squadron. 
On 8 December Von Spee called at Port Stanley in the Falkland 
101ana. 
s , Planning to destroy the British coaling and communications 
Stati 
on located there. 
:i. 
ns:i.de the 
To his surprise Sturdee and his squadron were 
:Port refueling. 
afte:i:, him at 
091.1-5. 
Von Spee retreated and Sturdee came out 
At 1220 the British closed in on the German squadron, 
and k. 
eel?ing at 1 s d d h' ong range, opened fire at 1300. Von pee or ere is 
l.:tght 
c:ruisers to scatter and Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were taken under f:t:i:, 
e by- th 
e battle cruisers. Scharnhorst was sunk around 1400 and 
Cn.e:t 
~ "1ent doi;.,n an hour and forty minutes later. Leipzig was sur-l:'ou_ 
no.ea. b 
y the British cruisers Kent, Cornwall and the old qlasgow and 
:t:iut d 
o.,,,n around 
2100 that evening. Two colliers accompanying the German 
squad.:i:-on "' 
ere captured by the auxili ary Macedonia and the light cruiser 
~. 
After Leipzig sank,~ took off in pursuit of Dresden and 
1 
tila"' ~ a:i_ 1-nt ort from "Z" Berliner Tageblatt "'- e11 · 1 
lgence File Number 4553 C-10-d, 
8 November 1914. Office of 
National Archives. 
1.31. 
and ffi.t:renber g_. ~~ managed to escape but Kent caught 
Nurenber£ and 
sank. her . 1 The a tt i tude of th B · 
e ritish regarding the destruction of' 
Von Snee' s d 
.t;' s,qua r on is 
Inv· . 
well summed up by an officer of the battle . 
cruiser 
~ in a letter home, 
We have done a very 
doing wi thout doubt. 
but we can 't hazard a 
good t hi ng , and a thing that warranted 
I t is a tremendous thing for the Admiral, 
suggestion as to our next move. 
b The Germans cert ainl y put up a magnificent fight to the last, 
ut they were outclassed. I am glad that it has taken only a 
rnonth to avenge the 'Good Hope ' and poor old 'Straw'. I am 
also very glad to be in the first great sea battle of the war, 
and in t he position that I hold. The Admiral was very com-
Plimentary last night about the wireless, and tho I say it 
rnys el f I think we did well to keep the enemy in the dark. 
I hope they will call our battle 'The Battle of the Falk-
lands' as i t i s a rather nice name. This action, which I think 
rnay be called a great one, has very much upset a great many 
Preconceived ideas, Many experts said that no modern battle 
could last more than one short half-hour, whereas we were r· . 2 l ghti ng hard for s ix hours. · 
The German r eaction to the loss of their squadron, their admiral 
and rnost of 
their men follows: 
With deep s orrow and at the same time wi th a feeling of 
Pl:'ide the German people received the news of the loss of 
o~:r Eas t Asiatic cruiser Squadron. We must admit that this 
t i me the English have completed their work. After the num-
e:ous losses which our squadron inflicted on them on the 
high s eas and especially after the brilliant victory off the 
~oast of Chile, the English Admiralty, desiring not to lose 
he conf idence of their country, put forth their utmost 
euaeavors , To this end a fleet of warships of the different 
Powers was di spatched in pursuit of our cruisers. It is 
Possible that t he German Admiral Count Spee could have 
escaped his pursuers had he remained in the Pacific Ocea~. 
He had al r eady succeeded in rounding Cape Horn and entering the South Atlantic. Destiny overtook him at the Falkland 
"the ~ort from "Z ,, Extract from a Letter Written by an Officer of 
~le , copy dated 9 December 191L, Office of Naval Intelligence 
Urnbe:r 4755A F-6-d. National Archives, 
2~. 
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Gherardi· , Report from "Z " December 1914. 
Isl ands. We only know at present very 1·ttl 
the strength of our enemies which engage~ h" e ~oncerning 
It is possible that the English Government ~;In batt!e· 
close of what units their fleet consisted an~ wh?0 : dis-
them participated in the battle off the Falklandiic 1 °fd We h s an s • . can, owever, accept two conclusions as definite~ 
f irst, that our sailors fought with heroic resistance to 
the last br eath, as is evidenced from the fact that the 
battle lasted five hours, and, secondly, that they were 
ov~rmatched in the number of guns as well as in speed. 
This much is gleaned from the off icial announcements of 
the English Government, that the ships engaged consisted 
only of that squadron dispatched from England, as is 
shown by the name of the English Admiral Sturdee, who was 
formerly Chief of Staff of the Admiralty. Manifestly 
Sturdee assembled a fleet of the most modern, large 
armored cruisers and dreadnaughts which would be superior 
to the German ships. We accept forthwith that in spite of 
the above, the enemy suffered material injury but we must 
admit, whether willing or not, that our squadron is des-
troyed. The hope that at least the small cruisers 'DRESDEN' 
and 'NURNBERG' should succeed in escaping experienced a sad 
limitation. The 'NURNBERG' succombed {.si c ). ·tq·"lTer pursuers. 
Only the 'DRESDEN' remains. The whole people accompany her 
with their best wishes. We must always be resigned to the 
fact that sooner or later the activity of our cruisers in 
distant seas must come to an end and we should be reconciled 
to this . This fact will not change the continuance of the 
cruiser war. It will be decided in home waters. As will 
also the fate of our colonies be decided not in Kamerum, 1 Kiautschau and East Africa but on the European battlefie[ds . 
The Battle of the Falkland Islands for all intents and purposes 
eliminated the German flag from the high seas. To be sure the High Seas 
Fleet and the Baltic Command still very much existed but their cruisers 
and battleships remained in port except for hit and run cruiser raids 
against English coastal towns such as those conducted against GorleSt on 
in November and against Scarborough, Hartlepool and Yarmouth in December. 
The Germans did have one type of warship, however, that did not remain in 
Port and had already proved itself most effective. 
L T bl tt l December 1 14. -He ort from 'Z" Berliner a e a 
Office of 
Naval Intelligence File Number 4553 c-10-d. National Archives. 
J..33 
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The sinking of the three British cruisers by the submarine ~in 
September has already been mentioned. Earlier in the month, on the 5th, 
the British cruiser Pathfinder was torpedoed and sunk by~. Then, too, 
the Russian cruiser Pallada fell a victim to U-26 on 11 October. Pallada on 
this occasion was accompanied by the cruiser Bajan who did not stop to 
assist her stricken sister as the British cruisers had done in September. 1 
The Allied navies were beginning to learn about U-boats. The British lost 
Yet another cruiser , Hawke, on 15 October to u-9 . Hawke and the cruiser 
~seus were on patrol in the North Sea when attacked• Theseus managed to 
outmanuever the U-boat but Hawke was bit amidships, a tremendous explosion 
followed, and she went down in four minutes. 2 On 31 October it was the 
turn of Hermes , an old light cruiser which had been converted to a seaplane 
tender. 3 The Germans were coming alive to the great potential of the 
Under . sea raider as 1914 waned and they were displaying a remarkable ability 
in its employment. 
What sort of a creature was this "under sea boat"? Commander 
Cherardi submitted a report to the Navy Department in December of 1914 
Which · gives an excellent description of the type of craft in use during 
thee 
ar1y phase of the war. The example Gherardi cited was u-32. This 
SU.brn 




li,ep~rt from "Z 11 , Vossische Zei tung 15 October 1914. Office of 
ntelligence File Number 4637 AA F-6-d. National Archives. 
2 
~ l ish Cli,_e~ort from "Z ", dated 18 October 1914, subject: Sinking of the 
~~l:l.ce 'F. 1:t'Uiser "Hawke 
11 b the German Submarine. Office of Naval Intelli -
1 e Number 5273 F- -d. National Archives. 
3 
~hi. Re:r:ort from "Z 11 d t "d 3 N :i... 1914 c:: ~""-S En ....;.::.t'l;- , a ,;:: ovemuer , subject: German Submarine 
;<"15 ""' -6 ... 
18h Cru1.· ser "Hermes 11 • Off1.· ce of Na 1 I t 11· 1 ~ - va n e igence File Number 
d. National Archives. 
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FIGURE 29 
GERMAN U-BOAT 
Gherardi, Report from "Z" 1 December 1914. 
U:2_ made over sixteen knots on the surface and ten knots 
subrnel"ged. 
She had four torpedo tubes. From bow to stern the subma j_ne 
was com 
Partmented in the following fashion: Compartment I - Bow compart -
lllent l'lith 
collision bulkhead. 
ti-lo t Compart ment II - Forward torpedo r oom with 
0 1":Pedo t 
Ubes aimed forward. Compartment III - Of ficer s cabin , Com-
lla:rtrnent IV 
Jun· - Connnanding Officer's cabin. Compartment V - Berths for two 
J.o:i:, Offi 
Cotnp cel:'s or warrant officers. Compartment VI - Crews quarters. 
al"tnient 
VII - Crews quarters. Compartment VIII - Operating and diving 
Compartment IX - Diesel engine room. Com-
- El ectric engine room. 
to'l'>h 
-.1:'edo tubes 
Compartment XI - After torpedo room, 
aimed aft. 
~ 
tu carried six 54 cm. torpedos. Four of these were loaded in e tub 
es and t 




A gun was carried in a closed hatch in the forward 
'11he 
ex conning tower housed three personnel, the commander, the 
ecutiv-e 
€;). Of'flcer and the helmsman. ass The conning tower was fitted with 
:P0:i:-ts equ· 
bl'iq 1PPed With shutters for submerged running. There was no 
€e o:i:-
lveath 
~el'i er screen on top of the conning tower. Two of the three 
Sco:Pes 
t lvith h" 
he tbi w lch U-32 was equipped came into the conning tower while 
l'd. one 
~el'i Went into the operations and engineering compartment. The 8 co'h .t--es 
~l'ov-1,.:i 
~eq 
lve:i:-e x- • 
a1 sed and lowered by a hand gear 
to ho 
from periscope wells 
1<?el'e 
lrla:r-.kect 
Use them when they were not in use. The periscope collars 
in deg~ees and · set at o0 1-~en ... when aiming the periscope was • ,v u 
at the target the bow tubes were fired. In addition the Ger-
to use angle firing techniques. 
emergency, unconnected with enemy action, the U-boat 
"'
1th 




released from 1.· ns:i.·de the craft. f h 
There were our ot er buoys in their own 
The buoy contained a light and a telephone and could be 
recesses , two f 
orward and two aft, attached to lifting s ha ckles . If the 
boat got into dHnculties while submerged these buoys could be released 
a.u
d th
e subma,.ine could be lifted to the surface by a submarine tender. 
D - 3-s_ carried a d ld 
crew of twenty-eight officers and men, an cou stay 
unde=rw-ater fo-... d ff · f · 11 ~ three days before the crew starte su ering rom 1. ef'fects . l 
With the Virtual elimination of the German Navy from the waters 
of the world alld the slow but deadly effect of the Allied naval blockade 
just beginning• the Germans turned more and more to the U-boat to redress 
the naval imbalance. The submarine was to be Germany 's hope and prayer 
yet at the 1 d f at The same time one of the reasons for her eventua e e • 
n ew l'leapon 1-ra the Allies had yet to s most effective, particularly since 
d evelop any countermeasures or tactics. However, the very newness of 
the s ubmarine al no ;nternational opinion, official so meant that there was _.. 
or unofPiciaJ_ To the public in Allied - '
0
n how it was to be employed. 
and neu.tral co"nt . t.h1.· ng sneaky and underhanded "'- r1.es there seemed to be some· 
about the u~boat. 
appreciate but the deep that crept up on its not some little creature of 
unwary victim a d And when the Germans turned to n struck without warning. 
CO!lllnerce de t to the blockade, world s ruction later in the war as an answer 
. s they could understand and Battleships and cruiser 
opinion outs:ta. f outrage and horror. e the Central Powers became one 0 The 
l b " t· German Submarine 'Re o:rt~ ~~@....~~~~W2 ~~~~1~1~4~;s~u~J}etc~. :fc~~~itimi;f"--"u-32
11
• Offi ::-- from "z" dated 1 Decemb~r ~ r h734 P -10-E. National Archives. ce of Naval Intelligence File Num e 
-·---
world was n 0 more ready to accept unrestri ct ed s ubmarine warfare than it 
was to acce t P Unannounced bombardment of ci t i es by gun or from the air. 
The effe t . c ive employment of the only naval weapon of' value left to the 
Gennans only succeeded in rangi ng world opinion against her and eventually 
added immeasurable strength to her enemies . 
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FIGURE 30 
VICTJM OF A U-BOAT 
Gherardi, Report from ''Z" 1 December 1914. 
CHAPTER VI 
ROUNDING OUT THE YEAR 
As the war progressed, Ambassador Page in London worked very hard 
to keep relations between the United states and Great Britain on an even 
keel. This was not an easy task as the conflict expanded, However, two 
factors were in his favor. First, Page and the Forei~n Secretary, Sir 
Edward Grey, got al ong well together . Second, Ambassador Page, despite 
his protestations to the contrary, was pro-British and his reports re-
flected it. 
In a dispatch, dated 7 September , he informed Washington of the 
British determination to end their problems with Germany once and for all: 
The agreement between the Allies published today that no 
one will consent to end hostilities till al l thr ee consent 
is England ' s declaration to the Kaiser that no peace pro-
posals will be entertained till one side or the other is 
completely exhausted, The English are preparing for a long 
war. They mean to fight till pro-militarism is utterly 
crushed,l 
He elaborated on this theme further as a result of a conversation with 
Grey, Page reported the Foreign Secretary as saying that he had exhausted 
every means to preserve peace and Germany had refused his suggestions. 
Grey also told Page that no peace could be made with a power that violated 
treaties and in making war assaulted civilization itself. England regarded 
the Kaiser and his system of government the same way she once regarded 
Napoleon--as "a world pest and an enemy of civilization". Added Grey, 
1Page to State Department 1 7 September 1914. State Department 
File Number 763 .72119/20. National Archives. 
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"the:t-e can be 
no permanent peace till he and his 
8 
t 
ys em are utterly overthrown. rrl 
On 11 September, Page was back on the wire t 
o Washington with 
tales of German atrocities in Belgium and France : 
The violators of the Belgian treaty, the sowers of mines 
in t~e open sea, the droppers of bombs on Antwerp and Paris 
to kill anybody they may hit, have taken to heart Bernhardi's 
doctrine of the glorious enjoyment of war. It is impossible 
longer to doubt the wholly barbarous conduct of the Prussians.2 
The controversy between Great Britain and the United States con-
cerning the rights of neutrals on the sea became sharper in October. 
Page sent a 
message through the State Department to President Wilson on 
the l5th in which he wrote: 
.,, I cannot help fearing we are getting into deep water 
needlessly. The British Government has yielded without 
question to all our requests and has shown a sincere desire 
to meet all our wishes short of admitting war materials 
into Germany. That it will not yield. We would not yield 
it' i f we were in their place. Neither would the Germans, 
The English will risk a serious quarrel or even war with 
us rather than yield. This you may regard as final. 
Since the last lists of contraband and conditional 
contraband were made such articles as rubber and copper 
and petroleum have come to play an entirely new part in 
war •.. I have delayed to send this perhaps too long for 
fear I might possibly seem influenced by sympathy with 
England and by the atmosphere here. But I write of course 
solely with reference to our own country's interest and 
its position after the reorganization of Europe ..• 3 
State Department 
2 
Pae to State artment, State Department 
National Archives. 
3Page to State De artment, l October 1914. State Department File 
Number 7 3.72112/1 National Archives. 
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While Ambassador Page struggled to maintain cordial relations 
between the United States and Great Britain, important events took 
Place on the Continent. Ambassador Gerard notified the State Department 
on 12 October that he had been told on "good authority", ( not further 
identified) that Turkey would soon be at war with Russia. The Turkish 
Fleet, consisting mainly of Goeben and Breslau, (renamed respectively 
~dilli and Javas Sultan) was to attack the Russian Fleet in the Black 
Sea thereby precipitating hostilities. 1 The Turks had already closed 
the Dardanelles with mines at the end of September and declared that 
they would stay closed as long as Allied warships interfered with Turkish 
ships. The Allies in return stated that all Turkish ships having German 
officers or sailors aboard would be treated as German ships. Ambassador 
Morgenthau said that he considered the situation critical. 2 Conditions 
grew more critical toward the end of October and the British and Russian 
diplomatic officials began to make preparations to leave Constantinople. 3 
Soon the Turks took action. On 29 October their f leet bombarded 
the Russian port of Odessa. The next day they attacked Sevastopol and 
l 
Gerard to State Department , 12 October 1914. State Department 
File Number 763 .72/1190. National Archives. 
2 
Morgenthau to State Department 1 27 September 1914. State Depart-
ment File Number 763.72111/378. Morgenthau to State Department , 29 
September 1914. State Department File Number 763 ,72111/401. National 
Archives. 
3 
Mor enthau to State De artment 24 October 114. State Department 
File Number 7 3.72/112. National Archives. 
Turkey was in the war on the German side, l An interesting littl e tale 
came to Ambassador Morgenthau •s ears concerning the incident h" 
s w ich 
brought Tur key int o the war. 
I am i nformed t hat the Mi nister of Finance called on French 
Ambass ador late yesterday evening and s tated that the naval 
enga gement took place without the knowledge of the Ottoman 
Government, intimating t hat t h2 German officers in the Otto-man Navy had f orced the issue . 
With Turkey's entrance into the war on the side of Germany, Russia 
wa s cut off from her Allies through the Straits, the Aegean Sea and the 
Mediterranean Sea. This harsh geographic factor was t o have momentous 
consequences in the next two years. 
On the western front the war was taking on somewhat of a brighter 
aspect for the French. Ambassador Herrick reported on 21 October: 
I am reliably informed that French Government contemplate 
returning to Paris on the fifteenth of November next in case 
Dunkirk is not taken by the Germans. There appears to be 
good reason to believe that Allied forces in north are stronger 
than opposing forces and they seem to be making progress,3 
The optimism expressed in the last portion of this dispatch was 
illusory. The war of movement in the West had almost ended and four 
years of bloody stalemate lay ahead. 
During this period Ambassador Herrick got involved in a situation 
concerning the village of Sissone, the Prince of Monaco and German General 
1Mor enthau to State De artment State Department 
File Number 7 3. 72 / 1150 . ~W:!:.il~so~n~t.!:::o~S~t:::;a:..:t~e::....:D:'.!:e~a:::.rt~m=-en:::.t:::..z..-=:-~O;.;:c;.;;t..;;;o..:.b..;..e~r_l.---1_4, 
State Department File Number 7 3.72/11 5. National Archives. 
2Mor enthau to State De artment O October 114. State Department 
File Number 7 3,72/ 1152, National Archives. 
3Herrick to State Department, 21 October 1914. State Department 
File Number 763.72/1108. National Archives. 
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FIGURE 31 
GERMAN TRENCH ON THE WESTERN FRONT 
Burtt, Report of Observations with the German Army, p. 37. 
Von Buelow. The General was using the Prince's chateau near R . eims as 
his headquarters . The chateau contained many works of art as well as 
f amily heirlooms belonging to the Prince. Some broken glass was found 
on the road near Sissone and General Von Buelow, suspecting sabotage, 
imposed a fine of five hundred thousand francs on the village. Sissone 
and some neighboring villages came up with one hundred and twenty-five 
thousand francs but could raise no more. General Von Buelow then sent 
a message to the Prince of Monaco telling him that if he did not come 
up with the remainder of the money the chateau would be burned. The 
Prince immediately protested this imposition to the Kaiser and to Presi-
dent Wilson . As a result the Prince promised to pay the balance of the 
fine to the German Government after the war if his chateau remained un-
harmed.1 This habit of levying large fines or forced collections in 
occupied areas stamped the Germans as blackmailers and contributed to 
their bad r eputation in the conduct of modern war. 
Ita.ly ' s attitude during the fall of 1914 as we have seen was one 
of off i cial neutrality combined with watchful waiting and continued 
military preparation. Ambassador Page felt that Italy did not feel her-
self strong enough to "take aggressive action II against her former allies. 
He also shrewdly observed that the great strength shown by Germany had 
helped the cause of neutrality in Italy. 2 Of course, the Germans and the 
Austro -Hungarians were under no illusions regarding Italy's ultimate 
course of action, They fully expected her to come in on the side of the 
Allies when the opportunity seemed ripe . 3 
1Herrick to State De artment 2 October 114. State Department 
File Number 7 3.72116/90. National Archives. 
2Page to State Department , 12 October 1914. State Department File 
Number 763. 72111/3360. National Archives. 
reparations which 
Durin in g November I eluded the taly continued her military P 
u stockpiling 
P a st of food and criti cal material, ory , la Mr, page picked 
Pl ter borne 
ung out by events, that Italy would take th . 
e int e big 
opean w e a so heard that when the present 
Eu.r he spring of 1915 . 1 H 1 
ajar La er Ger11l"-"Y or Japan would attack the United stat 2 ngh es, 
entif w, n of a similar yarn in Berlin but he did not 
M ar was ov 
country or countr i es that were supposed to do the attacking. 3 
In 6 . 
id orne got . d 
Y the 




e Allies as the year 1914 drew to an end· The cause of 
chan t ge lay. 
he Al . 
10 
t wo aspects of the same problem, In the first p:tace, 
l i es were t 
"••ch. a tempti ng t o keep strategic materials and food trom 
i ng t he 
thi s t Germans and the Austro•HungariaOS• In order to acconIPlisb 
ask th 
been ey were interferiil!! with neUtral shippillS• as bSS aJ.readY 
noted 
" in th 
ae, e case of the united s tates varsus Great Britain, The 
.... man 8 att 
Ch empted to take advantage of the situation bY sending forrner 
ance11 or p 
•as r ince Ber nard von Buelow to 1talY as Ambassador, von Buelow 
an 
able d. ( 8 m) the i plomat and as a former J\Jllbassador to ItalY 1 93-,, ]<neW 
count 
the S ry and the Itali ans thoroughlY • iven so J\Jllbassador page told 
ecr ~ uy h It,v f :i:- of State that no one person would be able to c ans• a~ 
orn the cour h se upon which she had embarked whiC was: 
,,,the single idea of furthering her interests. For 
the present this seems to be along the line of strength-
ening her position of neutrality, at the same time that 
she provides for future eventualities by increasing and 
thoroughly equipping her army,l 
Italy would go to the highest bidder and the Allies could offer more 
than her former partners in the Triple Alliance, 
l_lq 
Yet the Allied blockade of the Central Powers was a chieving more 
than the irritation of Italy and the United States. Ambassador Gerard 
reported fr B . om erl1n on 3 December that a great need existed in Germany 
for copper 2 , Petroleum, rubber and clothing . In short , Germany at this 
comparati Vely early date was already beginning to feel the pinch in the 
essentials needed to conduct and sustain a modern war. 
On 5 December Gerard, in a long report to Washington, described the 
rapidly gro, ,1.·ng · thi th G G ~ , anti-American feeling w1 n e erman overrunent, press 
a nd public.3 This Gennan antipathy toward the United States was caused 
by the sale of munitions and other war materials to the Allies by American 
firms. The Germ .d d these activities in violation of the ans cons1 ere 
United States declaration of neutrality . When Gerard pointed out to the 
German Government that their armament firms had sold their wares to the 
various B 1k rs the Germans countered with a an countries during those wa ' 
the retort that they had sold to both sides. 
File 





Nu ~ard to State Department, 3 Dec~mber 1914. 
mber 76 3. 72112 / l+5 0. National .Arch1 ves. 
State Department 
File 
3Ger 5 December 1914. 
N ~to State Department, 
umber 763,72lll/1292, National Archives, 
State Department 
A letter to Gerard from an American businessman depicted the 
feelings of the German 
public on this issue . This particular business -
man dealt · f 
in arm machinery and equipment . He wrote that hi s salesmen, 
native Germans 
• were being rebuffed by potential customers when they 
learned wh 
ere the manufacturer was located. This was just the beginning. 
The tide of . 
anti -Americanism in Germany would rise rapidly in the suc-
ceeding month s. 
Meanwhile over 'n E s M·1 · t Att h / L' t ~ •ngland the U . . ii ary ace , ieu enant 
Colonel George 
O. Squier, had finally received the permission he had 
been seeking t . 
0 
visit the British Expeditionary Force in France. Squier, 
like Ambassador 
Page , 
was on p . 
got along very well with his British hosts . He 
articularly f 
good terms with the Secretary of State or War , the 
formidable Field l 
Marshal Lord Herbert Kitchener. On 11 November, 
Colonel Squier 
received word that Lord Kitchener wished to see him. 
Kitchener told 




General Joff're for his visit to the front. Lord Kitchener 
then gav-e S . 
qu1er a letter to Sir John and told hi m that he was to "disap-
Pear,, fl'orn Lo 
nd
on. The reason for the secrecy surrounding Squier's trip 
was that th 
e British Government was not allowing other foreign attach' s 
to visit th 





isappeared '' from London on 16 November in the same rail 
passenger 
ca:r lYith the Prince of wales. Upon his arrival in Paris 
I \ernor d 4 . 
ntervie"' "'.tan um for the Ambassador, dated 17 Octoberl91 , subJect: 
Geo-:'ge o. S l ~ Lord Kitchener , Secretar of State for W~r from IIT'C . 














ission was obtained from th 
e Military Governor of 
t that city for h' 0 Proceed by . im 
automobile north to Sir John F.ren h, h 
c s eadqua.rte.rs 1 
Squ · • Colonel ler also obtained · · f permission or two U.S. Army lieut 
th
e Paris Embassy to accompany him on the trip. T 
enants attached to 
F. w. Honeycutt and Carl Boyd. 
he two lieutenants were 
"1rote detailed 
the front . 
Both officers, at Colonel Squier's behest 
accounts of their trip to British Headquarters and to 
The party left Paris to travel to St. Omer, the site of B. E. F. 
headquarters on the morning of 21 November 1914. Lieutenant Boyd in 
his report described it as a cold day and an uneventful trip to Amiens 
Where they stopped for lunch. The reader will recall that the Germans 
had occupied Amiens during the first weeks of the war. The Americans 
spoke to several of the citizens about the German occupation and were 
told that the occupation forces were well behaved during their stay. 
The American observers next proceeded north from Amiens and found snow 
on the ground. Boyd described the terrain from a soldier's point of 
View dwelling on obstacles both natural and man-made. The officers 
spent the night at st. Pol and had some difficulty obtaining lodging 
because of the crowded conditions in the town. The next morning they 
set out on the last lap to St. Omer and Boyd again described the military 
terrain along the way in detail: 
At the southern edge of St. Omer we saw the headquarters 
of the Royal Flying Corps with a number of portable can~as 
hangers. They have, I understand, 25 to 30 flying machines. 
Their favorite machine, I am told, is one of their own make, 
and I regret that I do not remember the name. 
' 
lLetter to Chief war College Division, General Staff, dated 20 
November 1914, subject: Military Observer with British Army in France. 
Army war College File Number 7015-79. National Archives. 
We arrived in the town shortly before noon, and no one 
seemed to want to tell us where we would find the head-
quarters of General French. They looked at us curiously 
and either misdirected us or professed ignorance. However, 
we finally arrived there. Colonel Squier was received by 
the General himself while his aides Major Watt and Capt. 
Guest invited Lt. Honeycutt and me to come in and have some 
port wine, cake and cigarettes with all of which they said 
they were bountifully supplied. 1 
The reluctance of people to tell the American observers where 
they could find Sir John's Headquarters can be partially explained by 
an incident which took place during the second day of their stay which 
Boyd omits and Honeycutt relates. It seems that they were approached 
1.50 
by an Intelligence Corps Sergeant who politely asked for their papers. 
He had been checking the register of the hotel for new arrivals and 
noted that some parties had registered as American officers. After 
satisfying himself that they were in fact who they said they were, the 
Ser geant explained that great care had to be taken because of the numbers 
of spies about. 2 
Boyd stated that the orderly calm of the headquarters destroyed 
his preconceived notions of what an Army headquarters must be like during 
wartime. They saw a fleet of London buses which were used to t ransport 
reinforcements quickly to threatened portions of the front. Boyd, being 
a cavalryman, was glad to hear that the British cavalry had done good 
work in the retreat from Mons. He added that t he airplane had supplanted 
cavalry for reconnaissance purposes. Boyd noted that the machine guns 
1 
Report, dated 2 December 1914, subject: Report on Visit to British 
Field Army Headquarters. Army War College File Number 9907-1. National 
Archives. 
2Report, dated 2 December ~914, subject : Report of Trip to British 
Headquarters. Army War College File Number 8706-1. National Archives, -
l5l 
employed by the British were 
w 1ch Vickers-Maxim h" were the s a.me type 
used b y the U.S. Army, 
The town of Bethune Br· was being shelled wh rtish · en ilie Liaison arr· party with a 
rom th g of 
2
3 Novemb "\vent f icer reached it on the mornin 
ere to th er, 
They 
th e village of Hinges which was the 
e Indian Arrrry Corps, 
headquarters of 







e ritish Expeditionary Force consists of th 
Cavalry C rd , and 4th corps , the Indian corps and th e 
long ru orps. These troops hOld a line about 26 m· / 
(north nning from wyschaete (south of Ypres) to Fes~u:s 
Boyd 
Both 
'••that th B .. 
west of Ia Basse'). erg 
They leav cy have been hOldillll their part of the line, 
The caval the horsee ab~ut one fourth of their men back to care for 
their 
O 
~ ':'hile the rest , armed with the bayonet , take 
war hap sition in the trenches• I learn that since the 
the F s degenerated into such a stationarY fight much of 
rench cavalry is being used in the same way, .. 
Th t 
th e renches along thiS entire line are separated from 
e Germ 
30 y d an trenches by a distance of rrom 150 to 20 or 
very~. s • . In manY plaees the English say they can hear 
istinctly the Germans digging.
1 
One of the more interesting items mentioned by both Lieutenant 
a
nd 
Lieutenant ''b " f t f 
Honeycntt was the omb ac orY o the Indian corps, 
mend 
escribed in detail how the ''bomb throwers" were manufactured 
th
e field and hW theY were emPloyed, Boyd stated that the 
had to employ these weapons because the Germans seemed to be 
the:re in 
Eng1 · l.Sh 
supplied with them and were using them to good effect on the English 
"1ell 
t:renches 
The ''bombthrowers" and their ''bOJllbS" were of course the pre-
of the trench mortar, The observers also mentioned the construction 
cu:rsors 
~d Re ort dated 2 pecember 114, sub·ect: 
1 
Arch. Arll\'f Headquarter_e_, p,rnr:f war college Fil• 
l. ves .---:;.;::;:::;_~::.-:..~-
Re ort on visit to British 




continued to receive the benefit t' 
O:t-ne , s o the doubt in .,,. . '"" l'eports. H. ,•1aJo:r 
~ber is from Berlin on 6 December b 
e lvas egan ratbe:r st:r t once a German angely: 
lllper0 r seer who prophecied that the 
Should son ot' a one-a:rmed ti.. nev-e:r- as d 
<1en added. cen the throne of the German Empi:re. ,,] 
th Langhorne ~ at the s · 
04..1.d lvi.n wiss Army representative made a prophesy that G 
the e:rmany 
~is<,y bus, war in less than a year. Langhorne admitted that it was 
... ness t 
ti,,.t 
O 
l!laJce prophesies but noted as he had so orten berore IJ.o obse:r-
Ge,-,,,"'1s ~er could help but be impressed by the way in which the 
conducted 
a.nd a. the war. Th · d t 
eir success was ue o an excellent army comp1 
tr8 eteJy- United people. .ted 
on the · 
bet immediate task. 
The troops were well trained and concen-
~een Ge--.. 
'hi.. ~ ,,,any- at 
~,, war and the United States Steel Corporation at work. e Pa.r&lle1 
Langhorne made the interesting analogy 
to h· 




e being controlled by a central authority that rewarded Perf'o:r-
ren mance and stimulated production . Major Langhorne ended his -t--O:rt b 




that they had overestimated the Russians and underestimated 
13:t-.i_ t:Lsb_. 
1:n nr 
1:, ,vov-embel" the German Government had finally granted permission OJ:> S:J. 
)( tJ. C, f. t 
o • Al--m come to Germany and go to the ron as t/J:f.J.. Y Ot'f'i cers to .lta.l" 
~i.. Jr 
0
bsel"v-er~.2 b Gerard told the State Department ,; - So on 20 Decem er at the 






c l91 4- State Department ~e ~Um~o State Department, 5 No:ember • 
ei-- 763 • 72118/25. National Archives· 
P:J.:ie ~,, 3~o State Department, 20 December 1911+. State Department 4 mbe hi 




GERMAN FIELD TELEPHONE STATION 
Shartle, Re ort of Ca tain Samuel G. Shartle C.A.C. Militar 
Q.bserver with the German Army December 20, 191 - April 191~, p. 53 , 
l55 
-=o lona.i J 
-~ · oseph Kuhn , t he seni or observer, notified the War Coll 
ege 
Di -,,is ion of' the 1 St ff t the same eff U. S . Army Genera a o ect and added 
t.na.t as soon as t hey had p r oces s ed the y would leave for the front. l 
Spr eadi ng his net as f ar as possib le, Langhorne visited a prisoner 
Qf ~ar camp lo cated at Doeberi tz some t wenty-eight kilometers west of 
Berlin 2 8 2 on December. Doeberitz was a manuever and t raining ground 
f'o r the Ger man Guard Corps , a nd the usual arrangement was for one bri -
g ade to be in gar rison at near by Potsdam while the other was at Doeberitz. 
J:..t the time Langhorne visited , t he f acilities were occupied by depot 
troops and t r ain e es . Th e p r i soner of war camp was located in an area 
adjacent t o t he Ger man cant o nmen t . Here were confined Russian, French 
British and Belg ian enlisted p ris oners of war numbering some eight 
thousand . 
, 
The pri s oners were housed for the most part in large tents whose 
original purpose was to be f ield stables. The individual tent was desig ned 
to hold f i f ty hor ses, but t hey could hold many more men. As rapidly as 
possible the t e nt s were b eing replaced by one story frame buildings with 
smal l rooms at e ith e r e nd f or administrative purposes and for the use of 
non - c ommiss ioned officer prisoners. The buildings were heated by small 
sto ves in each o f t he two large squad bays, 3 
1
Report d a t e d 21 December 1 914, suMect: Arrival of Militar;y_ 
Obs e ~ve rs . Army War College File Number 79-106. National Archives. 
2Re ort dated 
Army \>Jar Colle g e Fil e 
3~ .• p. 2 . 
National Archives. 
---
The c of i ts amp was commanded by a retired captain of 
fo cavalry and each 
ur sect· for,. ions was in the charge of a reserve offi· ,, r cer. The guard 
equired was ana_ t smal l because of t he proximity of the depot ra· troops 
inees. 
When at all possi ble pri soners of the s ame nationality 
quar te we!'e unit, La ogether and even , i n some cases, those from the same red t 
ngh regi orne mentioned two hundred forty men rrom a British Suffolk 
lll.ent -who w 
ere quarter ed t ogether under their own non-commissioned 
Offi cer s He said th 
ese non- coms were excellent types with long service 
He spoke t o three Highland non-coms dressed i 
i 
n J:nri. u.J.a 
n ki.1 ts 
and South Afr· ica , 
l'lhen ga,. questioned the Ger mans t old 
t h 
A e least t ~ 0 r ouble were the French, 
1,anghorne that the prisoners who 
om who had lived in t he United states for ten years said: 
The best workers were the Russians, 
\le~ ,utan non- c 
ently re very much disappointed in the English; they appar-He a 
alway are not used t o work and don't want to work• TheY are 
Play ~a~anting t o play ball, we gave them an opportunity to 
but t h 
1 
on one of the hol idays and theY played quite well, 
lllore ."Y a r e no t as good workers as the RUssians ; theY make 
not o~~nrplaint s and they are not as clean as the RUssians, 
Iiussi y about their persons but about their barracks, The 
<acksan Prisoners will quit• willinglY clean up 
th
eir b,au": 
Wi ll' wash t hei r floors and the walls, but thiS the Br1t1sh 
i, not d . 1 •·ioat O wi l l i ngly . 
Of t r to le French pr i soners had been badl Y wounded and were accordinil 
the G 
el"lnans d · ners Th•Y 
0
bey • convales cing. The French were goo priso · 
eel the rul es and worked hard , 
supply blankets and pillows to the 
rooms issued bedding , 
as well as articl es of clot hing, r,arge bathrooms with showers 
hot ·ded The food was 
and col d running wat er wer e also provi , 
1-57 
plentiful, various and well prepared. A chapel provided spiritual needs 
and a small canteen sold tobacco and other small items which helped the 
morale of the prisoners. They received on an average of eighty sacks of 
mail a day of wfuich usually seventy were for the British prisoners. 
Approximately three thousand prisoners were employed on a daily 
basis outside of the camp complex. An attempt to find more outside jobs 
was in progress. Besides housekeeping chores and kitchen police, the 
prisoners within the compound made straw pads for horses hoofs. These 
pads were placed inside the horse shoe during winter weather to prevent 
1 ice and snow from balling up under a horse ' s foot. 
All of the prisoners that Major Langhorne questioned said that 
considering their circumstances they were well treated, well cared for, 
and well fed. Langhorne was impressed with the Russian non - commissioned 
officers and described them as intell igent looking and well clothed . 
Though the Russian privates did not look so intelligent, they seemed 
docile, strong and clean. 
Langhorne concluded his report by stating that there were many 
prisoner of war camps like Doeteritz located throughout Germany at training 
camps or manuever areas. The number of prisoners confined in these camps 
at the time of the repor,t was given at some six hundred thousand - a high 
2 number in a war only four months old. 
In a report, dated 11 February 1915, Major Langhorne summed up the 
military position as he saw it at the end of 1914.3 Once more as usual he 
1~ .• p . 4. 
3Re ort dated 
Army War College File Number 
sub'ect: The General Situation. 
National Archives. 
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was imnressed . h 
.t' wit German A:rmy organization 
and equipment, particularly 
its excellent t t t· ranspor a ion system and t he b · 
usinesslike manner in which 
the officers and troops operated. Lan h h g orne emp asized that the French 
had lost many men as prisoners of war and suffered many 
casual ti es. 
On the Eastern Front he observed German and A t · us rian troops in 
action. He reported that they wer e well prepared for winter operations 
with proper clothing and equipment. Where necessary vehicles had runners 
to move supplies and equipment over snowy ground. The hard frozen soil, 
in the absence of snow, supported the light transportation vehicles. The 
operations in October and November, where mud was a significant factor, 
demonstrated that the transportation arrangements could operate successfully 
even under adverse conditions. The Germans, he noted, were particularly 
1 
pleased with the operation of their motorized transport. 
The Germans had been quite successful in their battles against 
the Russians. The campaigns of Tannenburg and Lodz would, according to 
Langhorne , rank high in the history of warfare. Those campaigns had 
1 in demonstrated the ability of the Germans to manuever successful Y 
difficult country. Langhorne anticipated another highly successful 
German campaign against the Russians within the near future, one which 
The would seriously hurt Russia and perhaps drive her out of the war. 
Germans were confident of success and when the war on the Eastern Front 
had been successfully concluded they would transfer their troops from 
2 This constituted there and employ them against the Allies in the West. 
1~.' P• 2. 
2Ibid., p. 3, 
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a compl ete reversal of the original Schlieffen Plan. 
Langhorne stated that the Germans had one hundred army corps 
available in reserve , that they were trained almost to the standard of 
the troops already in t he field and led by veteran officers. He stressed 
again the great confidence felt not only by the military authorities but 
also by the general public. 
According to Langhorne, Germany had at this time no reason for 
,ianting peace since she had been militarily successful on all fronts. 
The only way t hat he could see a cessation of the slaughter was for the 
Allies to propose a reasonable peace. He thought they" might receive 
better terms if they proposed peace early; that is, before Germany reached 
her full military ascendancy. Langhorne noted that a possibility existed 
that Russia might make peace soon. In fact he thought that Russian agents 
had already been at work to this end. 1 The Germans also believed that 
peace between Japan and Germany was possible. Langhorne noted that this 
ld "f · t 
112 Th h h wou ; ree a nation for an attack on the United Sta es· oug e 
did not identify the potential aggressor, the major thought that the 
Uni ted States Government should be alert to the possibility of such an 
attack and that proper precautions should be taken. 3 
The problems involved in maintaining neutrality in a world at war 
were manifes t and varied as the United States discovered in 1914. Anti-
Americanism in Germany resulted from the sale of munitions to the Allies 
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Shartle , Report of Captain Samuel G. Shartle, C.A.C. Military 
Ob server with the German Army December 20, 1914 - April 6, 1915., p. 11. 
1.61. 
by Ameri ca n f irms . 
On the other hand l ar ge segments of t he American 
Publ i c wer e · 
incensed by Allied, particularly British, interference with 
t rade while f 
en °rcing t heir blockade of t he Central Powers. Ambassador 
Page in London di"d h " b ·t· t r h" gt 
is est to explain the British posi ion o ,?as in on 
but publi c d 
Pressur e, trans l ated into political pressure, finally force 
t he Uni t ed "' t 
0 
ates Gover nment to pres ent 
t o Great Britain on 28 Decemb l 
er. 
a strong official note of protest 
The hard - ,mrki ng Page was back on the wire to Washington five days 
later in his 
onstant effort to improve Anglo-American relations: 
f · Sir Edward Grey has just r ead t o me quite informally the 
irst dr aft of the repl y t ha t he will make to your note 
about shippi ng . This reply is frank and friendly in tone 
:n~ conciliator y in substance and quite short. He wis?es 
~ h i s _reply t o reach you as promptly as possible. He w~ll 
':" ubmi t it to the Cabinet next Tuesday and hopes to deliver 
l ~ to me Wednesday or Thursday. This general brief reply 
Wlll be followed later by a longer reply which will prese?t 
trade stat isti cs and such like t hings and which will require 
some time for its pr eparation . 
Sir Edwar d Grey priva t ely expressed to me his regret that 
the badl y cond ensed summary of your note leaked out ?ecause 
of the effect it may have in Germany: He said that in so 
far a s it gave the Germans hope t hat there might be or 
could be a seri ous difference between the United States 
and Gr eat Br itain i t would by so much tend to lengthen the war . 
It is of the utmos t importa nce of course that this w?ole 
telegram and all that i t cont ains remain strictly confi -dent i al . 
I hear f rom another source wholly and independent of the 
F'orei gn Office that the military authorities say that the 
durati on. of t he war will be ;i.n exact proportion to Germany's 
success in procuring copper. 2 
1
Note of Protest to Great Britain 28 December 1914. State Department 
Fi le Number 763 , 72112/545~. National Archives. 
2 
Page to St ate Department, 2 January 1912. State Department File 
Number 763 . 72112/563 . Nati onal Archives. 
This mess · 
age is a p erf ect exampl e of how Amba ssa dor Pa g e attempted 
::. -:::> inf luence A . 
mer ican opinion in favor of Great Britain. First he noted 
::..:--_at Grey ' s r eply to t he American note of protes t was frank, friendly 
e..~_d concilia t o ry . Then he stressed the point that any news of a possible 
s:r<:::?a ch betw-een the Un i t ed States a nd Great Brit ain would only help 
-:=; e rmany a nd pro long the war . And f inally , Page in his last paragraph 
.slipped i n t h G 
a comment regarding the impor t ance of copper to e erman 
-.,.;-ar effor t . 
In so many words he was jus t ifyi ng the Brit ish position 
::::::- e g arding t he detention of Amer ican s hips carrying potentially s t rategic 
goods . 
The y ear 1914 ended with no s i gn of p ea ce in sight. The German 
-=.r-mies stood on th w st Conf1' dence 
c.- conquer ed soi l in t he East and in e e • 
i. ~ the f uture cont inued i n German official circles and among the general 
-O"lJblic . How-ever , the Germans h ad f ailed t o knock out Great Britain and 
F rance . Russia , though hurt , was still ver y much in the war especially 
:i. ::cl Galicia -where she had g i v en t he Au s trians a severe mauling and con-
t, :!.-UUed t o exert Pressure o n them. Actually the Austro -Hungarians were 
p roving to be almost a s mu ch a h indrance as a help . Except for the 
G erman High Seas Fleet , the British had driven the enemy from the surface 
o :f the w-orld ' s oceans and Germany wa s b eg inning t o feel the pinch in 
:::ood and raw materials . 
On the Western front the Allies wer e digging in grimly for a l ong 
_;:ight , or at least as l ong a s i t would take them t o def eat Germany . In 
fact , France and England displa yed a quiet , new confidence based on t he 
-.rictory at the Marne and the Br itish successes a t sea. But their conf i dence 
::L n the eve ntual outcome of the confli ct wa s somewhat t empered by t he appa ling 
s lau ghte r that had already taken place a nd by a dim r ealization of what 
.J_a y ahead. 
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCWSION 
The explosion of war over Europe in 1914 caught the world by 
surprise. Few people thought that such a catastrophe would jeopardize 
the promise of the late nineteenth century as expressed in scientific, 
social, economic, cultural and material advances. 
Americans were parti cularl y vulnerable to the shock . Even among 
the most educated citizens of the United States the affairs , alliances, 
and intrigues of Europe seemed far away and , at times , slightly distaste-
ful. The reports filed by U. S. diplomatic and military representatives 
during the fall of 1914 reflect this lack of sophistication. Penfield ' s 
laconic message announcing the assassination of the Austrian Archduke is 
an example . His report contained no assessment of the situation~not a : 
-word of background on the Austrian Serbian quarrel, or any comment regard-
ing the possible consequences of the crime at Sarajevo, A.oo none of the 
0ther U.S. ambassadors in the major European capitals made a single 
r e ference to the dastardly act ! 
It must not be thought, however, that these reports were without 
value. In the first place they gave Washington some idea of current 
events in Europe as the crisis progressed. For the student of history 
these do cuments provide a glimpse of the great drama through the eyes 
of American observers on the spot and at the moment it unfolded, Thus 
the reader is able to obtain some rapport with the world of 1914 unob-
structed and unprotected by the gulf of over a half century of study, 
analysis and critique . Figures looming large in the perspective of that 
164 
era such a th K . . 
s e aiser, Sir Edward Grey Beth 
, mann-Hollweg % F . ' 
n alkenbayn and others move with 
or these dispatches and reports. 
Lord Kitchener 
deceptive casualness th 
rough the pages 
The quality and quantity of int t · 
orma ion varied from country to 
country d 
an from person to person. The reporting from Western Europe 
geneTally was better on both counts 
than the reporting from Eastern 
Europe, 
Major Langhorne in Berlin submitted long, rambling reports 
Which CO t . d . . . 
n aine much interesting detail and, unfortunately for him, a 
lot or 
Pro-German bias. His accounts of the Battle of Tannenberg and 
the s b 
U sequent campaigns of 1914 in Eastern Europe are good. His best 
J:'eport 
' from a professional standpoint, was the one he submitted con-
cerning the reduction of the French and Belgian forts by German siege 
ai:-tillery, Consider too Ambassador Walter Hines Page who took up his 
Po
st 
in London as a confirmed Anglophile. The onset of war and the 
events which followed only confirmed him in his opinion, and made the 
United States Ambassador a valuable friend of the British. One could 
not declare Page's reports consistently objective but they did give the 
st
ate Department and the President, and later historians, an excellent 
Picture of the British scene and British attitudes. 
The paucity of available personnel inhibited the quality, and 
especially the quantity, of American reports from Europe in the earliest 
st
ages of the crisis of 1914. It is sometimes difficult for people 
J:'eared in our present era of monumental and overlapping bureaucracy to 
J:'ealfze that in the not-too-distant past the public services of the 
United States operated on an austere basis, Many of the early routine 
messages mention the need to hire extra clerks for the embassies and 
consulates. In many cases military and naval personnel were forced to 
, 
J...66 
Pitch in and help the meager staff of our b . 
em assies when nume~ous Amer · .,_ 
1.eans y apprehensive about the fut 
ure, descended on them 
This m for assistance. 
eant that the armed forces representatives were una b
2 
t 
e O Pe:r:t'o:rm thei 
r tasksproperly. An th · "f" t f o er s1gn1 ican act which further emphasizes 
th
e austerity under which the United States Government operated abroad 
dur· 
lng this period is the rank held by the various military and naval 
atta h" 
c es assigned to the American embassies in the European capitals. 
The armed services of the United States were so small that men with years 
Of . 
service held the comparatively low rank of captain, major and lieuten-
ant c 0 mmander, and filled positions that today call for officers of a far 
more senior grade. 
After the first month of war, opinion among American representa-
tives in Europe was, with a few exceptions, generally anti-German. The 
Vi l · 0 ation of Belgium neutrality and the stories of German atrocities, 
true or false, in Belgium and France were mainly responsible for this 
manifestation of anti-German feeling. Then, too, the world was not 
Psychologically prepared for unannounced bombardment from the air, sub-
marine attacks without warning, retaliatory burning of towns, and the 
execution of hostages. U.S. representatives in the Allied countries 
recounted these horrors of modern warfare in their dispatches, and these 
stories were a significant factor in the molding of public opinion in 
the United States against the Germans. 
Most of the American observers in Europe at the end of 1914 offered 
few if any ideas on the probable outcome of the war, though Langhorne 
reiterated Germany ' s confidence in her ultimate triumph. The reports 
flowing into Washington from Europe at the end of the year had improved. 
considerably over those of July and August. The Americans had recovered 
f r om thei r ori ginal shock , solved most of the problems of their tourists, 
and hi r ed mor e people to work in their embassies. They also seemed to 
have a better awareness of what was going on around them and many, des-
p i t e t he off icial neutrality of the United States, had privately chosen 
sides. As t he new year 1915 dawned, United States representatives on 
the cont i nent watched the agony of Europe deepen as she wri thei "in the 
clutch of blind fo,r ces ". 
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